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Market Valuation, Merger Momentum and Bidding Frequency 
By Jie Guo 
ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, many issues relating to bidders' gams from United Kingdom (UK) 
domestic corporate acquisitions will be investigated. More specifically. the focus will 
be on various factors that might affect a bidder's acquisition performance. These will 
include the type of deal (tender offer versus merger. or diversification versus focus 
enhancement), the method of payment (cash versus stock versus mixed). the type of 
target (public, private. or subsidiary), and the bidder's, the target's or the market's 
valuation. An emphasis will also be placed on the relationship between the market 
valuation and the bidder' s outcome from acquisitions, where significant long-run 
negative relationships have been found. At the same time. frequent bidders and 
non-public target acquisitions will be examined, as they constitute a large proportion 
of the takeover deals in the UK market and an examination of their acquisition 
performance can shed light on many existing theories and hypotheses. This research 
was developed to investigate the fundamental reasons for the results obtained from 
bidding firms, and it was found that market valuation affects bidders' decisions and 
enhances the formation of merger momentums Furthermore, the results show that 
bidders are subject to various behavioural biases. and these biases are more obvious 
during high market valuation periods. OveralL the findings suggest that valuations at 
the firm and market level clearly affect the intensity of merger activity and the 
subsequent performance of mergers. 
The material contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree in 
this or any other university. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without prior consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis. the focus is on investigate acquiring firms' shareholders gains from 
corporate acquisitions by examining their stock performance using both short-run and 
long-run evaluation methods. The impact of market valuation, merger co-movement 
and bidding frequency on shareholders' wealth is also considered. The findings 
provide new evidence and carry implications for the merger and acquisition (M&A) 
literature, and provide answers to the "big question" from various angles. 
Over the past forty years. modern finance theory has provided many rationales for 
why firms choose to engage in M&As. For example, acquirers may be aiming to 
create market power so that they can eliminate potential competition, or seeking to 
improve corporate efficiency and be reacting to deregulation. In other cases. 
diversification or empire building may be the goal, possibly spurred by managerial 
hubris. Indeed, empirical research has shown that most of these theories can explain 
certain types of merger activity. although some theories appear to be more relevant for 
particular time periods. 
The study of mef!zers has attracted much attention from both financial and industrial 
. ~ 
organizations. The reasons for this interest are clear. From the point of view of an 
individual firm. a merger is one of the largest and most significant transactions that a 
11 
corporation can undertake. From an aggregate point of view, mergers are an important 
mechanism through which resources are reallocated across industries and within firms 
belonging to the same sector. Furthermore, taking a macroeconomic perspective, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argued that mergers are instrumental in spreading 
technological change. 
A small body of literature has recently emerged that aimed to find out the direct link 
between the causes and consequences of merger, although the conclusions are 
inconsistent. Within this context, the performance of acquirers buying non-public 
targets and using different methods of payment has barely been examined in the UK. 
Furthermore, some recent research shows that market conditions and market-wide 
valuation levels can alter the bidder's outcome from a merger, thus these deals should 
exhibit certain types of momentum pattern. Previously however, no evidence has been 
provided for the UK market regarding this issue. Therefore the goal of this thesis is to 
fill in these gaps by undertaking an intensive investigation from various angles. 
Furthermore, there are still some questions remaining unanswered, even though much 
attention has already been paid to related areas. The most crucial one is: "Do 
shareholders actually gain from mergers and acquisitions or not?" According to the 
previous research, the answer to this question depends on several factors: the type of 
deal, the method of payment, the type of target, how value improvement is measured, 
and the bidder's targets, and market's valuation status. Thus, there is no one easy 
12 
answers to the big question here; it needs to be decomposed into several aspects and 
an attempt made to solve them separately. 
In order to answer the big question, it is first necessary to identify the measures of 
value creation, that is~ the bidders' gain from M&A. There are two popular ways to 
measure whether the shareholders have gained from an M&A, the short-run return 
measure and long-run return measure. The short-run stock performance of the 
acquirers during the period surrounding the acquisition announcement is the most 
widely used technique to access the bidding firm's shareholders' gain from an 
acquisition. Many view short-run stock performance as the most reliable evidence of 
value creation because in an efficient capital market, stock prices quickly adjust to 
new information and incorporate any change in value that the acquisition is expected 
to bring. The second measure of value creation is the long-run stock performance of 
the acquiring firm for three to five years after the acquisition announcement. Many 
studies show that certain acquirers significantly under-perform compared to their 
peers in the long-run, thereby casting doubt on the conventional wisdom that stock 
prices adjust quickly and fully during the announcement period. 
The empirical analysis in this thesis begins by identifying the reasons for mergers, and 
establishes that the bidder's pre-acquisition price run-up is one of the most important 
of these. There is no previous empirical research that looks into this issue as regards 
the UK. market, and the results here not only contribute by filling this gap in the 
13 
literature, but also reveal the fact that a merger must happen for the right reason, and 
is actually the outcome of good performance rather than the cause. 
In Chapter 2, it is shown that nearly 90% of the bidders exhibited a substantial share 
price run-up prior to a merger deal, and that the run-up is more significant for stock 
mergers. This confrrms the hypothesis that a merger is actually the result of past good 
performance. The work moves on to investigate the consequences of merger 
announcement and it is found that prices continue to go up for a short period of time, 
followed by a significant long-run reversal for most of the bidders. The rationale lying 
behind this is that bidding firms must have done well in the past and accumulated 
either enough capital or experience to be in a position to acquire. However, because of 
this good performance, managers are in general prone to hubris and their share prices 
are thus overvalued compared to their peers. Hence, in the longer run, high market 
expectation towards bidders will eventually be replaced by reality and long-run 
reversal is observed. At the same time, an examination was made of bidders' 
performances in both the short-run and long-run by different types of portfolios 
defined by method of payment, target ownership status, and bidding frequency. 
Another very interesting fmding is that firms tended to have better performance when 
many small acquisitions were made rather than a small number of large deals. Most 
likely is because the acquirer accumulates experience and learns from past mistakes. 
From the previous studies, it is known that there is a close link between merger 
14 
activity and the valuation of individual companies. The idea that stock prices affect 
merger activity is not new; it dates back at least to Ralph Nelson (1959), who noted 
that merger activity seems to boom when stock prices are high. Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2001) confirmed this observation, showing that periods of high merger 
activity correlate with high market valuations. Furthermore, during these merger 
waves, firms are more likely to use stock to undertake acquisitions. Thus, Chapter 3 
discusses the empirical test conducted to examine whether overall market valuation 
affects the performance of mergers. Not only were overall market portfolios examined, 
but there was also a focus on sub-portfolios such as those containing frequent bidders 
and non-public target groups. From these tests, it was found that market valuation 
does have an impact on bidders' performances, at least in the long-run, for deals 
initiated during low market valuation periods significantly out-performed those in 
high valuation periods. Furthermore, it was found that frequent bidders keen on 
pursuing non-public targets during high market valuation periods received worse 
long-run performances. This is probably because their managers are more easily 
infected by overconfidence when the market is booming. A very important finding is 
that regarding deals initiated during low market valuation periods where it was found 
that frequent bidders out-performed infrequent bidders in the long-run. This finding is 
consistent with the organizational learning and investor sentiment hypotheses, which 
suggest that the rationality of frequent bidders is in fact more easily infected by 
market sentiment. 
IS 
Thus, it can be seen from Chapters 2 and 3 that mergers are the result of bidders' good 
performances and are also affected by market valuation and other factors. The 
hypothesis is, therefore, that when all these factors are correlated with each other and , 
with recent market conditions, certain momentum patterns should be exhibited. 
Chapter 4 investigates the merger momentum issue, where merger momentum is 
defmed as a correlation between the market reaction to a merger announcement and 
the recent market conditions. Here, strong evidence was found of merger momentum 
in high valuation markets, that is, the market reaction to a merger is positively 
correlated with the response to other mergers in the recent past, especially during a 
high market valuation period. 
In general, the contribution of this thesis has three aspects. Firstly, the research 
explores the direct link between the causes and consequences of M&A, and 
~stablishes that market valuation not only affects merger decisions but also influences 
bidders' performances. Secondly, the data set used is larger than any previously used 
in a UK M&A study; this not only avoided the problem of bias in the data selection, 
but also allowed for the data to be sub-divided into various portfolios in order to 
examine every detail. Thirdly, the study establishes that the merger momentum effect 
exists in the UK market, and then supportive empirical evidence is provided for why 
and when merger deals are correlated with market conditions and momentum patterns 
exhibited. This finding enables a link to be established between merger activity and 
fundamental market factors and offers a new explanation for bidders' long-run 
16 
under-performance. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explores the direct link 
between the causes and consequences of corporate takeover activities, while Chapter 
3 empirically examines the relationship between stock market valuations and bidding 
fIrms' performances. Chapter 4 examines the effects of merger momentum and the 
correlation with high market valuations, and Chapter 5 offers a fmal conclusion and a 
proposal for future investigation. Each chapter includes a literature review, and tables 
and fIgures can be found at the end of each. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE CAUSES A:\,"D CONSEQUENCES OF 
CORPORATE TAKEO\yER-----UK EVIDENCE 
"In an efficient economy, there would be a direct link between causes and effects. and 
mergers would happen for the right reasons" 
---------Andrade et. aI., (200 I. p.lI8) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the aim is to explore a more direct link between the causes and 
consequences of corporate takeover activities. Based on a large data set comprising 
6,423 completed UK domestic takeover deals. the results of this research show that 
there is a substantial price run-up for all acquirers prior to announcement. This 
suggests that corporate acquisition is the consequence of good performance rather 
than the cause. At the same time, both the short and long-run performances of the 
bidders in the different types of p0l1folios. including the method of payment. target's 
public status, and bidding frequency, were examined. Most of the results are in line 
with previous literature, and notably, it is found that the best acquisition strategy for a 
firm to achieve growth is hy making many small acquisitions rather than a small 
number of large acquisitions. In generaL these findings are consistent with recent 
arguments and e\'idence regarding the behaviour of management and the 
18 
overconfidence led by hubris or overvaluation in their acquisition pursuit. I 
The motivation of this study is very straightforward. As regards the takeover battle, 
the literature has generally found that the bidder loses and the target wins. However, 
by looking below the surface and examining the fundamental factors that determine 
the success of a takeover it can be seen that this is not the whole picture. If bidding 
firms are generally the losers in this battle, then why are an increasing number of 
merger deals being observed? Surely, there must be some link between the bidder's 
gain and merger incentives that have yet to be discovered. Has the bidder's 
pre-takeover performance something to do with their merger decisions? Is the bidder's 
merger frequency the factor that determines their post performance? Furthermore, 
will the outcome of the "battle" be different if non-public acquisitions are taken into 
consideration? Very few previous studies have examined these three issues as organic 
components, and this research aims to fill these gaps. 
In this chapter, the aim is to answer these questions by examining whether acquirers' 
pre-takeover performances drive acquisitions, or whether particular acquisition 
strategies drive performances. Moreover, the relationship between the bidder's gain 
and their acquisition frequency is tested. Furthermore, an examination is made of 
whether the shareholders of acquiring firms gain when acquisition announcements are 
made of public firms, non-public finns, and subsidiaries. 
I For previous empirical evidence, please rer-r to the literature review section. 
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Previous research offers rich literature regarding the causes and consequences of 
M&A. 2However, less attention has been paid to non-public target acquisitions. 
Although public target acquisitions account for a significant portion of the total dollar 
value of acquisitions, they account for a relatively small proportion of the number of 
acquisitions that take place. Recently, the increased focus on non-public target 
acquisitions has shown that there is a big difference between the acquisition 
performance of public acquisitions and non- public acquisitions 3 . Thus, it was 
important to include non-public and subsidiary targets in the sample in order to 
understand the whole picture and obtain an unbiased result. 
Based on the conventional wisdom of the merger literature, it is known that, on 
average, the target's shareholders gain from takeover transactions, while the 
acquirer's shareholders lose. The level of the acquirer's under-performance also 
depends on the method of payment and other deal specific factors and it is found that 
bad acquirers often become takeover targets themselves. In general, most of the 
research has found that it is very difficult for the acquirer to create value. However, 
the level of the acquirer's performance could dramatically change if the bidder's 
pre-takeover price run-up is taken into consideration. 
2 For 19705 evidence see Jensen and Ruback (1983), for 1980s evidence see Jarrell, Brickley, and 
Netter (1988), for 1990s evidence see Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelan (1998), and 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) 
] See Chang (1998), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2003) for recent evidence on non- public target acquisitions. 
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As stated at the beginning of this chapter, it is believed that there is a direct link 
between the causes and consequences of a takeover. In other words, takeovers must 
happen for the right reason. Clearly, chief executive officers (CEDs) are paid to 
ensure shareholder's value growth, and to correctly identify the takeover target either 
for diversifying corporate risk or for better potential growth. If it is assumed that 
CEDs are more rational than ordinary investors4, or at least will learn from previous 
mistakes, then the deals should reflect the interest of all shareholders, thus we should 
expect to see a positive market reaction to merger announcements with no long-run 
reversals. However, previous evidence shows that bidders' long-run performances are 
mixed, implying that there must be some important factors that have yet to be 
identified to explain bidders' returns. 
Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis, Jensen's (2000, 2004) agency cost hypothesis, and 
• 
Shleifer and Vishny's (2004) market misevaluation driven acquisition hypothesis each 
offer a partial explanation, but there must surely be a more direct link between the 
causes and consequences of takeovers. 
Bradley and Sundaram (2005) found that frrms that undertake acquisitions exhibit a 
substantial stock price run-up prior to their acquisition announcement. When 
examining the acquiring firms control portfolio from the United States of America 
(US) takeover market, they found that this portfolio out-performed the New York 
.. Because CEOs are more informed than outside investors. 
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Stock Exchange (NYSE) market index by 50%. In other words, their results suggest 
that these were performance driven acquisitions, and this could explain the cause of 
acquisitions. 
It is possible that the acquisition announcement might convey information unrelated 
to the merger itself, and the market incorrectly anticipates the benefits and costs of 
acquisitions for the acquiring firm's shareholders. This could be due to subsequent 
events affecting the value of acquisitions, or because, for whatever reason, the market 
has made a biased assessment of the value of the acquisitions. To allow the market 
sufficient time to absorb the merger announcement and filter out other irrelevant 
information, the long-run stock performances of acquiring firms have been 
investigated here in order to examine this issue. 
From this empirical analysis, acquirer's loss is dramatically decreased if the bidder's 
prior price run-up is taken into consideration and non-public target acquisitions are 
included in the sample. Also, the level of under-performance varies according to the 
types of acquisition strategy, the characteristics of the bids and targets, the method of 
payment, and the size of the target relative to the size of the acquirer. The research 
was constructed based on all these issues in order to shed light on the puzzle of why 
so many corporate acquisitions take place despite much of the previous research 
having documented the "bidder's curse". 
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Much of the previous literature has focused on public acquisitions, and less attention 
has been given to non-public target deals. Recently, however, there have been some 
studies that have started to investigate this area5, and they have found much evidence 
that differs from the conventional results relating to public target acquisitions. For 
instance, acquirers' stock price reactions to announcements of non-public target 
acquisitions are positive; the difference in the announcement effects of cash versus 
stock is not significant. These findings suggest that more effort is needed in this area 
in order to reach an unbiased understanding of bidders' performances. 
Another issue that has recently attracted the interest of many researchers is the serial 
acquisition strategy of firms over time. These studies have found that there is a 
difference between growth achieved by making many small acquisitions versus that 
achieved by making a small number of large acquisitions.6 The typical arguments 
advanced to support this include the following: smaller acquisitions are easier to 
integrate, are more likely to involve related businesses, and are more likely to benefit 
acquirers as they gain experience from learning by doing. They are less likely to be 
undertaken for reasons of hubris and empire building, and are more likely to be 
capable of exploiting information asymmetries, and are more likely to be acquired 
with cash rather than stock. 
, It is only recently that the evidence on acquisitions of non-public targets has begun to be examined in 
detail. See Hensen and Lott (1996), Chang (1998), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), and Moeller, 
Schlinggemann, and Stulz (2004). 
6 See Frick and Torres (2002), and Harding and Rovit (2002). 
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In this chapter, an examination is made of the interaction between the bidder's 
pre-acquisition price run-up and post-acquisition perfonnance, for both non-public 
acquisitions and public acquisitions, their acquisition strategies over time, the 
characteristics of the targets they acquire, and the returns realized by their 
shareholders. The portfolios were constructed based on the different characteristics of 
the targets and the bidders' acquisition strategies over time to shed light on the actual 
gain realized by the acquiring finn's shareholders. 
For the empirical analysis, a sample was constructed from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) data-base ranging from 1985 to 2003. All completed public, 
non-public, and subsidiary acquisitions made by publicly-traded UK acquirers were 
included. After matching with DataStream to obtain the share prices and other 
accounting infonnation, the data set consisted of 6,423 completed acquisitions, worth 
a total of 147.18 billion pounds, undertaken by 1,367 publicly listed acquirers. Both 
an event study analysis and a time series analysis were carried out of this sample. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature 
regarding this area of study. Section 3 provides theoretical arguments and the research 
design. Section 4 presents the data and methodology used in this study. Section 5 
presents the results of the empirical analysis and interprets the findings. A conclusion 
is given in Section 6 
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the conventional literature regarding acquirer performance casts doubts on a 
firm's ability to create shareholder value by undertaking acquisitions. It is generally 
believed that the takeover process suffers from agency problems, especially for the 
acquiring firms. CEO hubris and empire building must certainly playa role.7Jensen 
(1986) suggested that acquisitions represent opportunities for corporate managers to 
use free cash flows to enhance their welfare to the detriment of their firm's 
shareholders. In a similar vein, Murphy (1999) found that acquisitions may well be 
driven by CEOs wanting to increase their remuneration, since acquisitions increase 
firm size and there is a strong positive relationship between CEO remuneration and 
firm size. Even if agency problems are not present, competition among bidders 
ensures that acquirers pay "full value" for the targets they acquire.8 Furthermore, 
even if there is no competition, the bidder may find it difficult to exploit information 
asymmetries in acquiring publicly traded targets since financial market participants 
can bid away the potential gains from an acquisition. And finally, the use of stock as a 
medium of payment sends negative signals about the intrinsic value of the acquiring 
firm.9 There is much evidence to suggest that it is very difficult for an acquirer to 
gain from an acquisition. These results are however inconclusive because the benefits 
7 See Roll (1986). 
8 See Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). 
9 See Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1987), Huang and Walking (1987), and Travlos (1987). Mitchell 
Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) found that roughly one-half of the negative announcement effects for 
acquirers in stock based acquisitions reflected downward price pressures caused by short selling 
undertaken by risk arbitragers. 
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from acquisitions will be affected by the method of payment, the frequency of bids, 
the target's public status etc. 
There follows an in-depth review of the relevant literature regarding the above issues, 
that is, several theories related to the motivation and consequences of M&As and how 
we measure the profitability of M&As. Also the nature of non-public target 
acquisition, the wealth effect of frequent bidders versus infrequent bidders, the cause 
and consequences of management overconfidence, and the method of payment 
hypothesis are reviewed in depth. Besides these issues, the knowledge accumulation 
issue for frequent bidders is also examined, as this could be one of the reasons for 
different performances. 
2.2.1. Review of the Literature on the M&A Success Paradox 
For more than thirty years, scholars have researched M&A. Early empirical work 
sought to identify the characteristics of successful mergers, especially as they relate to 
diversification theory. Results were mixed, but most agreed that, on average, M&As 
fail to generate above normal returns for the acquiring fIrm's shareholders. Why, then 
do corporate CEOs continue to employ this strategy? And what can they do to 
improve the odds of success? Attention has also focused on understanding the 
variables that managers can manipulate to bolster a given transaction's probability of 
success: ways to improve the quantity and quality of information gathered during due 
diligence, and potential impediments to the integration of two firms. 
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The following will focus on related literature regarding takeover development and 
takeover theories, in order to give a better understanding of the present position and 
the direction to be taken. 
2.2.1.1 Measuring M&A Success 
It is widely agreed that the "success" of a merger or acquisition may be defined as the 
creation of synergy: the value of the combined firms is greater than that of the two 
firms operating separately. This reflects the simple observation that the price paid for 
a strategic asset must be lower than its expected value if it is to add economic value to 
the acquiring organization. Because the efficacy of a corporate combination is, at least 
in part, a function of how its outcome is calculated, close attention should be paid to it. 
This section reviews the empirical literature with respect to measuring success in 
M&A. Four principle methodologies have been employed: event studies, 
accounting-based measures, data surveys, and case studies. 
Traditionally, the CAPM has been the primary measuring tool for determining the 
degree to which M&As create economic value. Utilizing the event study methodology 
of Fama (1970), the stock prices of both acquiring and acquired firms are examined 
shortly after the merger announcement. The cumulative abnormal returns (the increase 
in stock price over and above that which the CAPM would predict without the merger) 
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are calculated, and the result assessed. The central underlying assumption is that 
investors are capable of accurately predicting the combined fIrms' future cash flow. 
2.2.1.2 Event Study Methodology 
The event study methodology has several attractive features. Firstly, the data is 
publicly available, permitting empirical studies to be carried out on large data samples. 
Secondly, it relies upon the well-respected efficient market hypothesis. Thirdly, 
because the abnormal returns are calculated, the data is not subject to industry 
sensitivity, enabling a broad cross-section of fIrms to be studied. 
These studies have provided support for the view that M&As create economic value 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Seth, 1990; Singh and Montgomery, 1987.) Later studies 
examined the distribution of this new wealth, and concluded that the stockholders of 
acquired fIrms capture most of the gains (Chatterjee, 1986; Seth, 1990; Singh and 
Montgomery, 1987; Sirower, 1997.) Indeed, the stock price performance of acquiring 
fIrms raises serious concerns: only about 35% of acquirers report positive stock 
market gains on the announcement date. lo 
These event study results, however, may be due to its reliance on the assumption that 
investors can accurately predict the combined fIrms' future cash flows. This 
assumption embodies the attractive feature of ensuring that non-M&A related factors 
are not influencing the incremental stock behaviour. Abandoning this assumption 
represents a direct challenge to the efficient market hypothesis (Morck, Shleifer, and 
10 For a useful review of these analyses, see Sirower (1997). 
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Vishny, 1990). 
2.2.1.3 Accounting Based Measures and Data Surveys 
Over the past fifteen years, scholarly attention has shifted to exploring different 
dependent variables. Perhaps the issue was not one of M&A success, but rather with 
the event study methodology's assumptions regarding success. Studies began using 
accounting-based measures of performance, market share data, and survey responses, 
and regressed these against various factors hypothesized to drive fmancial 
performance. The definition of success began to take on a longer-term perspective: 
perhaps it took three to five years to fully reap the benefits of the combined firm. II 
But accounting measures are subject to some of the same limitations as are long-term 
stock price measurements: factors other than the M&A may be driving the numbers. 
In addition, accounting measures reflect the past, rather than present financial 
performance expectations. Nor do they reflect changes in the firm's risk profile. Some 
academics have opted" to use survey measures to elicit the management team's views 
on whether or not the merger was a success (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Capron, 
1999; Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Weber, 1992.) In theory, an M&A should be deemed a 
success if the objectives identified during the due diligence process are met. In other 
II Kfishman, Miller, and Judge (1997), for example, hypothesized that the ability of top management 
teams to work effectively together would drive M&A success, measured by returns on assets. 
Ramaswamy (1997) explored the impact of strategic similarity in mergers occurring in the banking 
industry. Again, returns on assets were used to measure performance over a three-year period. 
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words, the key question may be, Did we accomplish what we set out to accomplish, 
regardless of other exogenous or endogenous factors simultaneously at work? 
Capron's recent survey-based work claims: " ... traditionally available financial data 
are too gross to permit differentiation between the types of fine-grained value-creating 
mechanisms ... " (Capron, 1999) While these approaches rely on self-reported 
perceptions of long-term performance, they reduce some of the noise that may 
accompany publicly available information. 
2.2.1.4 Case Studies 
Because every M&A is a unique event, occurring in a unique environment that is 
subject to innumerable influences, case studies have also provided a rich stream of 
research (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Marks and Mirvis, 1998; Shanley and 
Correa, 1992.) While it is not possible to generalize to other specific situations, the 
case study methodology does enable one to generalize to theoretical constructs. This 
analytic device enables the analysis of the processes of value creation, rather than 
simply the events seeking to create value. 
These results, combined with the observation of continued growth in M&A activity, 
give rise to the M&A success paradox. If it is assumed that managers are rational, and 
that corporate governance structures serve as a check and balance on poorly 
conceived strategic actions, the level of M&A activity should taper off, which has not 
been observed. To date, scholars have been unable to unravel this paradox. 
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2.2.2. Takeover Theories and Motivations 
Many theories have been put forward to explain why mergers and other forms of 
restructuring take place. Efficiency theories imply social gains from M&A activity in 
addition to the gains for participants. The differential efficiency theory states that 
more efficient firms will acquire less efficient firms and realize gains by improving 
their efficiency; this implies excess managerial capabilities in the acquiring firm. 
Differential efficiency would most likely be a factor in mergers between firms in 
related industries where the need for improvement could be more easily identified. 
The related inefficient management theory suggests that the target's management is so 
inept that virtually any management could do better. which could be an explanation 
for mergers between firms in unrelated industries. 
There are varIOUS sources of value increase from M&As, such as the efficiency 
increases mentioned above, others. such as operating synergy, diversification, and 
financial synergy, could all contribute to the M&A value Increase source. These 
value-increasing sources will now be reviewed in tum. 
2.2.2.1 Operating Syner~' 
The operating synergy theory postulates that there are economies of scale, or of scope, 
and that mergers help achieve levels of activities at which these economies can be 
obtained. 
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The theory based on operating synergy assumes that economies of scale exist in the 
industry and that prior to the merger the firms are operating at levels of activity that 
fall short of achieving the potential for economies of scale. Economies of scale arise 
because of indivisibilities, such as people, equipment, and overheads, that result in 
lower costs if spread over a large number of units of output. Thus, in manufacturing 
operations, heavy investments in plant and equipment typically produce such 
economles. 
2.2.2.2 Financial Synergy 
The financial synergy hypothesizes merging firms complement each other, not in their 
management capabilities but in matching the availability of investment opportunities 
to internal cash flows. A firm in a declining industry will produce a large cash flow 
because there are few attractive investment opportunities. A growth industry has more 
investment opportunities than cash with which to finance them. The merged firm will 
have a lower cost of capital due to the lower cost of internal funds as well as possible 
risk reduction, saving in flotation costs, and improvements in capital allocation. 
Previous empirical fmdings appear to support this internal funds effect. Nielsen and 
Melicher (1971) found that the rate of premiums paid to the acquired firm as an 
approximation to the merger gain was greater when the cash flow rate of the acquiring 
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fmn was greater than that of the acquired fIrm. This implied that there was 
redeployment of capital from the acquiring to the acquired ftrm's industry. The 
investment literature also indicated that internal cash flows affect the rate of 
investment of ftrms. (Nickell, 1978). Another proposition is that the debt capacity of 
the combined fIrms can be greater than the sum of the two fIrms' capacities before 
their merger, and this provides a tax saving on investment income. Still another 
possible dimension is economies of scale in flotation and the transaction costs of 
securities (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). 
2.2.2.3 Diversification Motives 
Diversification as a motive for mergers differs from shareholder portfolio 
diversification. Shareholders can efficiently spread their investments and risk among 
industries, so there is no· need for fIrms to diversify for the sake of their shareholders. 
Managers and other employees, however, are at greater risk if the single industry in 
which their firm operates should decline; their firm-specific human capital is not 
transferable. Therefore, fIrms may diversify to encourage fmn-specific human capital 
investments that make their employees more valuable and productive. Diversification 
may also serve to increase the probability that the organization and reputation capital 
of the firm will be preserved by transferring it to another line of business owned by 
the firm in the event of its initial industry declining. 
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Diversification can be achieved through internal growth as well as mergers. However. 
mergers may be preferred to the internal growth avenue under certain circumstances. 
The firm may simply lack internal growth opportunities owing to a lack of requisite 
resources or to potential excess capacity in the industry. Timing may be important, 
and mergers can provide diversification quickly. 
Empirical studies have found that the average diversified firm is worth less than a 
portfolio of comparable single-segment firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 
1994). A number of explanations have been offered to explain the discount. One is 
that external capital markets allocate resources more efficiently than internal capital 
markets. Competitive capital markets generate price signals to guide the flow of 
resources. Without such price information managers make inferior decisions in 
internal allocations. A second reason could be that there are political influences that 
result in subsidizing under-performing divisions within a firm. A third explanation for 
the diversification discount is that managers of multiple activities are not as well 
informed about each activity as the managers of a single product firm. Fourthly, 
securities analysts are said to be less likely to follow multi-segment firms because of 
inadequate information on the individual segment. 
A recent empirical study by Lamont and Polk (2002) found that excess values do 
forecast future returns. "Firms with discounts have higher subsequent returns than 
firms with premia. The diversification discount puzzle is, at least in part an expected 
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return phenomenon as well as an expected cash flow phenomenon" 
While the event study literature demonstrates that the acquired firm's shareholders 
reap above-normal returns (due to the payment of a premium for the firm), this 
represents value capture, not value creation (Seth, 1990). The newly combined entity 
is left with the task of creating value in excess of the premium paid. Strategy theory 
states that value is created in an M&A through the identification and exploitation of 
synergy. While different terminology is used, three broad classes of synergy are the 
usual focus of researchers. First, operating synergies arise when economies of scale or 
scope are captured across a variety of the firm's activities. Financial synergies are 
driven by reductions in the cost of capital due to a reduction in bankruptcy risk, an 
increase in the size of the arm, or internal funding of the target's investment projects 
at a cost lower than that available in the capital markets. Collusive synergies, 
sometimes called market power, enable the firm to either extract a higher price for its 
products or services or pay suppliers a reduced price (Chatterjee, 1986). 
Diversification theory claims that related acquisitions should have greater potential 
for synergy creation than unrelated acquisitions (Rumelt, 1974; Salter and Weinhold, 
1978). Most likely is because the greater the points of contact and overlap between 
two firms' value chains, the higher the potential for capturing operational synergy. 
Singh and Montgomery (1987) hypothesized that because all three forms of synergy 
are theoretically available in related acquisitions, and that because only financial 
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synergies and administrative efficiencies are available in unrelated mergers, related 
acquisitions will create more value than unrelated ones. 
Given this model of value creation possibilities, scholars have sought to understand 
what types of mergers might lead to above normal shareholder value. While the above 
diversification theory is intuitively appealing, Lubatkin (1983) noted that the concept 
of synergy had never been tested. Attention therefore focused on measuring the results 
from related versus unrelated mergers, again using the event study methodology. The 
presence of a related skill, market, resource, or purpose of two merging firms was the 
usual definition of relatedness employed (Rumelt, 1974). Researchers operationalized 
this concept generally by using the US Federal Trade Commission's Standard Industry 
Classification at either the two or four-digit level. 
A review of these empirical studies (all using the event study methodology), reveals 
conflicting results. For example, Lubatkin (1987) found no statistically different 
results in related versus unrelated mergers, while Elgers and Clark (1980) found that 
unrelated mergers out-performed related ones. However, Singh and Montgomery 
(1987) found that total dollar gains, standardized on the value of acquired assets, 
showed statistically significant differences between related mergers and unrelated 
ones at the .05 level, with related mergers out-performing unrelated ones. However, 
target firms obtained the lion's share of these gains, while the acquiring firms 
experienced no statistically significant wealth gain. 
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Chatterjee (1986) attempted to empirically isolate the effects of various sources of 
synergy. Arguing that the type of synergies captured cannot be classified based on the 
type of merger due to the potential presence of multiple sources of synergies in, say, a 
related merger, Chatterjee examined non-horizontal related mergers versus 
non-related, conglomerate mergers. His hypothesis was that if horizontal mergers 
were excluded from the study, he could eliminate the impact of any collusive 
synergies and zero-in on operational and financial synergies. Financial synergies may 
be present in any type of merger, but operational synergies would only be available to 
a firm that acquired a related business. Furthermore, Chatterjee argued that the 
observation that two sources of synergy may be present in a related merger while only 
one in an unrelated merger does not logically lead to the expectation that the former 
type of merger will out-perform the latter. Using event study methodology, he found, 
counter-intuitively, that firms acquired by non-related acquirers fared much better 
than their counterparts acquired by related firms. Interpreting the results of targets 
involved in a related acquisition, Chatterjee suggested that operational synergies may 
prove very difficult to implement. 
Seth (1990) built upon Chatterjee's argument that there is no a priori theoretical 
reason to suppose that value creation is a function of the number of potential 
synergies. She found overwhelming evidence that M&As create value when the target 
and bidder firms are viewed together, but only limited evidence that this value 
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creation occurs to a greater extent in related acquisitions versus unrelated. Seth 
concluded that, " ... the finding that related acquisitions do not unequivocally 
out-perform unrelated acquisitions provides evidence that the sources of value 
creation associated with unrelated acquisitions provide similar magnitudes of synergy 
compared with the sources of value creation associated with related acquisitions." 
Methodologies other than event studies have also been used to test diversification 
theory in M&A. In an analysis that controlled for industry, Hopkins (1987) found that 
all firms pursuing an acquisitive strategy in fact lost market share. This suggests that 
improving a firm's market position via acquisitions may be an unrealistic goal. He 
stated, "Managers concerned with the position of their firms may want to consider 
internal growth as an alternative to growth through acquisitions." 12However, firms 
with a strong marketing position (i.e., brand loyalty) lost less market share than those 
with a particular strength in technology, and in conglomerates. Hopkins hypothesized 
that this is due to the relative attractiveness of industries that have high marketing 
related barriers to entry. Supporting this view is Lubatkin's (1987) observation that 
predicted synergistic benefits are highest for marketing concentric mergers. 
Seeking to operationalize certain views of diversification that may be classified under 
the resource-based view of the firm, Farjoun (1998) argued that the above studies on 
related versus unrelated acquisitions suffer from too narrow a view of relatedness. 
12 See Hopkins, (1987). 
38 
Examining diversification activity in the manufacturing sector, he explored degrees of 
relatedness with respect to physical assets (e.g., production lines) and human skills 
(e.g., similar engineering skills), and how these factors of relatedness might be 
correlated with financial performance. 13 He found that when viewed separately, 
neither the existence of physical asset relatedness nor skill relatedness was correlated 
with financial performance. However, when viewed together, that is with the presence 
of both related physical and skill bases, and controlling for industry effects, a strong 
effect on performance emerged. He concluded that the joint effects of relatedness are 
synergistic in nature: "each base thus extends the other.,,14 
Perhaps these conflicting conclusions speak more to measurement and classification 
problems than to the true economics underlying M&A. Indeed, the above researchers 
would often group the various FTC classification schemes differently. Hence, an 
underlying problem may be one of the definition of related versus unrelated 
acquisitions. 
Alternatively, the potential synergy gains available in related acquisitions may be 
priced out during negotiations (particularly to the extent that it is based on publicly 
available information) making value creation in horizontal mergers a particularly 
13 For example, operationalized as returns on assets, returns on sales, the MIB ratio, and Jensen's alpha 
measure. 
I( See Farjoun, (1998). 
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difficult task (Barney, 1988). There may in fact be no a priori reason to expect greater 
abnormal returns from a related acquisition than from an unrelated one (Singh and 
Zollo, 1998). 
In summary, the empirical evidence has been conflicting as to what type of 
diversification strategy can in fact create value for the acquiring firm's shareholders. 
Diversification theory has not yet been empirically confirmed. Assertions that M&As 
are a useful and productive method for diversification and growth, and those 
synergies are more readily and easily captured in related acquisitions do not withstand 
the empirical test. Difficult as they may be, mergers are often viewed as a more 
favourable strategy than, say, building the business internally (Singh and Montgomery, 
1987), giving rise to the M&A synergy paradox. 
2.2.2.4 Undervaluation Theory 
The undervaluation theory states that mergers occur when the market value of the 
target finn's stock for some reason does not reflect its true value or its potential value 
in the hands of alternative management. The q ratio is also related to the 
undervaluation theory. Firms can acquire assets for expansion more cheaply by 
buying the stock of existing firms than by buying or building their own assets when 
the target's stock price is below the replacement cost of these assets. Some bidders 
may seek targets with a high q to obtain the capabilities that create value. 
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2.2.2.5 Agency Problems 
Agency problems may result from a conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders or between shareholders and debt holders. A number of organizational 
and market mechanisms serve to discipline self-serving managers, and takeovers are 
viewed as the discipline of last resort (Manne, 1965). A takeover through a tender 
offer or a proxy fight enables outside managers to gain control of the board of 
directors. Manne (1965) emphasized mergers as a threat of takeover if a firm's 
management lagged in performance either because of inefficiency or because of the 
agency problem. 
Managerialism, on the other hand, views the takeover as a manifestation of the agency 
problem rather than its solution. It suggests that self-serving managers make 
ill-conceived combinations solely to increase the firm's size and their own 
remuneration. The hubris theory is another variant of the agency cost theory; it 
implies that acquiring firms' managers commit errors of over-optimism in bidding for 
targets. 
Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis states that takeovers take place because of the 
conflicts between managers and shareholders over the payout of free cash flows. This 
hypothesis posits that free cash flow, that is, cash flows in excess of investment needs 
should be paid out to shareholders, reducing the power of management and subjecting 
managers to the scrutiny of the public capital markets more frequently. Debt-for-stock 
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exchange offers are viewed as a means of bonding the manager's promise to payout 
future cash flows to shareholders. 
2.2.3. Non-Public Target Acquisitions: An Overview 
Non-public target acquisitions are more likely to be small acquisitions, and include 
subsidiaries or divisions of larger firms being sold off. Non-public owners might be 
willing to sell out at a discount for liquidity reasons, which would manifest itself in a 
greater return to the buyer. IS 
The volume of acquisitions involving non-publicly held targets has far surpassed that 
of publicly traded firms in recent years. In the US, for instance, of the 6,731 
companies that were acquired in the manufacturing sectors during the period 1996 to 
1999, more than 63% were non-public companies (Shen and Reuer, 2003). Similarly, 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003) studied 8,225 acquisitions of independent 
targets by public firms in the US between 1980 and 2001, with a transaction value 
above US $1 million and found that 67% of these involved non-publicly held targets. 
However, there are very few studies regarding UK non-public target acquisitions, thus, 
the aim here is to fill this gap. By using a large sample ranging from 1985 to 2004, 
consisting of 6,424 acquisitions, and almost covering t\\'o merger waves 16, this study 
IS See Fuller. et al. (:!002). 
16 The 1980s wave ran from 1986 to 1989 and is often cited as the "hostile takeover wave", the later 
one runs from 1997 to 2000. this is considered as a strategic merger wave. 
found that nearly 88% of the sample consisted of non-publicly held companies. Thus. 
these results will. after careful examination, consistent with previous finding and 
enrich the literature in this field 
The lack of research on acquisitions of non-publicly held firms is largely due to the 
unavailability of information regarding such firms and on the terms of these 
acquisitions. The study of non-public targets is interesting not only because of the 
sheer volume of acquisitions involving these firms. but also because recent research 
suggests that they differ greatly from public targets. For instance, Chang (1998) found 
that, unlike acquisitions of publicly traded targets. bidders of non-publicly held targets 
experience positive abnormal returns in stock offers. Two recent studies (Fuller, et aL 
2002) showed that the acquisition of non-publicly held targets yielded substantial 
gains for bidders, regardless of the method of payment used. In addition. strategy 
research has recently shown that bidders tend to acquire public targets rather than 
non-public targets when they face valuation problems due to information asymmetry 
in the acquisition process. Notably, bidders are more likely to acquire public targets 
than non-public targets when they purchase firms with significant intangible resources. 
Acquirers are also more likely to use cash as the method of payment when the target 
is a non-public company. There follows an in-depth review of the distinguishing 
features of non-public target acquisitions. 
2.2.3.1 Bidders' Value Creation of Acquisitions: The Agency View 
Those who view mergers from the agency angle argue that acquisitions can be an 
effective way of reducing agency costs and improving the operations of mismanaged 
firms. Agency theorists postulate that managers have considerable discretionary 
power over the use of corporate resources. and exercise it to pursue their own interests 
rather than to maximize shareholder value. Agency costs arise when the managerial 
and ownership functions are separated and ownership is dispersed, and contracts are 
not costIess, but written and enforced (Jensen and Meckling 1976). These costs arise 
because of the difficulty of developing contracts designed to comprehensively spell 
out the actions that managers are to take in the interest of the firm's owners. Moreover, 
because it is costly to monitor the performance of managers relative to the actions 
specified in contracts, decision making agents may engage in value-destroying 
activities. For example, managers may undertake empire-building acquisitions or 
continue diversification to increase their social status and recompense, or to secure 
their own employment. As a result. the optimal size of the firm from the manager's 
point of view is larger than the optimal size from the shareholder's point of view. 
Allen and Gale (2000) suggested that corporate governance is designed to mitigate the 
potential conflicts of interest bet\\'een managers and shareholders. Internal 
mechanisms include board structures. debt financing, and executive director 
shareholding. Each of these internal mechanisms has its o\\'n limitations in aligning 
shareholder and manager interests, As Fama (1980) and Jensen (1986) suggested, the 
key external mechanism is the market for corporate control, which acts as a 
mechanism of last resort. The probability of replacement following an acquisition 
provides a direct incentive for top management to perform well. 17 
Earlier work developed by Berle and Means (1933) and Manne (1965), the theory of 
market for corporate control, posits that as top managers engage in behaviour of self 
interest their company's performance is likely to increasingly diverge from its 
maximum potential. This under-performance is reflected in the value of the 
company's stock. In such circumstances, other management teams are likely to invite 
shareholders to replace the incumbent management team. The market for corporate 
control is, therefore, the competition among management teams for the rights to 
manage corporate resources. 
2.2.3.2 The Agency Problem and Non-Public Targets 
The higher concentration of ownership often found in non-publicly held companies 
compared with publicly traded firms should lead to fewer internal agency conflicts. 
Concentrated shareholders have substantial incentives and power to monitor managers 
and reduce the problem of professional managers free riding, which is associated with 
a structure of small and atomistic shareholders. Proponents of leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) argue that post LBO corporations, with their highly leveraged capital 
structure, high percentage of ownership of managers, and close monitoring by 
17 See Kennedy and Limmack (1996), and Martin and McConnell (1991). 
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sponsors of the buyout, have a superior incentive structure to pre-LBO corporations 
(Jensen, 1989). Since agency conflicts are lower with increased inside ownership in 
non-public firms, it can be argued that non-publicly held companies are more 
attractive to bidders. 
Non-publicly held companies are also often family owned, which can reduce agency 
problems. Because family members are either directly involved with the management 
of the firm or have the power to monitor management closely, family controlled firms 
are more profit-maximization oriented and are less likely to invite a takeover. For 
example, the kinship and social relations among family members ensure that 
managers will not expropriate shareholder wealth through the consumption of perks 
and the misallocation of resources. 
In addition, families maintain a long-term presence in their firms. They typically have 
longer horizons than other shareholders and are therefore more willing to invest in 
long-term projects. Stein (1998) showed that firms that have shareholders with longer 
investment horizons suffer from less managerial myopia and are therefore less likely 
to forgo good investment in order to boost short-term earnings. By anticipating the 
transfer of the business to a family member in the future, family firm decision makers 
with an extended horizon mindset may be more likely than non-family decision-
makers to make decisions that improve the viability of the company over time. 18 
\I See James (1999). 
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Finally, if the extent of the family's ownership interests is substantial, 
family-controlled finns are more difficult to takeover because the family has the 
power to veto unwelcome bids. 
There are several empirical studies that provide support for the argument that the 
value created in takeovers is higher for non-public targets than public targets. Davis 
and Stout (1992) examined the risk of takeovers by using event-history techniques on 
time-series data covering all takeover bids for US Fortune 500 firms between 1980 
and 1990. They interpreted the results as evidence that a controlling block of 
ownership in family-controlled firms reduces agency problems. 
These results are in line with studies that show that non-public firms tend to be better 
, 
managed than public firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), and therefore can produce 
more synergy when being taken over. Capozza and Seguin (2003) found that 
managerial expenses are lower as inside ownership increases. Similarly, Durand and 
Vargas (2003) found that, within a sample of non-public firms, owner-controlled firms 
were more efficient than agent led firms. This suggests that the closer the alignment of 
ownership and management, the lower the likelihood of a self-serving attitude and 
inefficient use of resources. To sum up, agency theory suggests that non-publicly held 
family-controlled finns should suffer less from profit maximization behaviour. Thus, 
they are very healthy in structure, and have a great growth potential when integrated 
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into the bidder's business with the benefit of more professional management. 19 
2.2.3.3 The Non-Public Target and Asymmetric Information 
Gaughan (1999) argued that the information asymmetry problem is likely to be more 
severe in the context of the acquisition of a non-publicly held target, as compared 
with a publicly held target acquisition, because the equity market reduces information 
asymmetry by listing rules and information disclosure requirements. There are several 
reasons that can be highlighted to explain why publicly held targets should exhibit 
fewer asymmetric information problems. Firstly, the greater amount of information 
disclosed on public targets can directly mitigate information asymmetry problems. 
Public companies are required to disclose information for registration and subsequent 
listing, and produce financial statements audited according to generally accepted 
accounting principles. Investors and analysts also exert pressure on public companies 
to produce detailed financial statements. In contrast, non-publicly held companies are 
not subject to either government public disclosure requirements or to the pressure of 
public equity markets. The financial statements of non-public companies are subject 
to more distortion because independent third-party auditing is not required, and also 
because non-public firms tend to produce financial statements in a way which is apt to 
minimize the taxable income. 
19 Please note that, in the context of this chapter, the issue of fewer restructuring opportunities for 
non-pUblic held firms stemming from their lack or lower level of professional management compared 
to public firms is not addressed, as it is believed that this is mainly associated with the size factor. 
Bigger firms ~nd to be endowed with higher professional managers (with public targets being on 
average of greater size than non-public targets). 
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Secondly, the publicly observable share prices of public targets reveal the collective 
judgment of dispersed investors (Hayek, 1945) and important information about the 
business. The equity market serves to place a price on the public firm. The price 
aggregates heterogeneous information and incorporates the collective judgment of 
investors. The price can therefore help buyers calibrate their bids. Stock markets play 
a monitoring role in revealing information and disciplining managers' behaviour. It 
has been suggested that share prices offer performance information that cannot be 
extracted from a firm's current or future accounting data.2o 
In summary, the reduction in asymmetric information associated with the fact that a 
target firm is publicly listed can help acquirers screen targets with high value creation 
potential from targets with low value creation potential, and thus calibrate their bids, 
which increases the likelihood of recouping the acquisition premium. This is even 
more important for the purchase of firms with high intangible assets, where valuation 
problems are severe. When firms need to buy intangible resources, they are likely to 
be more reassured when buying a public firm than a non-public target. It is therefore 
expected that public targets will provide safer opportunities for trading intangible 
resources than non-public targets. 
2.2.3.4 The Difference in Value Captured from Public and Non-public Targets 
Chatterjee (1992) suggested that higher value creation potential doesn't necessarily 
lead to higher returns for bidders. The proportion of the value created by the 
20 See Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) 
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acquisition that the acquirer can capture to a great extent depends on the respective 
bargaining power of the target and the acquirer. It has been argued that it is harder for 
the acquirer to capture value from a publicly held target than from a non-publicly held 
target. In the light of the functioning of the market as a mechanism for corporate 
control, publicly held targets are more visible and liquid. Publicly held targets are thus 
generally more powerful than non-public targets, relative to their buyers, and are able 
to command a higher control premium. 
An acquirer can capture value from a merger deal when the takeover market is not 
highly competitive. In many cases, even when the merger creates value thanks to a 
good recourse fit between the target and acquirer, the market allocates the full 
synergistic gains to the target's shareholders rather than to the acquirer's shareholders. 
Many studies show that strategic relatedness (a proxy of synergy) is not a sufficient 
condition for an acquirer's shareholders to earn abnormal returns.21 
Value creation does not ensure value capture by the acquirer when the competition 
among potential bidders drives up the target price until the net present value for the 
successful bidder is close to zero, that is, the synergies are equal to the premium paid. 
As a result, even in a synergistic deal, acquirers can earn abnormal returns only when 
the market for corporate control is imperfectly competitive (Mitchell and Capron, 
21 Synergy is here defined as the increase in the merging firm's competitive strengths and resulting 
cash flow beyond which the two companies are expected to accomplish independently. See also Barney 
(1988), Lubatkin (1988), Seth (1990), and Sirower (1997), 
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2002). In a competitive acquisition market, multiple bidding tends to increase control 
premiums and reduce bidder returns, which is consistent with the lack of significant 
positive abnormal returns on average for acquiring firms found in many finance 
studies.22 
2.2.3.5 Bidding Competition for Non-Public and Public Targets 
Bidders of publicly held targets are likely to face more competition in the market for 
corporate control, and therefore are likely to make overpayments for their targets, 
with the result of long-run stock price under-performance. However, this is not the 
case for non-public target acquisitions, simply because the competition for these 
targets is much lower than for public targets. Furthermore, public targets are more 
visible to buyers, and thus can benefit from a more competitive bidding process. For 
instance, firms that go public engage in an intensive marketing exercise through road 
shows, subsequent registrations, and offerings. They not only present themselves to 
the investment community and attract media attention, they also tap into the 
underwriter's business relationships. 
Furthermore, Zingales (1995) found that sales of public targets are auction-like in that 
they usually involve frequent bidders in open markets, while non-public targets are 
typically sold through negotiation based on voluntary exchange. A target firm in a 
relatively poor bargaining position to their potential acquirer can benefit from the 
auction process inherent in the stock market. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed 
22 See Asquith (1983). JareU. Brickley and Netter (1988) and Mandelker (1974) 
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that an auction is almost always preferable to a negotiation when selling a company. 
No amount of bargaining power is as valuable to the seller as attracting one extra 
bidder. The value of negotiation skills is small, compared to the value of additional 
competition. Note 'that large non-public targets can organize auctions that increase 
competition among bidders. Yet, in many cases, non-public targets tend to be smaller 
and cannot afford the costs associated with setting up an auction process. 
Bidding for a publicly held target can lead to herding behaviour and intense 
competition among bidders that are under the scrutiny of the media and the fmancial 
community. Most bidders tend to bid more aggressively as the number of competing 
bidders increases?3 As a result, bidders for public targets are more likely to be 
subject to the winner's curse. The winner's curse is the notion that the winner of a 
sealed-bid auction for a hard-to-value company tends to be the one who fails to 
recognize this adverse selection effect and is likely to be "cursed" by having paid too 
much for the target. 
Finally, acquirers of public targets are prone to overpaying as a result of the free-rider 
problem of shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1980) showed that most likely is 
because in the case of a tender offer, each shareholder has an incentive to hold on to 
their shares and wait for a higher return if the tender offer is successful. The winning 
bidder may have to pay the full price for the possible synergistic gain; otherwise, 
23 See Kagel and Levin (1986). 
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mutually beneficial takeover transactions will not occur. In a nutshell, each 
shareholder'S best strategy is to hold on to their shares because they can get a higher 
price if the tender offer succeeds. However, if every shareholder thinks this way, no 
shares will be sold and the tender offer will fail. Most likely is because every 
shareholder wants to free ride on other shareholders' sell-offs; the shareholders of a 
public target may thus get a better deal in an acquisition than shareholders of a 
non-public firm. Furthermore, it may be the case that with acquisitions of non-public 
firms, the owners are eager to sell for liquidity or other reasons, such as wanting to 
exit, or needing extra financial or human resources in order to grow, and hence are 
willing to sell at a discount price. In summary, as a result of a more competitive 
market for the corporate control of public firms, publicly held targets are expected to 
have greater bargaining power than non-public firms, which reduces the potential 
value that can be captured by the acquiter. 
2.2.4 Review of Literature on Frequent Bidders 
An investigation of the frequent bidder issue could shed light on the large increase in 
d tl 24 the number of series acquisitions that have been observe recen y . Previous 
research on frequent bidder acquisitions has shown that frequent bidders 
under-performed compared to their peers. However, there are different hypotheses 
suggesting that frequent bidders yield positive returns indicating that the "learning by 
doing effect" may playa very important role in explaining the positive excess returns 
24 This study shows that more than 62% of the bidders were frequent bidders, making more than four 
acquisitions during the sample periods. 
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of frequent bidders. A recent study by Conn, et al. (2004) found that for acquirers 
whose first acquisition is unsuccessful, the bid order effect is positive, that is, later 
deals by the same acquirer yield better performances compared to earlier ones. These 
results are consistent with the "learning by doing hypothesis". 
2.2.4.1 Theoretical Hypotheses 
There are several hypotheses relating to the impact of the number of acquisitions on 
the bidder's performance. These are the learning by doing hypothesis, the 
monopolization hypothesis, the indigestion hypothesis, the hubris hypothesis, the 
overvaluation hypothesis, the accounting manipulation hypothesis, and the merger 
programme announcement hypothesis. 
According to one view of the learning by doing hypothesis, both the number and 
order of acquisitions will have a positive impact on performance. The fundamental 
idea behind this hypothesis is that there is an "acquisition learning curve" and that the 
"experienced acquirer" will be more successful than the less experienced one. Cisco's 
acquisition programme is the most commonly quoted example to have developed and 
refined a complete methodology for carrying out acquisitions. This hypothesis 
predicts that the returns to acquisitions should rise over time. Variations on the 
learning by doing hypothesis argue that the type of acquisition is important and so 
there are several learning curves to go down. There could be one for related 
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acquisitions and another for unrelated, one for domestic and another for cross-border , 
one for public acquisitions and another for non-public acquisitions. This means that 
the performance effect of any acquisition depends on how many of that type of 
acquisition have been carried out previously. 
Multiple acquisitions may also result in a sequential improvement in acqwrer 
performance if they bestow upon acquirer companies a sequential increase in market 
power. For example, Kamien and Zang (1993) showed that a sequence of 
endogenously formed mergers will eventually lead to monopolization of the industry. 
However, it can be argued that with the present-day global enforcement of 
competition policy, this type of monopolization is a rarely observed phenomenon.2s 
Other hypotheses postulate that serial acquisitions do not enhance the bidding firm's 
shareholder wealth. The indigestion hypothesis argues that the acquirer is unable to 
successfully integrate subsequent acquisitions because of the short time period 
between acquisitions. Each subsequent acquisition therefore results in worse 
performance than the previous one. 
Roll (1986) suggested another way of explaining bidding firms' under-performance, 
which also holds for series acquisition activity. The hubris hypothesis states that 
worsening performance may be explained by less care being taken with the next 
merger due to over-confidence drawn from the success of the previous. This could 
25 See Nilssen and Sorgard (1998). 
manifest in several ways, such as a less careful choice of targets, a higher price paid 
for those targets, or higher leverage being taken on to pay for subsequent acquisitions. 
Under this hypothesis, it may be expected that the decline will be much more acute 
for acquirers whose initial acquisition is successful. Furthermore, the subsequent 
acquisition may tend to be value destructive. 
The overvaluation hypothesis takes the view that mergers occur when the acquirer is 
in a temporarily good position. The acquirer might' find that its stock price is high 
owing to a change in market sentiment or recent good performance. As mentioned 
before, this could also be due to the agency costs arising in acquisitions of overvalued 
frrms. 26 Such acquirers tend to use stock as the medium of exchange in a merger deal, 
and these deals are more likely to boost the stock price in the short-run and result in 
under-performance in the long-run. Recent empirical evidence is consistent with this 
view.27 Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argued that this applies to multiple 
acquirers as well as single acquirers. For example, the market may like the acquirer's 
acquisition activity initially, but this reaction deteriorates over time as the unrealistic 
expectation is replaced by reality that leads to the original temporary overvaluation 
declining, or vanishings altogether. 
The accounting manipulation hypothesis argues that the accounting manipulations 
associated with mergers may fool the market only initially. The more managers 
26 See Jensen (2004). 
27 See Dong, et al. (2003), Ang and Cheng (2003), and Bouwman, et al. (2003). 
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manipulate the accounting in order to keep their jobs or gain greater benefits, the 
more likely they are to be found out. One accounting explanation for declining 
performance is the PE game that focuses on increasing EPS through purchases of 
targets with relatively low PE ratios. This popular motive has the qualities if being 
completely irrational, short-sighted, and unsustainable. 
The merger programme announcement hypothesis explains performance decline by 
arguing that on the announcement of the first acquisition the market both reacts 
favorably to that event and also to the fact that it is part of a merger programme. This 
leads to the first acquisition being looked on very favorably. When a second 
acquisition is announced there will be some announcement gain since it is now a 
known event, but part of the value has already been discounted in the share price. This 
theory predicts a zero effect on the share returns of later acquisitions. It makes no 
prediction about a decline in profitability associated with subsequent acquisitions. 
2.2.4.2 Empirical Evidence of the Frequent Bidder Effect 
In the last few decades, there have been various studies that have examined both 
short-run and long-run returns, and the profit effect in terms of the general 
performance impact of single bidders compared to frequent bidders. For example, 
Stegemoller (2001) examined the long-term performance of 542 US firms making 
five or more public, non-public, or subsidiary acquisitions from 1990 to 1999. The 
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evidence shows that frequent acqUlrers out-performed comparable firms in both 
accounting and stock return measures. This evidence is robust to method of payment 
and the public status of the target. Stegemoller (2001) also presented results consistent 
with relatively large takeover programmes being substantially more successful than 
smaller ones. Baker and Limmack (2001) found similar evidence for the UK although 
Gregory (1997) found that both single and regular acquirers experienced significant 
negative returns. 
Some early studies, such as that of Schipper and Thompson (1983), examined the 
returns of frequent bidders using an early sample period, and found positive abnormal 
returns of 13% for the twelve months up to and including the announcement of the 
acquisition programme. However, they found little stock price reaction to subsequent 
acquisition announcements. They argued that most likely is because most of the 
benefits of a merger programme are capitalized on at the announcement of the 
programme. 
At the same time, a number of early studies examined how the performance of 
frequent bidders changed with each acquisition in order. Asquith, et al. (1983) found 
that most of the bidding firms in their sample made multiple bids, 45% making four or 
more subsequent bids throughout the seventeen-year sample period (1963 -1979). 
They analysed the abnormal returns for successive merger bids of 156 firms that 
initiated merger programmes in the period 1963 to 1979 after eight years without a bid. 
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They also found that bidder returns remained positive at roughly 2.5% through the 
fourth bid. 
Subsequently, Loderer and Martin (1990) examined the impact on the short-run 
returns of 1,538 acquirers of 5,172 targets from 1966 to 1984. They found that first 
acquisitions led to significantly larger announcement effects than subsequent 
acquisitions. They also found that first acquisitions tended to cause significantly more 
positive announcement effects when they were the only acquisitions in the series than 
when they were the first of two acquisitions. They interpreted these results as 
suggesting that acquisitions are profitable and that partial anticipation causes an 
estimation bias, because frequent acquirers experience a positive revaluation while 
announcing the first acquisition in a series, and then weaker positive revaluations 
when announcing subsequent acquisitions. 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) examined the announcement returns to 449 US 
acquisitions occurring between 1980 and 1992, and compared these to the experience 
of acquirers between 1948 and 1979. They found a significant negative relationship 
between acquisition experience and performance. Hayward (2002) examined 350 
acquisitions by 100 US firms between 1990 and 1995, and related the acquirer 
announcement returns of these focal acquisitions to the characteristics of previous 
non-focal acquisitions made by the same acquirers between 1985 and 1989. He found 
that the number of non-focal acquisitions had a negative effect on announcement 
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returns. In a nutshell, these two authors argue that this pattern may reflect the fact that 
firms tend to continue making similar acquisitions and therefore are not learning from 
experience. 
The milestone research by Fuller, et al. (2002) examined the short-run returns to 539 
acquirers that had carried out at least five acquisitions over a three-year period from 
1990 to 2000. They did not look at any takeover activity prior to this period and found 
that first bids were associated with significant positive returns, whereas returns to fifth 
and subsequent bids were insignificant and sometimes negative. They argued that one 
explanation for this finding is that after making many quick acquisitions, bidders 
either negotiate less efficiently or create less synergy in later deals. They found that 
the shorter the time period surrounding acquisitions, the lower the acquirer's returns, 
which is consistent with their explanation. 
Rosen (2004) examined the short and long-run effects where the acquisition was the 
first acquisition by a sample firm over a three-year period. He found that the short-run 
reaction was independent of whether the announcement was the first to be made by a 
firm in the previous three years, but that first time announcers did better than other 
bidders in the long-run. Rosen also found that the announcement effects were 
positively related to the firm's previous merger announcement effect. 
In summery, there is some evidence that frequent bidders do better than single bidders. 
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There is also evidence that the short-run performance of acquisitions declines with 
each subsequent acquisition. Although several hypotheses offer theoretical support to 
these patterns, the learning by doing hypothesis has received the most attention. In the 
next section, there is an in-depth review of the literature on the learning by doing 
hypothesis to facilitate a better understanding of this issue. 
2.2.5 Learning to Acquire: the Knowledge Accumulation Mechanism 
Much of the research has found that in a series of acquisitions, bids that come later in 
the process yield better performances for frequent bidders. Many researchers attribute 
this effect to the learning by doing hypothesis. The fundamental idea behind this is 
very straightforward; bidders learn from the past and accumulate knowledge from 
each bidding. In other words, if the acquirer selects the appropriate integration 
approach from among the available alternatives, invests sufficient time and effort in 
extracting valuable lessons from its own past acquisition experiences and uses this 
knowledge to constantly improve its management of the integration process, then the 
post acquisition performance of its transactions should be systematically superior to 
that of its competitors that either select sub-optimal integration approaches, or invest 
less time in introspection and learning. If it is assumed that the bidder is rational or at 
least semi-rational, then the same mistake will not be repeated twice, hence the later 
bidding should generate better performance compared to the previous one. 
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For the purpose of reviewing prior work, the findings of research that has used 
fmancial market measures as dependent variables will be briefly highlighted. This will 
be followed by a summary of the research on post-acquisition management. The 
principal elements underlying a knowledge-based view of the acquisition 
management process are then presented. Research on stock market reactions to 
different types of acquisitions has been very useful in emphasizing the challenge that 
acquirers face in creating value beyond the premium paid to gain control of the target 
firm. Research on post-acquisition management has been relatively less extensive, in 
part because of the greater difficulty in finding rich data on post-acquisition practices 
and consequences for large samples of transactions. Each of these streams is reviewed 
briefly, and their findings reported to show how they relate to this thesis. 
In taking a knowledge accumulation based view of acquisitions, it is suggested that 
decisions to integrate acquired units are influenced by practices developed as the firm 
gains experience from previous transactions. Nelson and Winter (1982) suggested that 
organizational routines are significant repositories of knowledge within the fmn. They 
further argued that these routines have to be replicable in comparable settings for the 
firm to benefit from its prior knowledge. In the contest of acquisitions, then, the 
organization develops a practice, or re-utilizes behaviour, which incorporates past 
experience in tacit or explicit forms. 
Leshchinskii and Zollo (2002) found that two constructs can be developed which 
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underlie the fmn's ability to process the knowledge it may accumulate from prior 
experiences. These constructs are essentially vehicles for the ftrm to accumulate and 
embody the knowledge it gains from prior acquisitions. The ftrst construct is process 
routinization which is the degree to which knowledge from previous experiences 
accumulates in tacit forms and results in quasi-automatic, uniform response behaviour 
to varied stimuli. The second construct is so-called knowledge codiftcation that is , , 
the degree to which the accumulated experience is codifted in manuals, blueprints, 
computational models etc., which provide the "know what" and eventually the "know 
how" for the execution of a certain task. The two constructs are clearly not orthogonal 
and some degree of correlation can be expected between the two, given that they are 
both products of the same knowledge accumulation process. However, the 
mechanisms of process routinization and knowledge codification are separable, in that 
the former is more tacit in its character, while the latter is explicitly codified. 
Leshchinskii and Zollo (2002) argued that knowledge codification might have a 
positive influence on the perfOlmance of acquisition processes for several reasons. 
First of all, these tools serve as repositories of organizational memory; they provide a 
trace of what was decided and done in past instances, particularly useful in relatively 
infrequent and complex processes such as acquisitions. Second, they facilitate the 
diffusion of knowledge to parts of the organization different from the one where the 
higher level of understanding is achieved. For example, a manual provides a fast and 
effective training for people new to the process. Thirdly, they clarify the roles, 
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responsibilities and deadlines for all the people involved in the execution of large 
numbers of inter-dependent tasks, thereby facilitating the coordination of the entire 
process. Finally, the process by which these tools are created and developed 
necessitates collective cognitive efforts to identify the links between decisions, 
actions and performance implications. It is by creating and updating these tools that 
acquirers figure out what worked and what did not work in their past experiences and 
formulate ideas for the improvement of future integration processes. 
2.2.6 Management Overconfidence and Merger Outcome 
HMuch management apparently was overexposed in impressionable childhood years 
to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad's body 
by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial 
kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T[ arget}. .. We've observed many 
kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain 
serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses-even after their corporate 
backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads. " 
______ Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
Annual Report, 198128 
Previous literature has defined overconfident managers as those that over estimate 
their ability to generate returns, both in their current firm and in potential takeover 
targets. Thus, these managers undertake mergers that destroy value. Overconfidence 
28 Quotes taken from Weston, Chung, and Siu (1998). 
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also implies that managers view their company as undervalued by outside investors 
and, therefore, the impact of overconfidence is strongest when CEOs can finance 
mergers internally. The following is a review of the literature that has looked at the 
question of why managers tend to be overconfident when engaging in merger deals 
and the consequences of such overconfidence. 
Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis suggests that managers engage in acquisitions with an 
overly optimistic opinion of their ability to create value. A number of papers have 
documented evidence supporting this hypothesis. 29 However, one important question 
remains unanswered, which is how do managers become overconfident? Managers 
could simply be born overconfident. Alternatively, they may develop overconfidence 
through experience. The psychology and behavioural economics literature documents 
one common source of overconfidence: the self-attribution bias.3o Individuals subject 
to the self-attribution bias tend to overly credit their ability for good outcomes and 
overly credit external factors for bad outcomes. Hirshleifer (2001) summarized the 
relationship between overconfidence and the self-attribution bias, he argued that 
overconfidence and self-attribution bias are static and dynamic counterparts; 
self-attribution causes individuals to learn to be overconfident rather than arriving at 
an accurate self-assessment. 
29 See Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003), and Malmendier and Tate (2003) for direct evidence 
supporting the hubris hypothesis. 
30 See Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004), and Gilovich, Giffin, and Kahnemann (2002), and 
Kahneman and Tverskey (2000) for reviews of the literature. 
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Billett and Qian (2005) explored the managerial self-attribution bias in M&As by 
looking at the sequence of deals made by individual acquirers. They argued that if 
managers mistakenly attribute past acquisition success to skill rather than good luck 
and develop hubris through acquisition experience, the pattern of deals will exhibit 
three characteristics. First, compared to their first deals, acquirers will do worse in 
their subsequent acquisitions because of the developed overconfidence. Second, 
acquirers who become overconfident from successful acquisition experiences will be 
more likely to acquire again. Third, acquirers who become overconfident from 
successful acquisition experiences may also exhibit the same optimism when trading 
their companies' stock. Using a large US sample comprising 3,702 acquisition bids 
from 1985 to 2002, they found supporting evidence for all three conjectures. 
In a similar vein, Malmendier and Tate (2003) analyzed the impact of manager 
overconfidence on M&As. By classifying managers into overconfident and rational 
groups they found that overconfident managers were more likely to conduct a merger 
at any point in time than rational mangers. They argued that this is probably because 
overconfident managers are likely to overvalue the acquisition of a target company 
because they overestimate the returns they can generate in the combined fums. They 
are also likely to overvalue their contribution to their own company. Malmendier and 
Tate also constructed a model of merger decision for managers who are overconfident 
in their ability and made three predictions. First, overconfident managers are more 
likely to conduct mergers when they have access to sufficient sources of internal 
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finance. In this case, they avoid the perceived loss in value from issuing undervalued 
equity to fmance the merger. Second, overconfident managers are more likely to 
conduct bad mergers. 31 Thirdly, the announcement effect will be lower for 
overconfident managers, on average, than for rational managers, since overconfident 
managers are more likely to make value destroying bids. Furthermore, Malmendier 
and Tate (2003) explored the market's reaction to merger announcements using 
standard event study methodology and the empirical results were consistent with their 
predictions.32 
Another explanation for the relationship between overconfidence and merger activity 
is the non-public information that managers have. Differences in information over 
time might account for these observed differences in managerial behaviour, even 
within a firm. Specifically, a manager who has positive non-public information about 
a potential merger might find it profitable not only to merger, but also to hold his 
options in anticipation of the merger's return. To address this possibility, Malmendier 
and Tate (2003) calculated the hypothetical returns to the manager from exercising his 
(or her) options earlier, rather than holding to expiration. They found that these gains 
are, on average, positive. Moreover, they found that such managers are no more likely 
to conduct mergers during the years in which they could have exercised options (that 
31 That is, mergers that either have no value or destroy value for the acquiring firm's shareholders. 
32 Malmendier and Tate (2001) exploited time series data on the managers' holdings of company stock 
options to construct a measure of managerial overconfidence. They found that overconfidence has a 
positive impact on managerial acquisitiveness between overconfident and rational managers even 
within the same firm. Thus, their results are robust to alternative interpretations that rely on cross 
sectional variations among firms. 
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they instead hold to expiration) than in the remainder of their years as manager. 
Overall, the higher acquisitiveness of overconfident managers, eyen on average. 
suggests that overconfidence is an important determinant of merger activities. 
In summary. previous studies have explored the role of overconfidence in the merger 
decision-making process. Overconfidence could arise from self-attribution of past 
success leading to hubris in future decision making. Investigation of the 
announcement effect revealed that acquisition by an overconfident bidder is value 
destructive. 
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2.3 HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this paper, the aIm IS to explore more direct links between the causes and 
consequences of corporate takeover. Many previous studies have suggested that 
bidding firms suffer losses from corporate takeover activities, on the other hand M&A 
has become one of the most important means by which firms implement their 
strategies for growth. Many researchers have developed different theories to explain 
the persistence of these transactions. Roll (1986) posited that M&A occurs because 
of the hubris and overconfidence of managers. Jensen (2000) argued that excessive 
cash flows permit firms to waste corporate assets on over-priced acquisitions. He later 
(2003) expanded this idea to argue that market-wide overvaluation leads to similar 
effects. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argued that firms with overvalued stock prices 
pursue acquisitions using stock as the method of payment to take advantage of the 
window of opportunity offered by temporary market inefficiencies. 
As discussed above some studies have found negative, long-run post-acquisition 
returns associated with particular types of acquisitions. Perhaps it is indeed hubris, 
agency costs, or temporary market overvaluation that drive corporate acquisitions. 
However, this is surely not the whole picture; it seems highly probable that the above 
arguments only provide partial explanations. As Andrade, et al. (2001) suggested, 
there must be a more direct link between the causes and effects of mergers. Thus, the 
challenge of identit\ing and understanding these reasons remains. 
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In short, this paper explores a more direct link between the causes and effects of 
corporate acquisition activity. As a result of the research it has been established that 
there is a significant price run-up of the bidder prior to an acquisition, thus the 
bidder's pre-takeover performance could be the main determinant of its acquisition 
strategy. 
HI: In order to be in a good position to take over other firms to achieve growth, 
bidding firms should have superior performance prior to an acquisition and thus 
should exhibit a substantial price run-up prior to acquisition. 
The relationship between the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition performance of 
acquiring firms was examined to find the empirical support for this hypothesis. This 
concept is very easy to follow, it could be the case that firms that have done well in 
the past are in the best position to acquire other firms, and those that are able to 
assimilate their acquisitions more easily will continue to do well afterwards. However, 
if managers are unable to resolve any conflicts between target and acquirer, or if the 
acquisitions are partially driven by the hubris of the managers, then a long-run 
decrease in the bidder's stock price should be expected. It doesn't matter how good 
the bidder's post acquisition performance is, the results here show that it is the case 
that performance drives acquisition. 
H2: Bidders using stock as the method of payment exhibit a more significant price 
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run-up prior to an acquisition. However this will result in worse performance in the 
long-run than where the bidders pay by cash. 
Previous researchers have found that bidders using stock as the method of payment 
send out a negative signal to the market that their stock is overvalued,33 the market 
then adjusts its expectations regarding the bidder, with the result that the bidder's 
stock price declines. From the bidder's point of view, it is more profitable in the 
short-run to use their overvalued stock as the method of payment when buying an 
undervalued target or a target with stock less overvalued than theirs. However, once 
the market absorbs this information, it will automatically discount the bidder's stock 
price, which results in losses over time. Thus, using stock as the method of payment 
indeed reflects the trade off between short-run benefits and long-run performance, and 
also reflects the bidder's vision of long-term growth. In a nutshell, the empirical 
results of the present research is consistent with most of the previous studies in 
showing that stock bidders experience a worse performance in the longer run 
compared to those using cash. In addition, it was found that the price run-up of stock 
bidders is also more significant which suggests their stock is probably overvalued. 34 
33 Asquith, Bruner, and Mullin (I983), and Schipper and Thompson (I983) examined the effects of 
acquisition programmes announcements, and found a positive acquirer market effect. Jensen (1986) 
found that a stock offer sends a signal to the market of overvaluation. 
34 To justify whether a stock is overvalued or not, the real value must be identified as it is the 
benchmark of the price; the assumption that the price is overvalued can only be made by comparing it 
with other firms using cash. For a detailed analysis of stock price overvaluation please refer to Chapter 
3. 
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H3: Bidders that pursue non-public targets should out perform those that pursue 
public targets in both the short-run and long-run. 
Non-public target acquisitions are the most likely to be small. The non-public target 
includes subsidiaries or divisions of larger firms being sold off. Non-public owners 
might be willing to sell out at a discount for liquidity reasons, which would manifest 
itself in a greater return to the buyer. A great deal of the literature on M&A has 
concerned itself with publicly traded targets. However, this traditional focus on public 
targets has meant that a significant portion of corporate acquisition has been 
somewhat neglected in academic research. Some recent studies on non-pUblic 
acquisition have found that acquirers' stock price reactions to announcements of 
non-public target acquisitions are positive; the difference in the announcement effects 
of cash versus stock all but disappear and, in some instances, the relationship is 
reversed. The empirical findings of the present research are similar to those of 
previous researchers. Most importantly, it was found that bidders involved In 
non-pubic target acquisitions yielded better performance in both the short-run and 
long-run. 
It can be argued that there are at least four reasons why non-public acquisitions should 
-
out-perform public targets. First of all, small acquisitions are less prone to agency 
problems. Most likely is because they feed hubris less and consume less cash flow, 
and hence are not an effective means of building empires or increasing the 
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remuneration of CEOs. Second, there are likely to be greater information asymmetries, 
which make it more likely that an acquirer can exploit non-public information to its 
advantage. Third, less public information is available and hence there are fewer 
bidding competitors. Fourth, non-public targets might be willing to sell out at a 
discount for liquidity reasons, which would manifest itself in a greater return to the 
buyer. Finally, cash as the most popular method for small acquisitions will eliminate 
the negative signal that is conveyed to the market when stock is used as the medium 
of exchange. 
H4: It is better for a firm to grow through a large number of small acquisitions than 
through a small number of large acquisitions. 
Corollary: 
The returns to the acquiring firm will be positively related to the number of 
acquisitions and negatively related to the relative size of the assets acquired. 
Many researchers believe that there is a difference between growth attained through 
making a small number of large acquisitions and that attained through many small 
acquisitions. Firms of consultants that sell M&A advice argue that relative size and 
frequency can affect the success or failure of an acquisition programme. Harding and 
Rovit (2004) studied many cases of M&A undertaken by different consulting firms, 
and they suggested that frequent acquirers that build skills and experience through a 
host of small deals come out on top and therefore executives should make a 'big deal 
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doing a lot of little deals'. Cools, et al. (2004) similarly concluded that the highly 
acquisitive firms in their sample out-performed those that made few or no acquisitions 
by 29% during the course of a decade. Typical arguments advanced for this include 
the following: smaller acquisitions are easier to integrate; more likely to be in a 
related business; are more likely to benefit acquirers from learning by doing; less 
likely to be done for reasons of hubris and empire-building; more likely to be able to 
exploit information asymmetries; and are more likely to be acquired with cash rather 
than stock. 
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2.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1 Data Selection 
The initial data on acquisitions was taken from the SDC M&A database of Thompson 
Financial. It includes all completed domestic acquisitions made by publicly listed UK 
firms, with deal values and acquirer names or ticker symbols available for the period 
January 1985 through December 2004. The sample contains all disclosed value 
mergers and acquisitions including LBOs. tender offers, and acquisitions of remaining 
interest. It excludes other transactions that are included in the SDC M&A database 
that is, spin-offs, recapitalizations. carve-outs, self-tenders, repurchases, exchange 
offers, privatizations, and minority stake acquisitions. The SDC was also used to 
collect M&A targets' identities, and determine whether their stocks were publicly 
traded, the deal's initial announcement date, dollar value, method of payment, legal 
form, and whether it was friendly or hostile. For the purposes of this research a 
merger is defined as an acquisition of equity where one firm purchases at least 50% of 
another and after the purchase the bidder owns at least 90% of the target. After this 
initial screening. complete information was obtained for 8,752 acquisitions 
undertaken by 2.125 UK firms publicly listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Second. in order to be included in the sample, the bidder's financial statements for the 
year-end prior to the offer must ha\'e heen reported in \Vorldscope. Although the SDC 
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provides data fields for bidder and target accounting information, they are often 
missing for UK bidders. 
Third, bidder stock price information at the year-end prior to the announcement had to 
be available in DataStream. Thus, all the financial data was collected from the 
DataStream database, and then the SDC was matched with DataStream using the 
SEDOL code. Subject to the availability of the SEDOL code all the acquisitions that 
could not be matched in DataStream were excluded. To minimize any loss of data 
from merging these databases, Lexis-Nexis, Extel Financial, and Worldscope were 
used to identify company name changes. All acquisitions with a transaction value of 
less than 50,000 pounds were also excluded. After this screening process, 6,423 UK 
acquisitions, undertaken from 1985 to 2004, by 1,367 publicly listed acquirers for 
which all the information was available comprised the data sample. 
2.4.2 Sample Description 
Tables 2.1 to 2.5 summarize the characteristics of the events and firms in the sample. 
As can be seen from Table 2.1, nearly 60% of the acquisitions were clustered in the 
boom merger periods (1987 to 89 and 1997 to 2000). The number of acquisitions 
during these periods averaged nearly 320 per year, compared to an annual average of 
less than 230, the peak year being 1998 with 603 acquisitions. Nearly 90% of the 
acquisitions involved non-public targets. Only 10% of the sample represents 
76 
acquisitions of publicly traded targets. These proportions are roughly constant 
throughout the decade. Related acquisitions account for about 50%.35 47% of all 
acquisitions were made using cash as the sole medium of exchange, while only 5% of 
. the transactions were solely financed using stock, the remainder used both method of 
payments, although the average proportion of cash in the mixed offers was over 70%. 
Previous researchers that have focused on the US market have pointed out that the 
role of cash as a medium of exchange fell slightly during the 1990s and that of stock 
increased substantially. However, this pattern was not observed in the UK where cash 
offers dominated the market throughout the sample period. The average deal value in 
the sample was 26.08 million pounds, while the average deal value during the merger 
boom period was 36 million pounds, which suggests that large deals cluster around 
merger boomperiods. 
Table 2.2 contains a summary of the statistics regarding the cash value of the deals in 
the sample. The total cash value of all acquisitions over the period was about 147 
billion pounds. Average deal values steadily rose during the sample period. Before 
1990 the average deal value was about 4 billion pounds, but by 1999 the average had 
exceeded 18 billion pounds. Reflective of this trend, the merger boom period 
accounted for nearly 60% of the value of all acquisitions, despite the fact that only 
45% of all acquisitions occurred in this period. Although publicly traded targets 
accounted for less than 120/0 of the acquisitions, they accounted for 53% by value. The 
]5 For the purposes of this research related acquisitions are defined as acquisitions where the target and 
acquirer share the same two-digit primary SIC code. 
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proportion of public acquisitions slightly increased from the early sample period to 
the late sample period. Over 55% of acquisitions according to value are related, with 
no discernible pattern throughout the sample period. Although cash only acquisitions 
were 47% by number, they accounted for only 41 % by value; stock only acquisitions 
accounted for 5% by number, but over 16% by value. 
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of acquirers according to the frequency of 
acquisitions made during the sample period. While the average acquirer made four 
acquisitions, about 25% of all firms made only one acquisition during this time period. 
In fact 72% of all acquirers made five or less acquisitions during the sample period, 
which accounted for about 67% of all acquisitions. The most frequent acquirer in the 
sample was Capita Group PLC, which made fifty-four acquisitions during the sample 
period. The second most frequent bidder was Emap PLC, which acquired fifty-three 
targets in seventeen years . 
. 
Table 2.4 presents the data regarding the acquisition of public targets. Of the 709 
acquisitions of public targets during the sample period, over 48% were related 
acquisitions. Nearly 20% of the deals were financed by stock only, and 38% of the 
deals used cash as the sole medium of payment. The deal value for typical public 
targets was about 109 million pounds. The total number of acquirers was 609, of the 
total number of deals most were carried out by different bidders, perhaps this was 
because the deals were larger than those involving non-public acquisitions. The 
proportion of where stock was used for the public target acquisitions increased during 
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the merger boom period, which is consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis. 
The acquisitions of non-public targets (Table 2.5) tell a different story. While cash 
only deals accounted for 38% of the public target acquisitions, they accounted for 
nearly 48% of the non-public target acquisitions. Stock only deals comprised 20% of 
the public target acquisitions and 4% of the non-public targets. The average value of a 
non-public acquisition during the sample period was only 15% of the size of the 
public target acquisitions. In summary, compared to the public targets acquisitions, 
the non-pUblic target acquisitions during this time period were more unrelated, used 
less stock and more cash, were more technology driven, and were much smaller, at 
about 15% of the size. 
2.4.3. Methodology 
An event study analysis of the 6,423 individual fIrm events in the sample, and a time 
series analysis of each fIrm's sequential acquisition strategy were conducted. The 
purpose of these analyses was to examine the relationship between the pre-acquisition 
and post-acquisition performance of the acquiring fIrms, their acquisition strategies 
over time, the characteristics of the targets they acquired, and the returns realized by 
their stockholders. 
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2.4.3.1 The Event Study 
To analyse market reaction to the announcements of the acquisitions in the sample, 
standard even study methodology was employed to measure the pre-announcement, 
announcement, and post-announcement returns to acquirers. The excess returns were 
calculated by using a standard market model. 36 The calculations are based on 
Market-Adjusted Returns (MARs) and Cumulative Market Adjusted Returns 
(CMARs):, 
(1) 
(2) 
T 
CMARp,T = L ( MARp,t ) (3) 
t=l 
(4) 
where Ri,t is the return to the ith firm on day (month) t, RM,t is the return to the 
equally-weighted market portfolio on day (month)t, Nt is the number of fmns in the 
portfolio on day (month) t, T is the end of the accumulation period as well as the 
36 Before choosing the models, the standard market model was compared with the Fama French 
three-factor model, the monthly return was regressed to an equally weighted prescient portfolio of the 
acquirer to the right hand side factors of the market model and the FF 3 factor models. The statistics of 
the regression indicate that both models fit the data well, the R2 of the FF 3 factor model is 0.86, and 
the standard market model is 0.91. The Durbin-Watson statistics reveal no first order serial correlation. 
The fact that the FF model tracks the market so closely indicates that the characteristics of the firms in 
the portfolio of acquiring firms are not dissimilar to the market as a whole. Thus, acquirers cannot be 
typecast by their size or MIB ratio. Since the standard market model has a higher R2 and the estimated 
Beta is insignificantly different from 1, the standard market model was chosen as the main estimation. 
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number of periods, and Op is the time series standard error of the MAR, estimated 
from the returns data prior to the event window. The data was centered on the day or 
month of the acquisition announcement as appropriate, and an average abnormal 
return to the acquiring firms was calculated relative to this event date. 
2.4.3.2 Conventional parametric Student t-test 
The t-statistics are estimated using cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns. 
More specifically, the test statistic of the null hypothesis that the mean CMARs is 
equal to zero for a sample of n firms is as follows: 
tCMAR = r 
0"( CMAR j ,I) / -V n 
(5) 
Where CMAR i,t is the sample average and a(CMAR;,r) is the cross-sectional 
sample standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of n firms. 
2.4.3.3 The Time Series Analysis 
To investigate whether it is better for a firm to grow through many small acquisitions 
or through a small number of large acquisitions, the value index (VI) methodology 
was applied. A VI portfolio was formed according to the merger sample over the 
sample period 1985 to 2004, each acquirer's return was converted into a VI, and 
logged to smooth away any price shocks, and minimize the effects of the extreme 
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values of VI from some finns. Some finns in the sample had VIs greater than 10. By 
using this methodology the negative effects of non-nonnal distribution of each firm's 
return were minimized, and the return time series made more consistent, helping to 
bring about a more significant result. The log of the twenty-year VI for acquirer i is 
calculated as: 
(5) 
where T is the last month in the calculation (December, 2004), the first month is 
January 1985, and Ri,t is the return to the ith acquirer in month 1. An acquirer is defined 
as a finn that made at least one acquisition during the period January 1985 to 
December 2004. 
In order to test the hypothesis that it is better for a finn to grow through a large 
number of small acquisitions than through a small number of large acquisitions, the 
relationship between the acquirer's return was directly tested with the number of 
acquisitions and relative size (RS) of the assets acquired. If the hypothesis holds, 
then a positive relationship between the returns of acquirers with a number of 
acquisitions and a negative relationship between the returns of acquirers with the 
relative size of the asset acquired, should be seen. A cross-sectional regression was 
conducted of the log of a finn's VI on the number of acquisitions it made, and the 
relative size of the assets it acquired during the sample period. The relative size of the 
acquired asset for each finn was measured by tabulating the deal value and pre-bid 
value of the acquiring finn for each acquisition, made by each firm. The sum of the 
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value of the deals was taken and divided by the sum of the values of the acquiring 
firms at the time of each transaction, thus giving a average of the RS. 
In general, the hypothesis is empirically supported, that IS~ that the bidder's 
performance is better when many small deals are made. 
2.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
2.5.1 Overview 
In this section the main empirical findings are outlined and the rationale behind these 
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findings is explained. First of all, from the large UK takeover sample, some 
distinctive features of nonpublic acquisitions are revealed. There are two types of 
non-public target: sales by non-public owners and sales of subsidiaries by larger 
companies. Compared with public target acquisitions, non-public target acquisitions 
are less related, use less stock and more cash as methods of payment, are more 
technologically driven, and are much smaller, at about 15% of the size of public target 
acquisitions. 
Secondly, it was found that frequent acquirers that pursue small targets yielded the 
best returns. Depending on the relative size of the acquisition, buy and hold portfolios 
of frequent acquirers returned substantially more than the equivalent portfolios of 
infrequent acquirers during the twenty-year period under study. The portfolio of firms 
that acquired targets in the smallest relative size quintile returned 50% more than the 
portfolio of acquirers in the largest relative size quintile. The portfolio of frequent 
acquirers of targets in the smallest relative-size quintile out-performed the portfolio of 
infrequent acquirers of targets in the largest relative size quintile by 180%. 
If the analysis stops there then the conclusion may be drawn that bidders' acquisition 
strategies and the public status of the target are the determinants of better performance. 
Is it therefore the case that acquisition will drive performance? However, a closer 
examination suggests that this is not the whole picture. It was found that during a 
period of up to two years prior to the acquisition month, the average acquirer's stock 
increased dramatically relative to the market benchmark, with the run-up being much 
higher for acquisitions undertaken with stock rather than cash. Moreover, the 
pre-acquisition excess returns to nonpublic targets that used stock as consideration 
were significantly higher than the excess returns to acquirers of public targets that 
used stock as the medium of exchange. Consistent with previous literature, it was 
found that a bidder's post acquisition performance exhibited a long-run downward 
drift. 
As regards the announcement period, it was found that the average announcement 
period return for acquirers of publicly traded targets was negative. However, acquirer 
announcement period returns of non-public acquisitions were not only positive and 
significant, but also economically meaningful. When public targets were acquired 
with stock, it was found that the announcement period return was more negative the 
larger the relative size of the target. However, it was found that the market responded 
positively to acquisitions of public targets when the deal was made in cash. When 
non-public targets were acquired, the positive announcement period return increased 
with the relative size of the target and was higher when the deal was a related 
acquisition, and where the acquisition was stock based. 
In summary, these empirical results shed light on the different theories as to why 
merger occurs. Clearly, merger is not the driving force of good performance, because 
there is a long-run downward drift. It can, however, be argued that merger is the result 
of good performance. Secondly, the merger outcome also depends on the method of 
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payment, acquisition strategy and the choice of target. Thirdly, the conventional 
conclusion that "targets win and acquirers do not lose" is much too simplistic. As the 
results here show, the vast majority of acquisitions actually result in positive market 
reactions. The majority of the sample studied here involved non- public targets, and 
the acquisition of these non-public targets resulted in statistically and economically 
significant positive announcement period returns regardless of their size, method of 
payment, or relatedness. Even in the case of public targets, negative announcement 
period returns were observed only when the target was relatively large and when stock 
was used as the medium of exchange rather than cash. Fourthly, consistent with 
Antouniou, Guo and Pemezas's (2006) market overvaluation and merger momentum 
hypothesis, the research here found that hubris; overconfidence and overvaluation are 
no doubt attributes that afflict some acquirers. Hence, it can be seen that there were 
many acquisitions during the merger boom period, many of which exhibited negative 
long-run performances. Finally, these results give broad support to the performance 
driven acquisition hypothesis, which is consistent with the prevailing evidence that 
acquisitions are pro-cyclical and occur in "waves" in specific industries as well as in 
the aggregate. 
2.5.2 The Results of the Time Series Analysis 
In this section the hypothesis that it is better for a firm to grow through many small 
acquisitions rather than through a small number of large acquisitions is tested. This 
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hypothesis predicts that the returns to acquiring fIrms will be positively correlated 
with the number of acquisitions undertaken and negatively correlated with the relative 
size of the assets acquired. 
Table 2.6 presents the results of the cross sectional regression of the log of each fIrm's 
VI on the number of acquisitions it made, and the relative size of the assets it acquired 
during the twenty-year sample period. To measure the relative size of acquired assets 
for each fIrm two methods were used. If the target was a public listed company, its 
market value in the month of the merger announcement was used as a proxy for its 
size. For non-public companies the deal value from each transaction multiplied by the 
percentage of the asset acquired was used as a proxy for its size. The sum of the 
values of the deals were divided by the sum of the values of the acquiring fIrm at the 
time of each transaction, thus giving a average of relative size. The empirical results 
show that the log of the acquirer's twenty-year VI was positively correlated with the 
number of acquisitions and statistically signifIcant with a t value of 2.54. At the same 
time, it was found that it was negatively correlated with the relative size of the 
acquisition, and again the result was signifIcant. 
These results suggest that if a fIrm wants to grow through taking over other firms then 
it should do it step by step, that is, through small acquisitions. This is understandable 
because, as mentioned above, it is easier for bidders to integrate smaller targets and 
explore any asymmetric information from the deal. Furthermore, the non-public 
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owner might wish to sell out at a discount price for liquidity reasons. All these issues 
will bring success to the bidding firms of non-public target acquisitions. Again, 
frequent bidders can accumulate the experience and capital gained from many 
previous acquisitions, that is, with a series of smaller acquisitions the acquirer has the 
opportunity to gain experience and learn from its mistakes as well as its successes. 
In order to have a better understanding of this issue, the hypothesis of whether it is 
better to grow through many small acquisitions or through a small number of large 
acquisitions was tested, and a categorical analysis of the data was conducted. Firms 
were classified based on the number of acquisitions made and the relative size of 
assets acquired. Table 2.7 consists of five rows corresponding to the quintiles of the 
relative size of the whole sample. The columns are all acquirers, infrequent acquirers, 
frequent acquirers, and the difference between the latter two. Frequent acquirers are 
defined as firms that made four or more acquisitions during the sample period and this 
group comprises 595 bidders. Infrequent acquirers are defined as firms that made 
three acquisitions or less during this period and this group comprises 772 bidders.37 
The cells of the table contain the average logged VI and the number of firms falling 
into that category. 
By performing this analysis, strong evidence was found that supported the hypothesis 
37 The analysis was also replicated categorizing frequent acquirers as firms undertaking three or more 
acquisitions, and five or more acquisitions. The results using these classifications also support the 
hypothesis. 
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that it is better for a fIrm to grow through many small acquisitions than through a 
small number of large acquisitions. The average logged VI for all acquirers was found 
to decrease monotonically as the relative size increased. This is consistent with the 
fmdings reported in Table 2.6 that the gain to the acquirer is negatively related to the 
relative size of the target. The data also shows that for each quintile, the returns to 
infrequent acquirers were signifIcantly less than the returns to frequent acquirers. 
Furthermore, for frequent acquirers, all the returns were found to be positive except 
for the largest relative size quintile, and for infrequent acquirers most of the returns 
were negative. This could be explained by the learning by doing hypothesis, whereby 
frequent bidders gain experience through many small acquisitions, and learn from 
their past, including the mistakes they have made, and thus have a greater in-depth 
knowledge of the merger programme. As a consequence, they will be less prone to the 
hubris problem and thus yield better performances. Notably, the portfolio that yielded 
the best performance was that of the frequent bidders that pursued the smallest targets, 
whereas the portfolio of infrequent bidders that pursued the largest targets yielded the 
worst performance; the difference between these two .portfolios is highly signifIcant. 
In general, the results in Table 2.7 provide strong support for the inference drawn 
from the data in Table 2.6 that growth through many small acquisitions generates 
better gains than growth through a small number of large acquisitions. Except for the 
third quintile of relative size, the t statistics of the difference between the top and 
bottom quintile are all signifIcant. This result could shed light on existing theories of 
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the merger programme, and provide theoretical backup for firms that are involved in 
many small acquisitions to achieve growth. 
2.5.3 The Results of the Event Study Analysis 
In this section, the results from the event study analysis are presented. The analytical 
focus now shifts from a firm time-series perspective to a firm-event perspective. To 
test the main hypothesis that acquisition activity is performance driven, a standard 
event study methodology was employed to measure pre-announcement and 
post-announcement returns to acquirers in both the short-run and long-run. Firstly, the 
results of the differences in the performances of the bidders based on the public status 
of the target firms are presented. Then an examination is made of the differences 
arising from the choices of methods of payment. The results of the announcement 
period returns are given at the end of this section. 
2.5.3.1 The Results of the Bidders' Long-run Performances According to the 
Mode of Acquisition 
From the previous analysis, it can be seen that there are significant differences in the 
returns to and characteristics of acquisitions of pubic targets and acquisitions of 
non-public targets. These differences will be discussed here in detail. 
Figure 2.1 plots the Cumulative Monthly Market-Adjusted Returns (CMMAR) to the 
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portfolios of all acquirers, acquirers of non-public targets, and acquirers of public 
targets, and the statistics are reported in Table 2.8. Panel A plots the statistics from the 
twenty-four months before the acquisition announcement to the twenty-four months 
after, based on the monthly data. Panel B reports the statistics from the twelve months 
before through the twelve months after the acquisition announcement. It can be 
clearly seen that there is a dramatic stock price run-up prior to the event month for 
each of the portfolios. 
The CMMAR to the portfolio of all firms in the two years prior to the event month is 
11.8% (not shown in the graph), and is highly significant with a t-value of 8.48. The 
CMMAR to the portfolio of acquirers of non-public targets is 13.84% with a t value 
of 8.61, and the CMMAR for the acquirers of public targets is 10.52% with a t value 
of 7.38. The data shows that the pre-announcement run-up over this two-year period 
is significantly greater for acquirers of non-public targets than it is for those of public 
targets. From the results in Panel B (Figure 2.1, Table 2.8) it can be seen that there are 
also some clear trends of pre-announcement price run-up. For all acquirers, there is a 
7.13% (t = 4.61) price run-up, and for public acquirers the run-up is 4.38% (t = 2.48). 
The same is found for the twenty-four month analysis, where non-pUblic acquirers 
exhibited a higher prior announcement run-up of7.65%(t = 3.21). 
The two-year post-announcement return was significantly negative for both groups 
and significantly greater for the acquirers of non-public targets. Similar patterns are 
found in the 12-month period results. In general, the long-run study according to the 
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mode of acquisition shows that acquisitions of non-public targets yielded better 
returns in both the twelve-month and twenty-four month event windows. Despite the 
price decrease in the post-announcement period, most acquisitions still exhibited a 
significant price run-up prior to the merger announcement. Hence, these results 
provide strong support for the hypothesis that performance drives acquisition. In other 
words, if a firm wants to be in a good position for taking over other firms to achieve 
growth, it should have superior performance prior to an acquisition, and thus should 
exhibit a substantial price run-up prior to the acquisition. Consistent with most 
previous empirical research, negative long-run performance was found in both event 
windows, which suggests that merger is not the direct cause of a firm's good 
performance. 
2.5.3.2 The Results for the Bidders' Short-run Performance According to the 
Mode of Acquisition 
The event windows for the short-run study are 60 days (pre, post) and 20 days (pre, 
post), respectively. The cumulative daily market adjusted returns (CDMARs) are 
plotted in Figure 2.4 and the statistics are reported in Table 2.9. Statistics for the 
CDMARs from day -60 to day 60 and from day -20 to day 20 are reported for both the 
acquirers of public and those of non-public firms. Similar to the results for the 
one-year window, both the sixty-day and twenty-day pre-announcement stock price 
run-ups are significant, but not statistically different from each other. It can be seen 
from the sixty-day windows that the public target acquisitions had even higher price 
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run-ups prior to the acquisition announcements. This is probably because there is 
more infonnation available about public targets, which leads more investors and 
analysts to focus on this type of acquisition, thereby pushing up the price. Unlike 
the findings from the long-run post-announcement returns, positive 
post-announcement returns were seen for all of the portfolios, which suggests that 
over a short period of time merger can indeed push up the stock price and yield a 
better return. Notably, an abnonnal price movement is seen around the announcement 
period. For both the sixty-day and twenty-day event windows, it was found that a 
non-public acquisition announcement can boost the stock price very efficiently around 
the announcement period. However, it seems that public target acquisition 
announcements will discount the bidder's stock price immediately, as a clear 
downward movement is seen after the announcements of public target acquisitions. 
This may be because there are more stock or mixed offers in public target acquisitions, 
sending a negative signal about the bidder's stock overvaluation. On the other hand, it 
could be because there is a decrease in asymmetric information as more information 
becomes available when the merger is announced, and the market automatically 
discount's the bidder's price as the unrealistic expectation is replaced by real 
information after the announcement. 
The CDMARs to the portfolio of all fmns for the sixty days prior to the event day was 
2.91 %, and is highly significant with a t-value of 4.52. The CDMARs to the portfolio 
ofacquirers of non-public targets was 2.75% with a t value of3.47, and the CDMARs 
for the acquirers of public targets was 3.01 % with a t value of 5.27. The data shows 
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that the pre-announcement run-up over this sixty-day period was significantly greater 
for acquirers of public targets than for those of non-public targets. From the results in 
Panel B (Figure 2.4, Table 2.9) it can be seen that there are also some clear trends of 
pre-announcement price run-up for the twenty-day event windows. For all acquirers 
the run-up was 0.58% (t = 3.66), and for public acquirers it was 0.45% (t = 3.18). 
Unlike for the findings for the sixty-day windows analysis, the non-public acquirers 
exhibited higher pre-announcement run-ups of 0.60% (t = 2.24). 
The size and significance of the pre-announcement run-up casts doubt on the notion 
that acquisition drives performance. If acquisition can indeed stimulate a bidder's 
performance, post-acquisition price decreases would not be observed. Rather, the 
implication of this data is that firms with a higher market valuation are more apt to 
pursue acquisitions. In other words, acquisitions appear to be the result of good 
performance, rather than the cause. 
2.5.3.3 The Results of the Bidders' Long-run Performance According to Method 
of Payment. 
In this part, the results of the long-run performance of the bidders according to the 
different methods of payment are presented. In general, these fmdings are consistent 
with the previous literature in showing that stock-based acquisitions are not as 
profitable as those based on cash. 
Figure 2.3 presents the CMMARs of acquisitions involving cash and stock, for the 
twenty-four and twelve-month event windows based on monthly data. The data is 
presented in Table 2.8. The most striking feature of Figure 2.3 is the big jump in 
returns for stock-based acquisitions during the twelve months surrounding the 
acquisition announcement. Both the cash and stock-based acquisitions exhibited a 
significant price run-up prior to the announcement. However, from the graph it can be 
seen that the stock-based acquisitions experienced serious price decreases after the 
announcement for both the twenty-four and twelve-month event windows. These 
drops in price not only wiped away the pre-announcement gains, but also brought the 
returns further downwards. Another distinctive trend that can be seen from the graph 
is that for the cash bidders the overall return was positive for both event windows. 
The CMMAR to the portfolio of acquirers using cash as the method of payment was 
12.36% with a t value of 9.03; for the acquirers using stock as the method of payment 
it was 20.62% with a t value of 1.48. These numbers show that stock bidders exhibit a 
significant price run-up prior to announcements. These results are consistent with the 
. overvaluation hypothesis, which is that stock bidders will consider their stock 
overvalued compared to the target stock, and by using stock as the method of payment 
they can take advantage of this overvaluation. The data also shows that the 
pre-announcement run-up over this two-year period was significantly greater for the 
stock bidders than it was for the cash bidders. However, the situation after the 
• 
acquisition announcement was dramatically different, with the stock bidders in 
general experiencing a very significant price drop, to -35.91 % (t =-1.74) for the 
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twenty-four month event windows, and -22.61 %(t = -3.52) for the twelve-month 
event windows; this is consistent with most of the previous research. The reason for 
this sudden price decrease is mainly the negative signal conveyed in stock offers. The 
post-announcement performance is much better for cash bidders. For the twenty-four 
month event window, the cash bidders' return decreased to -10.64% (t = -8.01), and 
for the twelve-month event window, the return was -4.52% (t = -2.85). 
2.5.3.4 The Results of the Bidders' Short-run Performance According to the 
Method of Payment 
The results of the bidders' short-run performance according to he methods of payment 
are illustrated in Figure 2.4 and the supporting statistics are presented in Table 2.9. As 
with the findings of the long-run studies, the pre-announcement run-ups were found to 
be larger for the stock-based acquisitions. 
These results are consistent with the hubris and overvaluation hypotheses because, 
notably, for both stock bidders and cash bidders, the post-announcement returns were 
all positive. This is in line with much of the previous research, which found that 
merger activities can indeed boost the bidder's return over a short period of time. 
The CDMARs to the portfolio of acquirers that used stock as the method of payment 
was 8.11 % with a t value of 5.12, and the CDMARs for the cash acquirers was 2.69% 
with a t value of 6.55. The data shows that iPe pre-announcement run-up over the 
sixty-day period was significantly greater for acquirers using stock than it was for 
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cash acquirers. From the results in Panel B (Figure 2.4, Table 2.9) it can be seen that 
there are also some clear trends of pre-announcement price run-ups for the twenty-day 
event windows. Distinctively, it shows that both stock bidders and cash bidders 
exhibited positive post-announcement price run-ups for the twenty-day event 
windows. For the stock bidders the run-up was the greater at 1.15% (t = 5.52), while 
for the cash bidders the run up was 0.89% (t = 1.35). 
2.5.3.5 The Results of the Bidders' Returns During the Announcement Period 
According to the previous literature, the bidder's announcement period returns are 
subject to many influences, and exhibit different trends from the long-run studies. 
Thus, an empirical test was carried out that specifically focused on the announcement 
period. 
Table 2.10 reports the cumulative announcement period market-adjusted returns for 
the event days -2 to +2 for all of the acquisitions in the sample according to the year 
and type of target. The announcement period return to the entire sample was 
significantly positive in each of the eleven years reported, and the announcement 
return over the entire time period was 1.45% (t = 17.27). The average announcement 
return for the sample of acquirers of public targets was negative in ten of the eleven 
years, and the negative return was statistically significant in four of those ten years. 
The overall announcement return for this sub-sample was -0.71% (t = -3.89). In 
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contrast, all of the announcement returns to the non-public target acquisitions were 
positive and statistically significant. The overall announcement returns to the 
acquirers of non-public targets over the period of 1990 to 2000 was 1.95% (t = 20.66). 
Finally, in eight of the eleven years, the announcement returns were significantly 
greater for the sample of acquisitions of non-public targets than for the sample of 
public target acquisitions. The overall difference for the entire period was 2.66% (t = 
12.31). 
In order to investigate the role that the relative size and method of payment plays in 
acquirers' announcement returns, a categorical analysis of the data was conducted. 
Table 2.11 presents the results of the announcement returns to acquirers according to 
whether they were acquisitions of public and non-public target, by the quintiles of the 
relative size of the target. 
The results suggest that for public target acquisitions, the returns are lower the larger 
the size of the target, while for non-public target acquisitions the returns are greater 
the larger the size of the target. Notably, most of the results in Table 2.11 are 
statistically significant. The results for the sample of public targets are consistent with 
the hubris theory of acquisitions as well as the overvaluation hypothesis. The results 
for the sample of non-pUblic targets, however, are consistent with the simple notion of 
wealth maximizing behaviour on the part of acquiring firms, at least those who 
acquire non-public targets. 
98 
Table 2.12 presents the announcement period returns according to type of target, 
medium of exchange, and relative seize of target. In general, it can be seen that there 
was a monotonic increase for cash offers as the relative size increased for both public 
and non-public acquisitions. In contrast, for the stock based acquisitions of public 
targets, the larger the relative size, the more negative was the announcement period 
return. The portfolio with the largest gain to the stockholders of acquirers of public 
targets was the fifth relative size quintile of cash-based acquisitions with a 1.72% 
five-day accumulated return with a t value of 2.66. However, the portfolio with the 
largest losses for acquirers of public targets was the fifth quintile of stock-based 
acquisitions with -1.45% (t = -3.73). For the group of acquirers of non-public targets, 
it can be seen that in the case of both cash and stock-based acquisitions, the 
announcement period returns increased monotonically as the relative size increased. 
Finally, it was found that the announcement period returns monotonically increased in 
the fifth quintile as movement was made across the medium of exchange from cash 
deals, to mixed deals, to stock deals. The biggest gain across all the portfolios lay in 
the fifth quintile of stock-based acquisitions of non-public firms, with a return of 
2.79% (t = 3.55). The portfolio that yielded the lowest return was the fifth quintile of 
stock-based acquisitions of public targets, with a return of -1.45% (t = 3.73). 
In summary, these findings provide empirical support for the hypothesis that, in 
general, performance can indeed stimulate merger activity, and that the outcome of an 
acquisition also depends on the mode of acquisition and the choice of target. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to resolve several empirical and theoretical 
issues concerning the characteristics, strategies, and performance of bidding ftrms 
undertaking M&As. By constructing and utilizing a large database, covering virtually 
all of the UK domestic acquisitions undertaken by publicly traded acquirers from 
1985 to 2004, it has been possible to re-examine, confirm, or contradict a great deal of 
the accumulated evidence in the M&A literature. 
The main contribution of this research is that it establishes that there is generally a 
signiftcant pre-acquisition price run-up for acquirers in the UK market, which 
suggests that mergers are the outcome of good performance rather than the cause. At 
the same time, the study has found that ftrms tend to perform better in both the short 
and long-run through making many small acquisitions compared to those that are 
involved in just a small number of big targets. As regards the merger announcement, it 
was found that there is a subsequent downward revision in the value of acquirers, and 
is highest for acquisitions involving public targets. Another major finding of this 
study is that there is a greater pre-acquisition price run-up for acquisitions in which 
the medium of exchange is stock rather than cash. This result holds for both public 
and non-public targets, although the run-up is particularly high for ftrms that use stock 
to acquire non-public targets. 
Consistent with most of the previous research, these ftndings show that for public 
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target acquisitions, the announcement effect is normally negative, whereas it is 
positive for non-public target acquisitions. When the sample was divided into groups 
according to method of payment, further interesting patterns were observed. The 
announcement return was greater for mergers based on stock than for cash deals. It 
was also the case that the larger the relative size of the deal, the larger the 
announcement return. This holds true for both the cash and stock sub-samples of 
non-public targets. For the public target acquisitions, the announcement effect was 
positive for cash only deals and the larger the cash deal, the more positive the effect. 
In contrast, the announcement effect of stock only deals was negative, and more so 
the larger the transaction. These results give a very good indication that the overall 
negative announcement returns to acquirers is probably due to a few large deals 
involving public targets and using stock as the method of payment. 
The empirical testing verifies that the bidding firm's performance not only depends on 
the method of payment, and the ownership status of the target, but also on other 
factors such as the acquirers previous bidding frequency, the manager's attitude, and 
market-wide valuation levels. Even though the results here appear to be consistent 
with much of the previous , a greater emphasis is placed on pre- acquisition price 
levels, and a close link is revealed between causes and consequences in the merger 
market, and this relationship could be influenced by the factorsidentified above. Also, 
some previous research offers explanations of how and why this link varies with 
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different types of deals.38 
Throughout the empirical investigation of the bidder's performance issue, some 
interesting points came to light that may be fruitful areas for future study. One of 
these is the market's reaction to non-public acquisitions. Given that the M&A 
landscape is dominated by acquisitions of non-public targets and given the persuasive 
evidence that the market reacts very differently to this group, arguably more time 
should be devoted to the study of this type of acquisition. There are still quite a lot of 
puzzles regarding non-public acquisitions that remain unsolved, especially the 
influence of market-wide overvaluation of non-public acquisitions This issue will be 
investigated in detail in the following chapter. 
38 Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis, Jensen's (2004) agency cost of market overvaluation hypothesis, 
and Shleifer and Vishny's (2004) stock price driven acquisition theory. 
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative Monthly Market-Adjusted Returns for Acquirers of Public 
Targets and Non-public Targets 
K 
CMMAR = I (Rp,1 - RM,I) where R P,t is the monthly return of an equally-weighted 
I=-K 
portfolio of firm-events, R M,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted FTSE all 
share index, for month t, and K is 24 (panel A) or 12 (panel B). Month zero is the 
event month. Data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database and consist of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available; "Public 
target" is as defined by SDC, and "Non-public targets" is a target that is not publicly 
traded. 
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative Daily Market-Adjusted Returns for Acquirers of Public 
Targets and Non-public Targets 
K 
CDMAR = I (Rp,1 - RM,I) where Rp,t is the monthly return of an equally-weighted 
I=-K 
portfolio of firm-events, RM,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted FTSE all 
share index, for day t, and K is 60 (panel A) or 20 (panel B). Day zero is the event day. 
Data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Merger and Acquisition 
database and consist of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 2004 by 
1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. "Public target" is as 
defined by SDC, and "Non-public targets" is a target that is not publicly traded. 
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative Monthly Market- Adjusted Returns (CMMAR) for 
Acquirers Using Stock payment and Cash Payment 
K 
CMMAR = I (R p " - RM ,/) where Rp,t is the monthly return of an equally-weighted 
I=-K 
portfolio of firm-events, RM,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted FTSE all 
share index, for month t and K is 24 (panel A) or 12 (panel B). Month zero is the 
event month. Data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database and consist of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available." Cash 
only" "Stock only" is defines as the method of payment is 100% by cash or stock 
respectively. 
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Figure 2.4: Cumulative Daily Market-Adjusted Returns (CDMAR) for Acquirers 
Using Stock Payment and Cash Payment 
K 
CDMAR = I(Rp,1 - RM,t) where Rp,t is the monthly return of an equally-weighted 
t=-K 
portfolio of finn-events, RM,t is the monthly return of the equally weighted FTSE all 
share index, for day t, and K is 60 (panel A) or 20 (panel B). Day zero is the event day. 
Data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Merger and Acquisition 
database and consist of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 2004 by 
1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. "Cash only" "Stock 
only" is defines as the method of payment is 100% by cash or stock respectively. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the data from Securities data corporation (SDC) Merger and Acquisition 
database and consists of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 2003 by 1367 
publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. "Public targets" is defined hy 
SDC. "Related Acquisition" is defines as an acquisition in which the acquirer and target ha\t' 
the same two-digit primary SIC code. "Cash only" "Stock only" is defines as the method of 
payment is 100% by cash or stock respectively. Deal value is from SDC. 
Year Number Number Number of Number Number Average Average 
of of Public related of Cash of Stock Deal Number 
Targets Targets Acquisitions Only Only \'alue of Bidder 
(Million 
Pound) 
1985 20 5 3 13 " 22.1 17 .J
1986 65 12 27 40 8 35.3 44 
1987 191 35 77 109 26 33,2 133 
1988 306 48 123 177 12 23.4 194 
1989 289 65 109 131 26 22.3 185 
1990 231 21 90 122 7 15.5 166 
1991 223 38 88 117 12 28.2 136 
1992 231 27 103 111 18 16.6 155 
1993 245 28 104 116 19 14.7 134 
1994 329 44 162 160 20 16.1 223 
1995 343 48 173 149 20 14.4 236 
1996 358 32 156 163 21 20 244 
1997 499 46 277 230 28 37.4 309 
1998 603 46 328 314 26 23.4 340 
1999 542 61 285 235 19 42.5 315 
2000 571 48 323 220 35 37.8 332 
2001 438 32 221 132 32 19.2 286 
2002 344 25 182 161 16 25.9 240 
2003 273 25 173 127 15 36.6 185 
2004 ~!'1 .J~_ 23 173 159 11 37 193 
85 to 04 6423 709 3177 2986 374 26.08 'O~ - -) 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics on sterling value of acquisition activity and acquisition 
characteristics of UK acquirers: January 1985 to December 2004 (In UK billion 
pounds) 
This table presents the data from Securities data corporation (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database and consists of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are ayailable. "Public 
targets" is defined by SDC. "Related Acquisition" is defines as an acquisition in which 
the acquirer and target have the same two-digit primary SIC code. "Cash only" "Stock 
only" is defines as the method of payment is 100% by cash or stock respecti,'e1y. Deal 
value is from SDC. Acquirer market value is the beginning- of month Market value of 
acquirer's equity during the month in which an acquisition took place. and this data is 
from DataStream database. 
Year All Non-Public Public Related Cash Only Stock Only 
Targets Targets Targets Acquisitions 
1985 1. 06 O. 70 O. 35 0.16 0.43 O. 19 
1986 1. 80 0.42 1. 38 O. 59 1. 39 0.33 
1987 5.18 2.86 2. 32 2.80 2.67 1. 68 
1988 6. 10 2. 74 3. 36 2. 11 4.81 O. 18 
1989 5.45 2.03 3.42 2. 71 3.24 O. 53 
1990 2.87 1. 65 1. 22 1. 65 0.92 0.20 
1991 5.22 2.96 2.26 0.99 1. 96 O. 13 
1992 3.20 1. 88 1. 32 O. 61 1. 14 O. 11 
1993 3.18 1. 41 1. 77 1. 80 1. 24 0.44 
1994 4.66 2.27 2. 39 2. 12 2.49 0.22 
1995 4.27 1. 31 2.96 1. 64 2.02 O. 53 
1996 6.17 2. 04 4.13 3. 55 2.84 1. 47 
1997 16.59 12.08 4. 50 13. 66 3.62 10.21 
1998 11. 70 6.15 5. 54 6. 14 7.12 O. 90 
1999 18.44 7.17 11. '27 11. 50 8.62 0.27 
2000 18.09 8.33 9. 76 8. 77 6.56 4. 96 
2001 7.13 2.61 4. 53 3.92 2 -? • J~ O. 59 
2002 7.35 1. 80 5. 55 5.18 4.56 O. 55 
2003 8.24 4.94 3.30 5.94 2.64 0.80 
2004 10.48 4.06 6.42 5.68 5.33 O. 61 
85 to 04 147.18 69.43 77.74 81.50 66.12 24.91 
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Table 2.3 Acquisition/requenc)' 0/ UK public acquirers; January 1985 to December 
2004 
This table presents the data from Securities data corporation (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database and consists of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. The 
number of acquisition indicated the quantity of acquisition any firm had made during 
1985 to 2004 period. Percent of bidder is defined as the percentage of bidders in each 
category among total sample. 
Number of Acquisitions Number of Bidders Percent of Bidders Cumulative Percent 
1 348 25. "16% 25. 46% 
2 228 16.68% ~12. 14% 
3 203 14.85% 56. 99% 
4 104 7.61% 64. 59% 
5 112 8. 19% 72. 79% 
6 77 5.63% 78.42% 
7 52 3.80% 82. 22% 
8 41 3. 00% 85.22% 
9 36 2.63% 87.86% 
10 32 2. 34% 90.20% 
11 27 1.98% 92. 17% 
12 12 0.88% 93.05% 
13 23 1.68% 94. 73% 
14 11 0.80% 95. 54% 
15 11 0.80% 96.34% 
16 9 0.66% 97.00% 
17 2 O. 15% 97. 15% 
18 3 0.22% 97.37% 
19 4 0.29% 97.66% 
20 3 0.22% 97.88% 
21-60 29 2. 1290 100.00% 
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Table 2.4 Summary statistics on public target acquisition 
This table presents the data from Securities data corporation (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database and consists of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. We 
specially focus on public target acquisitions, and we present the acquisition activity 
and characteristics of public target acquisition only. "Public targets" is defined by 
SDC. "Related Acquisition" is defines as an acquisition in which the acquirer and 
target have the same two-digit primary SIC code. "Cash only" "Stock only" is defines 
as the method of payment is 100% by cash or stock respectively. Deal value is from 
SDC. 
Year Number No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Avg. Deal 
of Public Related Cash Stock Acquirers Value 
Targets Targets Acquisitions Only Only (Million 
Pounds 
1985 20 5 1 3 1 5 140.56 
1986 65 12 5 2 2 10 83.32 
1987 191 35 12 12 10 30 102.03 
1988 306 48 14 31 5 45 68.60 
1989 289 65 21 24 12 49 41. 52 
1990 231 21 10 10 3 20 86.92 
1991 223 38 12 19 6 28 87.20 
1992 231 27 12 13 2 21 75.35 
1993 245 28 10 10 5 22 54. 12 
1994 329 44 24 13 6 38 64.95 
1995 343 48 30 12 8 41 27.91 
1996 358 32 16 11 10 27 70.41 
1997 499 46 28 17 13 43 281. 01 
1998 603 46 30 21 10 40 143.07 
1999 542 61 32 23 9 53 125. 74 
2000 571 48 29 17 12 39 177.20 
2001 438 32 15 13 10 30 86.93 
2002 344 25 21 9 3 22 78.46 
2003 273 25 17 5 8 21 205.82 
2004 322 23 8 9 4 22 193.49 
85 to 04 6423 709 347 274 139 606 109. 73 
110 
Table 2.5 Summary statistics on non-public target acquisition 
This table presents the data from Securities data corporation (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database and consists of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. We 
specially focus on non-public target acquisitions, and we present the acquisition 
activity and characteristics of public target acquisition only. "Public targets" is defined 
by SDC. "Related Acquisition" is defines as an acquisition in which the acquirer and 
target have the same two-digit primary SIC code. "Cash only" "Stock only" is defmes 
as the method of payment is 100% by cash or stock respectively. Deal value is from 
SDC. 
Year Number No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Avg. Deal 
of Non-Public Related Cash Stock Acquirers Value 
Targets Targets Acquisitions Only Only (Million 
Pounds 
1985 20 15 2 10 2 13 29.43 
1986 65 53 22 38 6 37 30.06 
1987 191 156 65 97 16 113 18. 14 
1988 306 258 109 146 7 165 15.20 
1989 289 224 88 107 14 156 18.17 
1990 231 210 80 112 4 153 7. 33 
1991 223 185 76 98 6 119 14.94 
1992 231 204 91 98 16 138 7.85 
1993 245 217 94 106 14 122 9.34 
1994 329 285 138 147 14 196 9.37 
1995 343 295 143 137 12 203 11. 83 
1996 358 326 140 152 10 227 14. 79 
1997 499 453 249 213 15 279 11. 26 
1998 603 557 298 293 16 319 12. 16 
1999 542 481 253 212 10 286 29.90 
2000 571 523 294 203 23 315 22.64 
2001 438 406 206 119 22 262 13. 31 
2002 344 319 161 152 13 222 21. 18 
2003 273 248 156 122 7 166 16.42 
2004 322 299 165 150 7 182 24.49 
85 to 04 3673 16.89 
6423 5714 2830 2712 234 
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Table 2.6 Regression o/the log 0/ acquirer's Twenty-year value index (LVI) Oil the 
number 0/ acquisition/rom January 1985 -December 2004 and the relative size 0/ 
acquisition 
The log of the twenty-year value index for acquirer i is calculated 
as LVI, ; LN { ~) (1 + R, " } , where T is the last month in the calculation (December. 
2004), the first month is January 1985, and Ri,t is the return to the ith acquirer in month 
t. An acquirer is defined as a firm that made at least 1 acquisition during the period 
January 1985 to December 2004. The number of acquisitions is from the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions database and consists of. 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken 
from 1985 to 2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are 
available. Relative size is the value-weighted average of the ratio of the acquisition 
value to the market value of the acquirer in the month prior to the acquisition of all 
acquisitions made by Firm I during this period. t -statistics in parentheses. 
Dependent Variable: Log o/the Acquirer's Ten Year Value Index 
Independent Variables Co-efficient (t-statistic) 
Constant 0.06(3.10)** 
Number of acquisition 0.065(2.54) ** 
Relative size of acquisitions -0.26( -4.23)* * 
No. of observations 1367 
3.95% 
F -statistic 27.91 
(* * represents the significant at 1 % level) 
112 
Table 2.7: Categorical analysis of the log of the acquirer's twenty-year value index 
(LVI) for all acquirers,frequent acquirers, and infrequent acquirers grouped by 
quintiles of relative size of acquisition 
The numbers in the cells are average LVI, the log of the twenty-year value index for 
acquirer i is calculated as LVI, = LN {~) (I + R",)}, where T is the last month in the 
calculation (December, 2004), the first month is January 1985, and Ri.t is the return to 
the ith acquirer in month t. An acquirer is defined as a firm that made at least 1 
acquisition during the period January 1985 to December 2004. The number of 
acquisitions is from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database and consists of. 64:::3 
U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for 
which deal values are available. Relative size is the value-weighted average of the 
ratio of the acquisition value to the market value of the acquirer in the month prior to 
the acquisition of all acquisitions made by Firm i during this period. Frequent 
acquirers are defined as firms that made four or more acquisitions during this period 
which contain 595 bidders and infrequent acquirer are defined as firms that made 
three acquisitions or less during this period which there are 772 bidders. t -statistics in 
parentheses (** represent the significance at 1 % leveL * represent the significance at 
5%) 
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Table 2. 7 (Continue) 
Relative Size All Infrequent Frequent Difference between 
Quintile Acquirers Acquirers Acquirers frequent and 
infrequent acquirers 
Smallest quintile 0.421 0.239 1.193 0.1~5 
Number 272 154 117 (1.81)* 
Range <0.026 
Second quintile 0.254 0.192 0.646 0.519 
Number 273 155 118 (2.49)** 
Range 0.026 
Third quintile 0.173 -0.057 0.431 o ,,-._-) 
Number 271 154 116 (0.61 ) 
Range 0.026-0.065 
Fourth quintile 0.039 -0.133 0.119 0.72 
Number 275 156 118 (1.78)* 
Range 0.065-0.10 
Largest Quintile -0.077 -0.215 -0.164 -0.897 
Number 275 153 116 (-2.98)** 
Range >0.10 
Difference between 0.238 0.192 0.962 
smallest and largest 
quintile (4.92)** (0.65) (2.92)** 
Difference between 0.964 
smallest/frequent 
and (3.02)** 
largest/infrequent 
quintile 
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Table 2.8: Pre and post- event cumulative monthly market-adjusted returns for all 
acquirers, acquirers of public targets, non-public targets, and acquirers using stock 
or cash as the method of payments 
-1 T 
Pre-CMMAR = L(Rp ,( -RM ,/) and Post - CMMAR = L (R p ,/ - RAJ,l) 
/=-T l=l 
where Rp,t is the monthly return of an equally-weighted portfolio of firm-events, R~1.t 
is the monthly return of the equally weighted FTSE all share index. for month t. and 
T= 12,24 respectively, Month zero is the event month . Data are from the Securities 
Data Corporation's (SDC) Merger and Acquisition database and consist of. 6423 U.K 
acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for 
which deal values are available. "Public target"' is as defined by SDC. and 
"'Non-public targets" is a target that is not publicly traded. "Cash only" "Stock only" 
is defines as the method of payment is 100% by cash or stock respectiyely. The 
significant level is reported as (-value. 
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Table 2.8 (Continue) 
All acquirers 
Acquirers of public targets 
Acquirers of non public 
targets 
Acquirers of cash 
payments 
Acquirers of stock 
payment 
Difference: 
non-public vs. public 
Difference: 
Cash vs. stock 
All acquirers 
Acquirers of public targets 
Acquirers of non public 
targets 
Acquirers of cash 
payments 
Acquirers of stock 
payment 
Difference: 
non-public vs. public 
Difference: 
Cash vs. stock 
Pre-event 
Month (-24 to -1) 
11.80% (8.48**) 
10.52% (7.38**) 
13.84% (8.61 **) 
12.36% (9.03**) 
20.62% (1.48) 
3.43% (1.83*) 
4.350/0 (3.21 **) 
Month (-12 to -1) 
7.13%(4.61 **) 
4.38%(2.48**) 
7.650/0(3.21 **) 
6.14%(5.22**) 
14.17%(2.67**) 
3.420/0(2.67**) 
7.580/0(3.69**) 
Post eyent 
Month (+1 to ~24) 
-16.47% (-7.48**) 
-14.75% (-8.18**) 
-15.70% (-7.38**) 
-10.64% (-8.01 **) 
-35.91 % (-1.74*) 
-3.77% (-3.17**) 
-3.98% (-l.72*) 
Month (+ 1 to + 12) 
-8.43%(-3.22**) 
-6.650/0( -2.12 * *) 
-7.78%(-1.71*) 
-4.52%(-2.85**) 
-22.61 %(-3.52**) 
-1.69%( -2.13**) 
-16.330/0(-1.87*) 
., .. indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively 
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Table 2.9: Pre and post- event cumulative dai(v market-adjusted returns for all 
acquirers, acquirers of public targets, non-public targets, and acquirers using stock 
or cash as the method of payments 
-3 T 
Pre-CDMAR = L(Rp,1 -RM,I) and Post-CDMAR = L(Rp,1 -RA/J where Rp.t 
I=-T 1=3 
is the daily return of an equally-weighted portfolio of firm-e\'ents for Day 1. Rm.t is 
the daily return of the equally weighted FTSE all share index, for day 1. and T=20,60 
respectively. The window of days (-2,+2) zero is the event window. Data are from the 
Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Merger and Acquisition database and consist of. 
6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 2004 by 1367 publicly listed 
acquirers for which deal values are available. "Public target" is as defined by SDC. 
and "Non-public targets" is a target that is not publicly traded. "Cash only" "Stock 
only" is defines as the method of payment is 1 00% by cash or stock respectively. The 
significant level is reported as t-value. 
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Table 9 (Continue) 
All acquirers 
Acquirers of public targets 
Acquirers of non public 
targets 
Acquirers of cash 
payments 
Acquirers of stock 
payment 
Difference: 
non-pUblic vs. public 
Difference: 
Cash vs. stock 
All acquirers 
Acquirers of public targets 
Acquirers of non public 
targets 
Acquirers of cash 
payments 
Acquirers of stock 
payment 
Difference: 
non-public vs. public 
Difference: 
Cash vs. stock 
Pre-event Post event 
Day (-60 to -3) Day (+3 to +60) 
2.91 %(4.52**) 0.64%(1.74) 
3.01 %(5.27**) 0.72%(4.66* *) 
2.75%(7.47**) 0.63%(2.24*) 
2.69%(6.55**) 0.93%(7.38**) 
8.11 %(5.12)** -0.35%( -2.36* *) 
0.33%(1.12) 0.23%(3.17**) 
-3.97%(-13.57**) 0.16%(1.22) 
Day(-20 to -3) Day (+3 to +20) 
0.58%(3.66**) 0.61 %(2.37**) 
0.45%(3.18**) 0.82%(2.49**) 
0.60%(2.24**) 1.24%(3.41 **) 
0.84%(3.72**) 0.89%(1.35) 
1.80%(5.22**) 1.15% (5.52**) 
-0.11 %(-1.26) -1.31 %(-3.90**) 
-0.53%(-4.18**) 0.42%(3.89**) 
"', "'., indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively 
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Table 2.10 Acquirer Announcement Return for All Acquirers, Public Target 
Acquisitions and Non-Public Target Acquisitions by Year of Acquisition: 1985 to 
2004 
Acquisition data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database and consist of 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. 
Announcement effects are measured by the Cumulative Daily Market Adjusted 
returns (CDMARs) during the five days surrounding the day of the announcement 
(Day -2 to Day 2). Abnormal returns are measures by the difference between the 
return to the security and the return to the FTSE all share index. "Puclic targets" and 
"Non-public targets" are as defined by SDC. The significant level is reported as 
t-value in parentheses. 
Year All Public Targets Non-Public Non-Public 
Targets minus Public 
1985 1.23% (2.12 )** -0.45% (-0.76) 1.29% (3.73)** 1.74% (2.89)** 
1986 1.36% (3.17) ** -0.16% (-0.39) 1.39% (2.84)** 1.55% (1.04) 
1987 1.85% (2.16)** -0.77% (-1.26) 1.78% (5.73)** 2.55% (5.39)** 
1988 1.76% (4.75) ** 1.02% (2.05)** 2.25% (4.83)** 3.27% (3.42)** 
1989 1.92% (3.66) ** 1.16% (1.15) 1.54% (3.27)** 2.70% (3.07)** 
1990 1.21% (2.81 ) ** 0.39% (0.71) 2.19% (6.48)** 2.58% (5.92)** 
1991 1.13% (3.59) ** -0.26% (-0.88) 1.34% (5.37)** 1.66% (1.85) 
1992 1.02% (2.65) ** -0.05% (-1.96)* 1.56% (2.84)** 1.61 % (4.91)** 
1993 1.45% (4.49) ** 0.80% (0.46) 1.84% (3.62)** 2.73% (1.82)* 
1994 1.54% (4.23) ** 0.38% (0.29) 1.29% (2.83)** 1.67% (3.77)** 
1995 1.39% (3.64) ** -0.64% (-0.28) 1.37% (2.23)** 2.01% (3.17)** 
1996 1.72% (2.71 ) ** 0.41% (1.07) 1.92% (6.48)** 2.33% (6.82)** 
1997 2.35% (4.85 ) ** 1.21% (2.19)** 2.33% (6.16)** 3.54% (2.63)** 
1998 2.17% (6.79) ** 1.03% (3.02)** 1.67% (4.33)** 2.70% (4.61)** 
1999 1.89% (2.28) ** -1.34% (-0.26) 2.31% (2.61)** 3.65% (5.03)** 
2000 1.84% (4.65) ** -0.76% (-0.73) 1.87% (4.48)** 2.63% (2.56)** 
2001 1.46% (2.76) ** 0.89% (0.31) 1.69% (2.31)** 2.58% (3.85)*· 
2002 1.29% (5.76) ** -0.52% (-0.71) 1.26% (1.92)* 1.78% (1.02) 
2003 1.47% (2.97) ** 0.39% (0.85) 1.72% (5.98)** 2.02% (2.53)*· 
2004 1.29% (4.65) .. -0.77% (-0.36) 1.39% (8.41)** 2.16% (5.38)** 
All Years 1.52%(3.24) ** -0.67% (-4.81)** 1.71% (15.06)** 2.38% (11.72)*· 
. --
indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively 
, , 
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Table 2.11 Categorical Analysis of Acquirer Announcement Effects for Day (-2,+2) for Acquisitions of Public and Non-Public 
Targets by Size of Targets 
Acquisition data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database and consist of6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 
1985 to 2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. Announcement effects are measured by the Cumulative Daily Market 
Adjusted returns (CDMARs) during the five days surrounding the day of the announcement (Day -2 to Day 2). Abnormal returns are measures by the difference 
between the return to the security and the return to the FTSE all share index. "Puciic targets" and "Non-public targets" are as defined by SDC. Target size is 
measured by target firm's market value, for those non-public targets we gather use the deal value divided by percentage of the shares acquired to obtain target 
size. The significant level is reported as t-value in parentheses. 
Relative Size Quintile (RS) Range Announcement Effects' for Day (-2,+2) 
All Targets Public Targets Non-Public Targets 
Smallest Quintile RS<2% CDMAR 0.21% 0.16% 0.23% 
I-slat (2.85)** ( 1.61) (3.18)** 
N 272 141 1142 
2nd Quintile 2%<RS<4% CDMAR 0.37% 0.27% 0.43% 
I-sIal (1.98)** ( 1.87)* (2.04)* 
N 273 141 1140 
3rd Quintile 4%<RS<10% CDMAR 0.85% 0.12% 0.82% 
I-stal (3.16)** (2.76)** (3.49)** 
N 271 142 1139 
4th Quintile 10%<RS<25% CDMAR 1.27% -0.49% 1.48% 
I-stat (2.83)** (-1.31 ) (3.71)** 
N 275 143 1141 
Largest quintile RS>25% CDMAR 1.71% -1.15% 2.19% 
t-stat (3.55)** ( -2.61)** (4.76)** 
N 275 142 1142 
., •• indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively 
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Table 2.12 Categorical Analysis of Acquirer Announcement Effects for Day (-2,+2) for Acquisitions of Public and Non-Public 
Targets by Size of Targets and by method of payment 
Acquisition data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database and consist of 6423 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 
1985 to 2004 by 1367 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. Announcement effects are measured by the Cumulative Daily Market 
Adjusted returns (CDMARs) during the five days surrounding the day of the announcement (Day -2 to Day 2). Abnormal returns are measures by the difference 
between the return to the security and the return to the FTSE all share index. "Puclic targets" and ''Non-public targets" are as defined by SDC. Target size is 
measured by target firm's market value, for those non-public targets we gather use the deal value divided by percentage ofthe shares acquired to obtain target 
size. All stock and All cash refer to acquisitions were 100% of the was in the form of stock and cash respectively, Mixed refers to the sum of acquisition in 
SOC categories "some stock", "some cash", and "combination of stock and cash" The significant level is reported as I-value in parentheses. 
Relative Size Range Announcement Effects for Day (-2,+2) 
Quintile (RS} All Targets Public Targets Non-Public Targets 
Cash Stock Mixed Cash Stock Mixed Cash Stock Mixed 
Smallest RS<2% CMAR 0.17% 0.41% 0.24% 0.31% 0.23% 0.14% 0.18% 0.38% 0.12% 
Quintile t-stat (2.34)* (3.51)** (0.77) (1.15) (2.01)* (2.68)** (3.13)** (4.19)** ( 1.33) 
N 597 74 612 54 27 59 542 46 553 
2nd Quintile 2%<RS<4% CMAR 0.19% 0.27% 0.55% 0.47% 0.15% 0.21% 0.22% 0.51% 0.47% 
t-stat (2.89)** (2.11)* (4.41)** (2.87)** (0.69) (1.02) (2.62)** (1.91)* (2.91 )** 
N 596 75 613 54 27 59 542 47 553 
3n1 Quintile 4%<RS<10% CMAR 0.42% 0.35% 0.73% 0.88% -0.36% -0.19% 0.45% 0.88% 0.72% 
I-stat (3.69)** (1.61) (3.25)** (0.71) (-1.44) (-2.77)** ( 1.96)* (1.37) (2.18)* 
N 597 75 613 55 28 60 543 47 554 
4th Quintile 10%<RS<25% CMAR 0.71% 0.27% 1.45% 1.25% -0.81% 0.46% 0.79% 1.46% 1.07% 
I-stat (1.98)* (3.62)** (2.12)* (1.97)* (-2.99)** (0.89) (4.86)** (2.72)** (3.54)** 
N 598 74 612 55 28 59 542 47 554 
Largest RS>2S% CMAR 1.89% 0.11% 1.76% 1.72% -1.45% -0.52% 1.94% 2.79% 2.13% 
quintile t-stat (3.26)** (2.74)** (4.34)** (2.66)** (-3.73)** (-2.91)** (4.18)** (3.55)** (4.81 )** 
N 598 76 613 56 27 59 543 47 556 
• •• indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively , , 
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CHAPTER 3 MARKET PRICE DRIVEN ACQUISITIONS: 
THE UK EVIDENCE 
ti Understanding merger cuisine is important as investors re-evaluate companies that 
became addicted to acquisition in the 1990s. Tyco, AutoNation, Us. Office Products, 
and AT&T each bought more than 100 companies between June, 1995, and August, 
2001. All have badly lagged their peers' return. JJ 
----- Henry. David 2002, "Addicted to Acquisitions", Business Week, October 14 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the relationship between stock market valuation and the perfonnance 
of bidding firms is examined. In particular, the focus is on the interaction between 
bidding frequency and target ownership status. By using universal UK domestic 
takeover samples ranging from 1985 to 2003, it was found that market valuation does 
have an impact on bidder performance, that is, in the long-run the deals initiated 
during low market valuation periods significantly out-performed those carried out in 
high valuation periods. Furthermore, because frequent bidders are usually more easily 
infected by market sentiment, an emphasis has also been placed on the performance of 
frequent bidders during periods of differing market valuations. A very important 
finding regarding acquirers' bidding frequency was that the frequent bidder was not 
always out-performed by the infrequent bidder. For deals initiated during low market 
valuation periods it was found that frequent bidders out-perfonned the infrequent 
1:!3 
bidders in the long-run. This fmding is consistent with the organizational learning and 
investor sentiment hypotheses which suggest that frequent bidders learn from their 
past mistakes and are more careful when evaluating the target and combining synergy 
when the market valuation is low. This pattern is robust to controlling for bid 
characteristics that are known to impact takeover performance. 
The study of mergers has attracted a significant amount of attention both in finance 
and industrial organizations. One of the most active, but still open areas of research is 
the issue of why mergers occur and the market's reaction to different factors that drive 
merger activities. Several theories have been advanced to explain the origin of 
mergers. Each theory seems to be relevant for explaining partially why merger waves 
occurred in the last century, but it is hard to argue that there is yet a solid unified 
explanation of what drives acquisition.39 
Some previous studies have suggested that the volume of merger activity is positively 
correlated with market valuation; the relationship is more pronounced during high 
market valuation periods4o. Recently, researchers have found a significant positive 
39 In the previous literature, the usual way of classifying theories that explain the causes of mergers 
was by grouping them according to the assumption they made regarding market efficiency and 
managerial rationality. They are normally grouped as: a. neoclassical theory explanation (efficiency 
enhancing), b. agency problem explanation (Jensen 1986), c. hubris hypothesis (Roll 1986), d. stock 
price driven acquisition hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny 2004). 
40 See Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2003), Ang and Cheng (2005), and Rhodes- Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) for empirical evidence. Similar evidence has been found in the IPO market, where 
issuers timed the market to cater for the investor's preference. Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), 
Lerner (1994), and Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) all found that aggregate IPO volume and 
stock market valuations are highly correlated. 
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correlation between market valuation and the quality of mergers and this relationship 
is especially strong for stock-fmanced deals. One interpretation of these findings is 
that managers try to time the market by paying with stock when they believe their 
frrm is overvalued. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, frequent 
bidders that pursue non-public targets reveal a strong tendency to engage in market 
timing activity. Conn, et al. (2004) found that the overvaluation hypothesis explained 
a large proportion of multiple acquirers' abnormal performance. However, their 
results do not explain why mUltiple bidders are so keen on acquiring non-public 
targets, or the different outcomes associated with changes in market valuation. 
In this chapter, it is proposed that frequent bidders who engage in non-public target 
acquisitions are subject to many behavioural biases when market is over-heating 
(overconfidence, herding behaviour, etc.) and more easily infected by market 
sentiment when market valuation is changing over time. There are three main reasons 
for this phenomenon. Firstly, the unique characteristics of non-public targets makes 
them a perfect medium for frequent bidders to employ and overshoot their serial 
acquisition strategy, which results in them making too many deals.41 Secondly, when 
the market valuation is high, herding behaviour and hubris play a critical role in the 
frequent bidder's decision-making process, they become very optimistic about the 
41 Non-public targets are usually small companies with great potential, hence there is less financial 
analysis regarding these firms, and less overvaluation compared to public targets. Furthermore, small 
non-public firms have less bargaining power, and leave more profit on the table for acquirers. Thus, 
acquirers are very optimistic about their ability to manage such "under-valued" targets, and hence 
overshoot the number of targets. 
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future outcome of the deal and hence very active during high market valuation periods. 
Thirdly, the bidder's stock price will further increase, in the short-run, due to the 
"good news" of the merger. This will further boost the bidder's confidence resulting in 
an overconfidence bubble that will lead to more acquisitions. In the longer run, the 
overconfidence will eventually be replaced by reality because bidders in fact cannot 
gain sufficient earnings to support the nonrealistic stock prices of these bad mergers, 
with the result that there are significant losses. 
Conversely, it has been found that frequent bidders can be very rational during low 
valuation periods. When the market valuation is low, frequent bidders are more 
conservative than infrequent bidders. This is probably because the loss of reputation 
will be much higher if they make bad deals during cold periods, and because the 
experience gained from previous failures make them much more careful in choosing 
targets and evaluating the combining synergy from the deal during such periods. Thus, 
the deals made by frequent bidders during low market valuation periods will out 
perform those made by infrequent bidders in the long-run. 
A number of papers have formally recognized this link between mis-pricing and 
acquisition activity. Shleifer and Vishny (2004) proposed that overvalued fIrmS 
engage in stock financed acquisitions in order to obtain hard assets at an effective 
discount. This discount comes at the expense of the target's long-term shareholders, 
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so this theory relies on different horizons for the managers of the two firms. 42 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) developed another model to predict 
misevaluation driven mergers. In this case, it is the inability of the target managers to 
distinguish between errors that are market-wide and those that are firm-specific that 
leads to the irrational acceptance of offers from overvalued acquirers. 
Based on these theoretical predictions and on their empirical work Bouwman Fuller 
, " 
and Nain (2005) investigated whether the overall stock market valuation affects 
acquisition decisions. They found that the market valuation at the time the acquisition 
is initiated affects both the announcement returns and long-run perfonnance of the 
acquirers. Specifically, announcement day returns are significantly positive for 
acquisitions undertaken in high valuation markets and insignificantly negative for 
acquisitions undertaken in low valuation markets. Their findings suggest that the 
market rewards acquisitions made in high valuation periods but not those made in low 
valuation periods. By dividing the sample according to bidding frequency, the results 
of the current study give a new insight into the work of Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain. It 
was found here that the market rewarded frequent bidders during low valuation 
periods, whereby they significantly out-performed in the long-run compared to 
infrequent bidders in the same period, and also out-performed themselves compared 
42 One way to shorten the horizon of the target firm's managers is to remunerate them for successful 
deals. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) reported that targets received lower acquisition premiums 
when their CEOs enjoyed extraordinary payouts. Another option is to choose target firms whose 
shareholders have short investment horizons. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) documented that firms 
with short-term shareholders were more likely to get offers, but earned lower premiums. 
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to their results in high market valuation periods. 
Proceeding from what has been outlined above; the main objective of this research is 
to resolve three issues. Firstly, the issue of whether or not there is a close link between 
market-wide valuation status and the quality of mergers in general will be investigated. 
By doing this, an insight will be gained into how valuation level changes influence 
~ 
merger outcomes, and at the same time this research will test market reactions to 
different factors (such as bidding frequency, target ownership status. and method of 
payment) when the valuation changes. Secondly. it will be interesting to know how 
frequent bidders react to different market valuation levels. and whether or not the 
outcomes differ compared with infrequent bidders during same period. This is 
important because it has been found that frequent bidders are subject to series merger 
programmes, and are easily infected by market sentiment. However, very little work 
has been done in the past to examine the impact of frequent bidders, thus the aim here 
is to reveal whether frequent bidders display any unique characteristics when changes 
in market valuation take place. Thirdly. it was found that about 900/0 of the samples 
were non-public target acquisitions, thus it is necessary to investigate why these 
targets are so popular in the market, and how they fit into the bidders' merger 
programme when the market valuation changes. 
From the above discussion. two testable hypotheses can be constructed: 
H 1: H'here Ihe deal is initialed during a high market valualion period, the hidder 
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should receive a better announcement period return than where the deal is initiated 
during a low market valuation period as the investor sentiment is very high towards 
merger announcements during high market valuation periods. 
H2: Where the deal is initiated during a high market valuation period, the bidder 
should receive a worse long-run return than where the deal is initiated during a low 
market valuation period as deals made during low market valuation periods have 
better quality, which is revealed over time. 
Three of the contributions made by this research are presented here. Firstly, a sample 
comprising universal UK takeovers (nearly 90% of which involved non-public targets) 
during the period 1985 to 2003 was used to examine the overall correlation between 
acquirer performance and market valuation .. This is by far a very large sample used 
in a study of UK takeovers and covers several merger waves, thereby avoiding the 
data mining problem and yielding unbiased results. Secondly, it was found that the 
rationality of frequent bidders changes over time; they are subject to more behavioural 
biases during high market valuation periods and are more rational when the market 
valuation is low. Thirdly, a contribution is made to the behavioural corporate finance 
literature by providing evidence of the impact on bidders' rationality of valuation 
changes at the market level. Most of the previous studies have focused on the 
relationship between bidder performances and the valuation at the corporate level only. 
This work, however, looks at the whole picture by intensively examining the impact 
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of the valuation at the UK market level, with the results giving more support to the 
manager sentiment hypothesis, as they show that the manager's rationality can change 
over time as the market valuation changes. 
There are several theoretical hypotheses that are in line with this research: the market 
overvaluation hypothesis, the hubris hypothesis, the investor sentiment hypothesis, 
and the bounded rationality hypothesis. 
Some of the recent literature links market-wide valuations to merger activity and 
suggests that managers' rationality is influenced by the overall state of the market and 
not just by the valuations of their own fIrms. From Jensen's (2004) point of view, 
overvaluation influences fIrms' acquisition decisions, as the managers of bidding 
fIrms attempt to prolong the mis-pricing. To do so, they have to maintain the market's 
perception of the fIrm's prospects, and in the process they engage in value-destroying 
activities, such as earning management, unwarranted acquisitions, unprofItable 
investments, and even outright fraud. Hence, many fIrms begin to implement their 
series acquisition strategy (becoming frequent bidders) during high market valuation 
periods not only to dilute their overvalued shares, but also in an attempt to manipulate 
the earnings to support their inflated stock price. At these times, the small company 
with good prospects will be very attractive to the frequent bidder. Thus, the proposal 
is that more frequent bidders will be observed trading during high market valuation 
periods than in low market valuation periods. 
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As mentioned above the hubris hypothesis lends theoretical support to this research. 
Many previous researchers have found that managers are more likely to suffer from 
hubris and undertake acquisitions that lack sufficient synergies when the market is 
booming. 43 These hubris driven acquisitions, undertaken during high market 
valuation periods, are likely to be driven by management overconfidence and hence 
will likely destroy the firm's value in the long-run. On the other hand, when the 
market valuation is low, both investors and managers are more likely to be skeptical 
of acquisition deals, hence market valuation is critical to assessing the combining 
synergies from the deal. During a low valuation period, managers afflicted with hubris 
will suffer more from the market's punishment if they overestimate their ability to 
generate the combining synergy. At these times frequent bidders will be particularly 
careful when choosing targets because the low market valuation period is simply not a 
good time for them to implement their serial acquisition strategy. Thus, they need to 
be very certain of the outcome of any acquisition deal, and will prefer small targets to 
large public targets to avoid any loss of reputation if they make a mistake while others 
do not. 
Besides managerial hubris, the investor sentiment hypothesis also serves as theoretical 
support to this research. When market sentiment is bullish, not only do investors 
welcome merger deals but also corporate managers feel encouraged to make 
acquisitions because they believe that the market expects finns to undertake 
43 See Roll (1986), and Bouwman et at. (2003). 
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growth-enhancing activities such as M&As. In a similar vein, managers who initiate 
merger deals during low market valuation periods need to be very certain that the 
synergy is large enough to offset market sentiment and expectation, simply because 
the market does not expect acquisitions when the sentiment is bearish. Another 
possible reason for why so many non- public target deals are observed during periods 
when the market is booming is that the target's resistance is lower when the stock 
prices are high due to the fact that small targets are receiving premiums that are over 
and above their already high valuation. Another reason that non-public targets are 
very popular is that they are normally very small in size, and it is easier to integrate 
them into the frequent bidder's serial acquisition programme. 
The bounded rationality hypothesis has been receiving more and more attention 
recently and it provides a good explanation for the facts that have been observed from 
the behavioural corporate finance angle. Introduced by Simon (1955), the bounded 
rationality hypothesis assumes that some types of cognitive or information-gathering 
costs prevent agents from making fully optimal decisions. Bounded-rational managers 
cope with complexity by using rules of thumb that ensure an acceptable level of 
performance.44 Under high market valuation. conditions, managers are influenced by 
over optimism just like other investors; hence they are less rational than during low 
market valuation periods. Additionally, rules of thumb are hardly uncommon in 
financial management during high market valuation periods. For example, the net 
44 See Simon (1955), Conlisk (1996), and Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2005). 
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present value criterion (NPV) is the optimal capital budgeting rule, but several recent 
papers have documented that managers prefer to use the IRR rule because it avoids a 
cost of capital calculation.45 It can be expected that during market overvaluation 
periods, when over-optimism is predominant in the market, managers will use the 
most unsophisticated rule, that is their "self-confidence" to guide their investment 
decisions. Thus, more acquisition deals should be observed during hot market 
valuation periods simply because both managers and investors are much more 
irrational, and create a large "confidence bubble" for themselves, it is just like the 
fairy tale the "Emperor's New Clothes'". 
The empirical evidence presented by this research is consistent with the stated 
hypothesis. In short there is strong evidence to show that bidders who initiate their 
deals during low market valuation periods out-perform those who make their deals 
during high market valuation periods. At the same time, the evidence also shows that 
the market welcomes acquisition announcements during high market valuation 
periods in the short-run, but the fortunes are reversed in the long-run. Most 
importantly, it can be seen that frequent acquirers who make their deals during high 
market valuation periods under-perform compared to infrequent bidders in the 
long-run, but the opposite is found for those deals made during lov-. market valuation 
periods. This suggests that the levels of rationality of frequent bidders changes when 
the market valuation changes and is more volatile than the rationality of infrequent 
4S See Graham and Harvey (200 I). and Welch (2004). 
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bidders. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 revie\\·s the releyant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
results and issues of robustness. A conclusion is given at the end. 
lH 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theoretical and empirical literature exploring possible links between firm 
overvaluation and merger activity is growing very fast and some recent papers have 
already addressed the importance of the additional link with market-wide valuation 
levels. In this section, the relevant literature is intensively reviewed and the gaps 
identified. Firstly, the development of the market valuation hypothesis and different 
measures of market valuation are discussed. Secondly, there is a review of the recent 
debates regarding the determinants· of market valuation. Thirdly, the main 
measurement of market valuation used in this research is introduced, which is the 
price to earning ratio. Finally, there is a review of the literature on irrational manager 
behaviour, which provides the main theoretical support for the construction of the 
stated hypothesis. 
3.2.1 Market Valuation and Merger Activity 
The theoretical literature on M&A takes several different approaches. These can be 
broadly divided into two general approaches. Roughly speaking, the first approach 
emphasizes that the market is, in general, less than fully rational, whilst the second 
considers managerial behaviour to be less than fully rational. The first approach 
relates most closely to the research topic here, which supposes a link between market 
valuation and merger activity. 
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3.2.1.1 The Irrational Market Approach 
Consistent with managerial hubris and market irrationality hypotheses, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2004) proposed the market valuation hypothesis, which is a market timing 
model of acquisition. They assumed that acquirers are overvalued, and the moti\"e for 
acquisitions is not to gain synergies, but to preserve some of their temporary 
overvaluation for long-run shareholders. They asserted that stock is used to pay for 
acquisitions by overvalued acquirers of relatively less overvalued targets, and that a 
cash bid for the target would only occur if the target was undervalued even at the bid 
price. Both the decision to acquire and the means of payment deriye from market 
timing. Stock acquisitions are used by overvalued bidders who expect to see negative 
long-run returns on their shares, but are attempting to make these returns less negative. 
Schleifer and Vishny's model also predicts merger waves in which managers will 
make stock-based acquisitions in high market valuation periods and cash transactions 
will be used in low market valuation periods. A corollary is that the pace of stock 
mergers should be higher in industries and markets with a large dispersion of 
valuations. The market timing approach to mergers helps to unify a number of 
stylized facts. The defensive motive for the acquisition, and the idea that acquisitions 
are further facilitated when catering gains are available, help to explain the time-series 
link between merger volume and stock price. The model also predicts that cash 
acquirers earn positive long-run returns while stock acquirers earn negative long-run 
returns. which is consistent with the findings of Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998). 
In the same theoretical category, but with a different mis-valuation based explanation 
to merger volume and stock price, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) modelled a 
market where the market values for bidders and targets can both deviate from the true 
value. They defined mis-valuation as having two possible components, firm-specific 
and market-wide. Bidders in their model have private information about the value of 
their firm and the potential value of the target firm. On the other hand, the managers 
of the target firms have difficulty assessing the potential synergies since they only 
have private information about the value of their firm and limited information about 
the components of mis-valuation. In this setting, market overvaluation tends to make 
bids look more attractive to the target, while firm-specific overvaluation tends to 
make the bids look too low. In Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan's model, the chance 
that a merger will occur increases with market overvaluation. Overvaluation can 
trigger merger waves in the absence of any underlying reasons for the acquisitions, 
such as synergy. On the other hand, undervaluation may result in the halting of the 
merger wave even if an underlying reason, such as inefficiency, suggests that assets 
should be redeployed. 
Recent papers have found further evidence for market timing mergers. Dong, 
Hirshleifer. Richardson, and Teoh (2003), and Ang and Cheng (2005) found that 
market level mis-pricing proxies and merger volume were positively correlated. and 
that acquirers tended to be more overpriced than targets. They also found evidence 
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that offers for undervalued targets are more likely to be hostile, and that overpriced 
acquirers pay higher takeover premiums. Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2003) found 
evidence suggestive of a short-term catering effect, which is where in high valuation 
periods, investors welcome acquisition announcements, but the long-run performance 
following such acquisitions are the worst. All these patterns are consistent with 
overvaluation driven merger activity. 
According to Baker, Ruback and Wugler's (2005) survey on behavioural corporate 
finance, there are still some questions waiting to be explored in this area. One 
unresolved question in the Shleifer and Vishny theoretical framework of 
overvaluation is why do managers prefer a stock for stock merger to an equity issue if 
the market timing gains are similar? In the case of the UK, the question is why do 
managers prefer debt financed mergers to seasonal equity offerings (SEO)s? One 
explanation is that a merger more effectively hides the underlying market timing 
motive from investors. Baker, Coval, and Stein (2005) considered another mechanism 
that could explain a generic preference for equity issues via merger. First of all, they 
proposed that the acquiring firm faces a downward sloping demand curve for its 
shares, as in Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986). Their second proposition 
was that some investors follow the path of least resistance, passively accepting the 
acquirer's shares as consideration even when they would not have actively 
participated in an equity issue. With these two assumptions, the price impact of a 
stock financed merger can be much smaller than the price impact of an SEQ. In the 
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UK, it is much easier for an acquiring fmn to access debt fmancing than a SEO, thus 
many more cash offers than stock offers are observed. 
3.2.1.2 The Irrational Manager Approach 
This approach manly focuses on the interaction between managerial irrationality and 
merger activities.46 Roll (1986) developed the hubris hypothesis of acquisitions and 
suggested that successful acquirers may be optimistic and overconfident in their own 
valuations and fail to properly account for the winner's curse. The present research is 
in line with this hypothesis, with the proposal that frequent bidders are subject to 
more serious overconfidence problems because each acquisition within their serial 
takeover plan will temporarily boost their share price and result in more 
overconfidence on the part of the manager. 
More recently, Malmendier and Tate (2003) developed this argument and used their 
proxy for CEO optimism. They found a number of patterns that were consistent with 
the optimism and overconfidence theory. Firstly, optimistic CEOs complete more 
mergers, especially diversifying mergers, which are perhaps of more dubious value. 
Secondly, optimism has its biggest effect among the least equity dependent firmS.47 
Thirdly, investors are more skeptical about bid announcements when the bids are 
made by optimistic CEOs. 
46 As this literature has been reviewed in Chapter 2, it will only be briefly outlined here. 
47 That is, when managers do not have to weigh the merger against an equity issue that they, as 
optimists, would perceive as undervalued. 
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In summary, there is enough evidence to support the notion that periods of high 
merger activity are indeed correlated with high-market valuations. However, there are 
still some questions that remain unsolved, and which require further investigation. 
The main focus here is on how frequent bidders and non-public targets interact with 
market valuations. The following gives an introduction to the measurement used to 
detect market valuation levels. 
3.2.2 Choosing an Appropriate Measurement of Market Valuation 
The eagerness of acquirers to use their stock as acquisition currency during times of 
high market valuation raises the question, does overvaluation affect merger activity? 
In order to answer this question, one must fmd a reliable way to detect overvaluation. 
One way is to measure overvaluation ex-post, by looking at long-run abnormal stock 
returns.48 Another way is to use accounting multiples like the market-to-book (MIB) 
ratio or price to earning (PIE) ratio.49 However, both of these methods have their 
limitations. There are strong debates regarding whether evidence of abnormal 
long-run post-event average returns implies stock market inefficiency with respect to 
the event. Accounting multiples might be a proxy for effects other than mis-valuation. 
For example MIB ratios may also capture risk, growth opportunities, information 
48 See Frank, Harris, and Titman (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997), and Rau and Verrnaelen (1998). 
49 Rhodes-Kropf, et al. (2004) use the MIB ratio as a measure of misvaluation whereas Dong et al. 
(2003) use the price to book value of equity (PIB) ratio and the price to residual income model value 
(PN) ratio. Bouwman (2003) use the (PIE) ratio to measure market valuation. 
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asymmetry, or managerial discipline.5o 
Many recent studies have relied on indirect estimates of the true fundamental value of 
a firm. For example, Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2005) used accounting 
information and analysts' forecasts to calculate such a proxy, and found that 
richly-valued bidders were much more likely to use stock to fmance acquisitions, pay 
higher premiums, and have lower announcement returns. Ang and Cheng (2004) 
used similar inputs, and reported that, once overvaluation is taken into account, 
merged firms do not under-perform. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 
(2005) relied on a regression-based approach utilizing accounting information as 
inputs, and docUmented that low long-run value to book firms buy high long-run 
value to book firms, reversing the usual results that acquirers are more overvalued 
than targets. Friedman (2004) used accounting information and pre-event abnormal 
returns, and showed that the acquirer's overvaluation predicts the bid premium, but 
only in stock deals. Akbulut (2005) used managerial insider trading, and found that 
overvalued firms are more likely to engage in stock mergers and have high 
pre-announcement and low post-announcement long-term abnormal returns. Because 
of the problematic estimation of firm-level overvaluations, it is not possible to rely on 
just one of these methods to distinguish firm-level overvaluation. However, on an 
aggregate level, using the PIE ratio to detect market- wide valuation status seems to 
SO In this chapter, the PIE ratio is used as the main proxy for market valuations, and the market 
valuation is divided into cold, hot, and neutral periods. Later on, the rationale behind this choice will be 
fully explained. 
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be more reasonable. Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2003) used such a method to 
classify markets into high, neutral, and low valuation periods, and concluded that 
deals initiated during low market valuation periods can yield better long-run 
performances compared to those initiated during high market valuation periods.51 
3.2.3 Proxies for Detecting Market Valuation Level 
3.2.3.1 The PIE Ratio 
A commonly used technique for valuing shares is the PIE ratio, which is a measure of 
the esteem in which the company is held by the investors. Since the interest here is 
in examining overall market valuations, the UK TOATL market index PIE ratio has 
been used as a proxy for market valuation, in the same way as a firm's PIE ratio is 
used by investors as a measure of firm-level valuation status. 
One reason for this is that it is easy and convenient for investors to calculate using all 
known or past information. Ball (1978) found earnings announcements resulted in 
excess returns that led him to conclude that the PIE ratio can be used as a proxy for 
future returns. Recent studies have found evidence to the contrary, where companies 
with a low PIE ratio out-perform those with a high PIE ratio in the long-run. Levis 
(1989) found that in the UK, a portfolio of the companies with the lowest PIE ratio 
had a monthly return of 1.48% compared to 0.90% for the portfolio of those with the 
51 The using of the PIE ratio will be reviewed in the following part. 
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highest PIE ratio. Strong and Xu (1997) found similar results, with a monthly 
difference of 0.6% between the highest and lowest PIE deciles. 
In the case of the USA, Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1994) found differences of 9% and 4% respectively between the lowest and 
highest PIE portfolios, with the former out-performing the latter. Even in long-run 
studies, such as that of Jaffe, Keirn, and Westerfield (1989), for the period 1951 to 
1986, there appears to be a strong negative relationship between the PIE ratio and 
abnormal returns. In an international study of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
the UK, Brouwer, et al. (1996) found that a portfolio of companies with the lowest 
values out-performed one with the highest PIE values by 5%. The above studies show 
that for a sample of low and high PIE ratio companies the share price performance is 
very different. This performance is conditioned by the firm's pre-event financial 
profile being relevant to the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer. 
At an aggregate level, the market's PIE ratio shares the same properties as those of 
individual firms. As mentioned above, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) put forward the 
extrapolation hypothesis to explain the differential performance of glamour and value 
acquirers. Acquirers commanding a high market rating due to their recent past 
performance may act out of overconfidence or hubris in making acquisitions. The 
stocks of such companies may also be overvalued. The managers may be aware of 
such overvaluation but the stock market may not. The acquirer managers capitalize on 
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this information asymmetry, but over time during the post-acquisition period the 
overvaluation is corrected and glamour stocks are rated down leading to significant 
value decline. The opposite rationale applies to the value acquirers with low pre-bid 
market ratings. This hypothesis is consistent with the empirical evidence reported by 
Rau and Vennaelen. The PIE ratio is perhaps more widely used as a valuation tool in 
stock markets than MTBV. Thus, by using this tool, the overall market valuation 
patterns can be captured, and unbiased estimations yielded. 
3.2.3.2 The Volume of Takeover Activity and the Market Index 
In order to check for robustness, other proxies were used to detect market valuation 
levels. The takeover volume and market index were two of the other proxies used. 
The tendency for investor over-optimism might be more pronounced during "hot 
takeover markets". As with hot IPO markets, where private firms issuing IPOs are in 
high demand, there might also be periods during which investors perceive such target 
fmns as "hot tickets" to enhance the growth of the acquiring firms (see Ritter, 1984, 
1991). This positive investor sentiment would translate into a distinctly favourable 
market reaction at the time of the merger announcement. Such reaction during these 
high volume periods may reflect temporary phases of excess enthusiasm, which 
would have negative implications for the future performance of mergers occurring 
during these periods. Thus, the volume of takeover activity can serve as a creditable 
proxy for the market valuation level. At the same time, the market index itself can 
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serve as a proxy for market sentiment; it is a more direct proxy but contains market 
information other than purely the market valuation. However, the results yielded from 
the takeover volume classification and market index classification are all consistent 
with the results from the PIE ratio classification. 
3.2.4 Investor Sentiment and Market Valuation 
Recent research suggests that traders in the UK stock market respond more to the 
actions of other traders than any notion of fundamental value. Thus, current price 
movements have a greater impact on the course of future price movements than the 
relationship between price and fundamental value. 
McMillan (2002) examined the nature of the relationship between UK stock prices 
and the notion of fundamental value determined by the dividend discount model. His 
results suggest that: 
1,. While over the long-run, prices do follow a fundamental trend path, there can be 
substantial departures from the fundamental value. 
2 .. Most notably, the pull back to the fundamental value when share prices are 
overvalued is particularly weak, while there is a stronger association when share 
prices are undervalued. 
3. Furthermore, it appears that current price movements (and market sentiment) have 
a greater impact on determining the course of future price movements than the current 
state of the relationship between price and fundamental value. 
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4. Thus, price overvaluations can exhibit persistent beha\'iour. 
The recent course of stock price movements has been a source of much academic. 
practitioner, and media interest. This has led to a debate concerning the pull on prices 
to a notion of fundamental value, and implicitly whether the long -held belief in 
market efficiency remains valid. 
In the USA, leading economists Campbell and Shiller have been the main advocates 
arguing that stock prices during the late 1990s were merely overvalued. such that a 
'bubble' -like phenomena occurred and the basic stock market fundamentals had not 
changed. Furthermore, even as late as mid-2000. and the following three years of bear 
market conditions, the dividend yield, which measures prices relative to fundamental 
value, remained above its forty-year historical average, above a trend measure that 
allowed for a slow change in the position of the relationship, and above a measure that 
captured bear market regime change, all of which suggests that prices remained 
overvalued. However. there is no prospect of an immediate fall in prices as evidence 
presented in McMillan's (2002) study suggests that future price movements are more 
influenced by current price movements than the pull of fundamentals. That is, traders 
respond more actively to the actions of other traders than any notion of fundamental 
value. 
To conclude. market sentiment IS more important in determining future prIce 
movements than the current state of fundamentals and whether prices happen to be 
\.)\'ervalued. thus prices can indeed persist in a state of overvaluation. The above 
research does not cast doubt on the belief that prices are linked to fundamental \'alue. 
but on the belief that markets efficiently ensure that prices accord \vith fundamental 
value most of the time. 
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3.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 The Data Selection 
In order to obtain reliable results, a large UK domestic takeover sample was used in 
this study. The sample period ranges from 1985 to 2003, and consists of 4,591 
completed acquisition deals. The sample was gathered from the SDC UK Merger and 
Acquisition Database, which contains completed tender offers and mergers. In 
addition to the identities of the involved parties, the database provides information on 
whether the deal succeeded, whether it was friendly, hostile or neutral, the mode of 
payment, and the relevant dates in the history of the transaction (announcement, 
revision, rejection, failure, and completion). Acquisitions were included in the sample 
if the following criteria were met: 
1. The acquirer was a UK firm listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
2. Relevant data on the acquirer was available from DataStream. 
3. The target was UK based, being public, private, or a subsidiary. 
4. The transaction value was 100,000 UK pounds or more. 
5. The acquirer had obtained at least 50% of the shares of the target. 
6. As is usual practice, financial, governmental, and utility firms were excluded. 
7. The market value of the target's equity was at least 3% of the acquirer's market 
value. The employment of such a screen is a standard approach in the previous 
literature; it ensures that the proposed deal has a material impact on the acquirer's 
future. The inclusion of bids for very small firms might add noise to the results. In 
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any case, none of the findings changed with alternative thresholds, regardless of 
whether they were more or less restrictive. 
3.3.2 Description of the Data 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. After the sample screening 
process, 4,591 samples were gathered over the nineteen-year study period. From the 
table it can be seen that only about 10 % of the target firms are public companies, the 
rest are private or subsidiary companies. This choice of sample was based on the 
notion that previous research that has focused only on public target acquisitions 
neglected the majority of takeovers. Furthermore, it can be seen that there are only 
294 deals (6% of the sample) that were financed purely by stock. This figure does not 
necessarily mean that UK bidders are less overvalued in general compared to US 
bidders, it is just because UK bidders can easily get access to "overvalued cash", 
which is the junk bond market, whenever they need it. 52 
3.3.2.1 The PIE Ratio and Market Valuation Classification 
It is common practice to use the PIE ratio as a proxy for the market valuation level; 
similar proxies include BIM ratio, the market index, merger numbers and so on. This 
study follows Bouwman, et aI. (2003) in using the PIE ratio as the main proxy. 
However, the results are rendered more robust by also using other proxies . 
.52 This issue is explained in greater depth in the section dealing with the hypothesis construction. 
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Before carrying out the classification procedures, it was necessary to remove the trend 
from the market PIE ratio because the PIE ratio had trended upwards. Not removing 
the trend would result in a systematic classification of more recent acquisitions as 
high-valuation acquisitions and older acquisitions as low-valuation acquisitions. 
Figure 3.1 shows the original PIE index and the detrended PIE index. From the graph 
it can be seen that the detrended PIE index has a zero mean but all the patterns remain 
the same as with the original PIE index. 
After removing the best straight line fit from the PIE of the month in question and the 
five preceding years, each month was classified as a high, neutral or low valuation 
period. The monthly Total UK PIE data range from January 1980 to December 2003 
was used to position the price level that existed in each month. 53 Each month was 
placed in an above (below) average group if the detrended PIE of that month was 
above (below) the past five-year average. Then the months were ranked in order of the 
detrended PIE. The top half of the above average months were classified as high 
valuation months and the bottom half of the below average months as low valuation 
months. All other months were classified as neutral valuation months. 
Table 3.2 gives a description of the event study samples. During the period 1985 to 
53 The FTSE All Share and FT 100 PIE only became available in 1996, thus the Total UK PIE index 
was used to capture the valuation level. For reasons of robustness, the correlation between the Total UK 
PIE and FTSE All Share PIE were also checked, the correlation coefficient is about 0.99, hence the 
Total UK PIE index can be taken as a reliable proxy for the UK market. 
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2003, of the 4,591 acquisitions in the sample, 1,374 occurred during high valuation 
months, 2,133 during neutral valuation months, and 1,082 during low valuation 
months. Of the 1,374 high valuation acquisitions, 719 were cash acquisitions, 93 stock 
acquisitions, and 564 mixed payment offers. Of the 2,133 neutral valuation 
acquisitions, 1,123 were cash acquisitions, 139 stock acquisitions, and 871 mixed 
payment acquisitions. Finally, of the 1,082 low valuation acquisitions, 621 were cash 
acquisitions, 63 stock acquisitions, and 398 mixed payment acquisitions. In general, it 
can be seen that cash payments were more popular in the marketplace; cash was used 
to finance 53.7% of the deals, and only 6.4 % were financed by stock. This finding is 
consistent with most previous research done for UK market. Similar to the US results, 
it was found that most of the deals were initiated during neutral market valuation 
periods, even though the difference between high and low market valuation periods is 
still very significant. One explanation could be that compared with US bidders, UK 
bidders have greater access to free cash on the market, thus timing for market 
overvaluation and the use of overvalued stock as the medium of exchange is not so 
essential for making deals. 
From the previous literature it is known that acquisitions involving non-public targets 
exhibit very different characteristics in terms of acquisition strategy, method of 
payment, and the bidder's announcement return and. long-run performance. Thus, to 
get a clear picture of the impact of market valuation it was important to sub-divide the 
sample according to the targets' public status. Table 3.3 presents the number of 
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acquirers and the transaction value according to the target's public status. From the 
table it can be seen that only 438 of the 4,591 acquisitions involved public targets. the 
rest of the sample were private companies or subsidiaries. It can be clearly seen that 
non-public acquisitions dominated the takeover market not only in terms of numbers 
but also in terms of transaction value. 1,266 non-public acquisitions were observed 
during the high valuation periods, and only 945 during the low valuation periods. At 
the same time, there were more public acquisitions during the low market valuation 
periods. These findings suggest that non-public targets are favoured during high 
valuation periods and vice versa for public targets. The underlying rationale is quite 
straight forward: the public target's valuation increases when the market valuation is 
high, this leads to a much higher offer price when the deal is initiated, especially with 
cash offers being more popular in the UK. Hence, acquiring a public target during a 
high market valuation period will significantly increase the bidder's cost. Thus, 
bidders will prefer non-public targets when the market valuation is high. However, if 
they want to acquire a public company, the best option is to hold their acquiring offer 
until a low market valuation period comes. Again, this fmding is consistent with the 
market-timing hypothesis. 
Besides the target's public status, the bidder's bidding frequency is also a very 
important factor that determines merger outcome. Thus, Fuller's (2002) method for 
screening out multiple bidders was followed for this sample. Multiple bidders were 
defined as those that had made four or more bids within three years, and infrequent 
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bidder as those making three or less bids within three years. Table 3.4 shows all the 
details of the number of acquirers and the value of the transactions according to 
bidding frequency. After screening, 1,453 deals were found to fall into the category of 
frequent bidder acquisitions, which amounts to 31.6% of the total sample; the 
transaction value associated with these multiple acquisitions amounted to 28% of the 
total deal value. 
From Table 3.5 it can be seen that of the 1,231 bidders in the sample, about 44% were 
frequent bidders. When combined with Table 3.4, it can be seen that 44% of the 
bidders are responsible for 28% of the transaction value; this suggests that frequent 
bidders are particularly keen on small non-pUblic targets. It was also found that 
frequent bidders are more active during high valuation periods, there being 411 deals 
made during these periods compared to only 313 deals during low valuation periods. 
According to the overvaluation hypothesis, such mergers occur when the acquirer is 
in a temporarily good position. The acquirer might find that its stock price is high 
owing to changing market sentiment or some recent (but temporary) good 
perfonnance. Such acquirers exercise their series acquisition plans during hot market 
periods by using either overvalued equity or cash from the junk bond market. Such 
acquisitions should receive a positive market reaction in the short-run, but will get a 
worse reaction over time as the factors that led to the temporary overvaluation decline, 
or disappear altogether. At the same time, the bubble will eventually be replaced by 
reality. Thus most deals done by frequent bidders during high market valuation 
IS3 
periods will result in negative returns in the long-run. 
The empirical results shown here are consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis, 
and at the same time support the merger programme announcement hypothesis 
(MPAH).54 The fundamental idea behind the MPAH is that on the announcement of 
the first acquisition the market both reacts favourably to that event and also to the fact 
that it is part of a merger programme being carried out by a frequent bidder. This leads 
to the first acquisition being looked on very favourably. When a second acquisition is 
announced there is some announcement gain since it is now a known event, but part 
of the value has already been discounted in the share price. This hypothesis makes no 
prediction about a decline in profitability associated with subsequent acquisitions. 55 
Jensen's (2004) overvaluation hypothesis states that acquiring firms that are engaged 
in serial merger programmes usually exhibit overvaluation in their share price, and it 
is known that share prices need to have substantial earnings to support them. Thus, 
undertaking serial acquisitions can provide instant cash flow and earnings to 
temporarily boost the share price, and realize short-run returns. Based on this 
hypothesis, the bubble will get bigger and bigger and eventually burst resulting in 
. 'fi t I 56 slgm lcan osses. 
54 Summarized from Cosh, et al. (2004), 
ss Cosh, et al. (2004) found the serial decline only occurs for acquirers whose first acquisitions are 
successful. For acquirers whose first acquisition is unsuccessful, the bid order effect is positive. 
S6 David (2002) stated that "Understanding merger cuisine is important as investors re-evaluate 
companies that became addicted to acquisition in the 90s. Tyco, AutoNation , US Office Products, and 
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In summary, after carrying out the data screening process, there remained a sample 
comprising 4,591 deals undertaken in the period 1985 to 2003. In order to carry out 
the event study, the bidders obtained from the SDC were matched with their share 
prices and accounting data from Datastream by using the SEDOL code. The sample 
was then sub-divided into different portfolios according to the target's public status, 
method of payment, and bidding frequency. The methodology used in the event study 
will be introduced in the following part of this work. 
3.3.3 Methodology 
3.3.3.1 The Short-Run Abnormal Return Calculation 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from the announcement of an M&A event 
are calculated relative to the expected returns for windows of different lengths around 
the announcement date. Basically, the methodology as laid out in the previous chapter 
was used to calculate the CAR. 
The market model was not used here because over 30% of the acquirers in the sample 
were frequent bidders, which suggests a high probability of other bid announcements 
occurring in the estimation period. Any abnormal returns caused by these 
AT&T each bought more than 100 companies between June, 1995 and August, 2001. All have badly 
lagged their peers' return". 
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announcements would bias the estimation. 57 The CAR was calculated for a five-day 
event window around the announcement day (-2, 2). That is, the five-day CAR is: 
2 
CAR = L(Rit -Rmt ) 
t=-2 
Where Rit is the firm's daily stock return on date t and Rmt is the return for the 
capitalization weighted FTSE All Share index on date 1. 
Different windows were used in the calculation of the CAR measures to obtain some 
insight into the timeframe within which CARs were on average generated and to 
check for the robustness of the results to the specified window. The results gained 
from different event windows revealed a similar pattern to the main interval 
measurement. 58 The results of the short-run event study are presented in Sections 
3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 3.4.3. 
3.3.3.2 The Long-run Abnormal Return Calculations 
The aim here was to investigate the relationship between market valuation and merger 
outcome in the long-run. Thus, it was necessary to choose an appropriate 
methodology. This entailed becoming involved in the controversial area of long-run 
. return measurement. Many advocate the use of buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
S7 Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2003) did not use the market model for the same reason. Brown and 
Warner (1985) showed that weighting the market return by a firm's beta does not significantly improve 
the estimation. 
S8 Other intervals checked for robustness were (-5,5). (-1.1), and all the results were consistent with the 
main measurement. 
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(BHARs) to estimate long-run performance (for example, Rau and Vermaelen, 1998, 
Lyon, et aI, 1999, and Loughran and Ritter, 2000), but others suggest a portfolio 
approach (for example, Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The debate, in essence, reflects 
different tradeoffs of type one versus type two errors. Using BHARs gives the 
hypothesis tests a lot of power, but may reject too many nulls (type one errors). On 
the other hand, the portfolio approach, by aggregating individual events into 
calendar-time portfolios, excludes valuable information, thereby reducing the power 
of any hypothesis tests (type two errors). 
As the previous literature has documented, mergers normally come in waves, hence 
the main concern should be to try to avoid the serial correlation between each 
acquirer's return. However, as many previous researchers have advocated, estimating 
statistical significance with a buy and hold methodology is problematic because 
standard t-statistics do not adequately account for potential cross-sectional 
dependence in returns. In particular, standard errors will be biased downwards and 
t-statistics will be biased upwards. 59 Lyon (1999) recommended the use of the 
calendar- time portfolio approach because of the cross-sectional dependence in event 
performance in general. Furthermore, corporate events such as M&A have been 
documented to occur in waves, and the calendar-time portfolio approach understates 
the extent of "abnormal" returns since it smoothes them over the hot and cold periods. 
Moreover, this approach is better for measuring the return to an investor who holds a 
59 See Fama (1998), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
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security for a long post- event period. Based on all these concerns, the calendar-time 
portfolio approach was adopted for this study. 
The construction of the calendar-time portfolio of the bidders' returns was done by 
taking the average return of all firms that had made an acquisition in the prior three 
years for each month, but not including the current month. Each bidding fmn stayed 
in the portfolio for thirty-six months60, and the portfolio was rebalanced on a monthly 
basis. For each calendar month, a portfolio of event firms was formed, and the 
average cross-sectional abnormal return for that month was taken. The average 
abnormal return for the entire sample was the time-series average. Mitchell and 
Stafford's (2000) methodology was used to calculate the statistical significance, where 
the t-statistic was obtained by using the mean and standard deviation of the 
standardized calendar-time portfolio approach. The equation is as follows: 
~ Rot 
CTPj(t),1 = L..J I, 
i=j(t) Nj(t) 
Where jet) consists of acquisitions in group j for the months 1, through month 36 and 
where N j(t) is the number of acquisitions in jet). Mitchell and Stafford's (2000) 
standard methodology was followed to construct the calendar-time portfolio. In 
addition, any portfolio month with fewer than ten firms was dropped.61 
60 Based on the sample period limitation, the acquirer's post acquisition performance is calculated by 
using the twenty-four month returns if the deals took place between February, 2003 and December, 
2003. The result remains unchanged if the sample is cut off in these periods. 
61 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggested that there should be at least 10 firms in each month's 
portfolio, in order to avoid sample selection bias problems. 
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After the calendar-time return series for each group had been obtained, they were 
regressed on the Fama-French three factors to get calendar- time abnormal returns for 
each group; the equation is as follows: 
(5) 
Where Rept is the simple monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (either equally 
weighted or value-weighted), R f t is the monthly return on three month treasury bills, 
Rmt is the return on a market index, 5MBt is the return of the portfolios of small 
stocks and big stocks, and HMLt is the difference in the returns of the portfolios of 
high BIM stocks and low BIM stocks.62 For reasons of robustness, the standard 
capital asset pricing model was used to calculate the abnormal returns. Both results 
are reported in Sections 3.4.4, 3.4.5, and 3.4.6. 
62 The calendar-time portfolio approach was first used by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974). It was advocated by Fama (1997) 
and implemented in recent work by LouJhhran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers 
(1995). When using this approach, the calendar-time abnormal returns are calculated for sample firms. Inference is based on a 
,-statistic derived from the time-series of the moathly calendar-time portfolio abnormal return. 
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3.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, the empirical results and robustness issues of this research are 
discussed in depth. In general, the results are in line with the hypothesis, that is, that 
the deals initiated during hot market periods receive better short-run market reactions 
than those initiated during cold market periods, although in the long-run, hot market 
mergers exhibit the worst performance. Furthermore, the results suggest that frequent 
bidders are more easily infected by market sentiment; the volatility in returns is much 
higher for frequent bidders, and deals done in hot market valuation periods 
significantly under-perform those done in cold market periods in the long-run. 
3.4.1 The Short-run Abnormal Returns According to Target Type and 
Market Valuation Status 
The five-day cumulative abnormal returns are recorded by target type and market 
valuation status in Table 3.6. For each of the sample portfolios, it can be seen that the 
five-day CAR is significantly positive. The private and subsidiary target acquisitions 
yielded significantly positive returns, while the public target acquisitions yielded 
negative returns. The highest CARs among all the portfolios were to the acquirers 
who initiated their deals during high valuation periods and chose private targets. 
These yielded a statistically significant 2.09% return over the five-day announcement 
period. By contrast, acquirers who chose public targets during low market valuation 
periods yielded the worst performance at -0.77%. This result is generally consistent 
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with previous fmdings. 63 
For the total sample portfolio over all the market valuation periods, there are 4,591 
observations, which is by far the largest sample in a UK. takeover study, and a 
statistically significant positive return was found of 1.53% with a t = 14.22. The deals 
initiated during high market valuation periods out-performed those done in low 
market valuation periods (1.95% to 1.33%). Furthermore, it was found that 
acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets all yielded positive abnormal returns, 
which shows that the market's reaction is positive to these two types of acquisition in 
the short-run in all market valuation conditions. However, for public targets it was 
found that all the returns were negative. There are three possible explanations for this 
finding. Firstly, the larger the target is relative to the bidder, the stronger the target's 
negotiating position and its ability to extract more of the gain from the transaction. 
Usually the public target is relatively large in size, thus -0.72% returns to public target 
acquisitions in general were found. Secondly, bidding firms may find it more 
difficult to integrate larger public targets into their business, hence the market's 
expectation. The third explanation is that there are fundamental differences in the 
division of gains and or synergies between takeovers involving public and private 
targets, and these differences are magnified the greater the relative size of the merger. 
This can be considered as partially a liquidity effect. 64 
63 See Antoniou and Petmezas (2005). 
64 See Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), "Private firms and subsidiaries cannot be bought and 
sold as easily as publicly traded firms. The lack of liquidity makes these investments less attractive and 
thus less valuable than similar, more liquid investments. Sales of public targets are typically 
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There is another very distinctive fmding in Table 3.6, in that the announcement period 
returns during high valuation periods all out performed the returns in low valuation 
periods throughout all public, private, and subsidiary portfolios. Most likely is 
because the market sentiment is bullish among all managers and investors when the 
market valuation is high, thus the market is more welcoming to acquisition deals and 
vice versa. When the paired variables t test was performed between the returns series 
of high valuation mergers and low valuation mergers, it was found that, except for the 
public target acquisitions, all the differences between the high and low portfolios were 
significant. 
3.4.2 The Short-run Abnormal Returns According to Method of 
Payment and Market Valuation Status 
Table 3.7 presents the acquirer's short-run abnormal returns according to the method 
of payment classification. When the sample was divided according to method of 
payment and valuation, it was found that across all the acquisitions, all the portfolios 
of high and neutral acquisitions had significant positive results. However, during the 
auction-like in nature, with full disclosure required by the SEC. Professional arbitrageurs take positions 
in both target and bidder stocks, thus, providing more market feedback in the prices of both securities. 
In contrast, the sales process can vary substantially for private targets. At best, if the targets have a 
financial advisor, they can promote an auction-like atmosphere, with participation by a large number of 
qualified bidders. More realistic scenarios include limited auctions or a small number of interested 
bidders in a negotiated sale. The bidders are likely to have a bargaining advantage, at least relative to 
their position in bids for public targets." 
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low valuation periods, the stock and mixed payment portfolios had an insignificant 
result. Notably, for all the portfolios a descending return was found according to the 
market valuations. Acquirers gained higher returns in the high valuation markets. and 
lower returns in the low valuation markets. These findings are consistent \\"ith the 
market sentiment hypothesis, which assumes markets more easily absorb good news 
and give positive reactions when valuations are high and vice versa. 
In this table, it can be seen that stock mergers made during high valuation periods 
yielded the highest abnormal return, at 3.22% over the five-day announcement period. 
A portfolio of stock mergers also showed the lowest return (0.9%), but this was during 
a low valuation period. This suggests that market reaction towards merger 
announcements is more volatile for stock offers. 
Similar to the findings in Table 3.6, significant t statistics between the returns of high 
valuation and low valuation periods were found for all portfolios. Again, this indicates 
that the markets are more welcoming to merger deals during high valuation periods, 
rewarding them with high abnormal returns. When the deal is initiated during a low 
valuation period, the acquirer must be very certain of the combining synergy in the 
long-run simply because a big profit will not be made for the announcement period. 
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3.4.3 The Short-run Abnormal Returns According to the Bidding 
Frequency of the Acquirer and the Market Valuation Status 
In Table 3.8, the results are presented according to the acquirer's bidding frequency 
and the market valuations. Frequent bidders are defined as those making four or more 
bids within three years, and infrequent bidders as those making three or less bids 
within three years. 65 The first patterns to be found show that frequent bidders 
under-perform compared to infrequent bidders in general. 66 and the returns also 
follow a descending order as the market valuation changes from high to lov,·. 
According to this classification, the frequent bidders earned a 1.49% abnormal return, 
while the infrequent bidders earned 1.56% for all the sample portfolios. The sample 
was then sub-divided by market valuation status. For high valuation and neutral 
valuation periods the pattern remained the same as for the total sample. that is, 
frequent bidders under-performed, however, a very interesting finding was seen for 
the low market valuation periods. The frequent bidders in the low market valuation 
portfolio yielded a 1.41 % return, and the infrequent bidders yielded a 1.28% return. 
This finding suggests that frequent bidders actually accumulate experience over serial 
acquisitions and use it for choosing better targets and developing better takeover 
techniques. When the market valuation is low, the market is not expecting any 
acquisitions, thus both frequent and infrequent bidders show a much lower 
performance. However. based on their past experiences, frequent bidders can time the 
6S These results are robust to the use of different classifications of frequent bidder. please refer to the 
Appendix for the robustness results. 
btl This finding is consistent with Cosh et aL 's (2004) empirical findings for UK samples. 
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market even during low valuation periods and choose the right target to cater for 
market sentiment. 
It may be easier to understand the rationale underlying this if it is looked at from 
another angle. The relative size between target and bidder plays a very important role 
here. Frequent bidders are more prone to acquiring non-public targets simply because 
it is easier to integrate small targets into their series merger programmes. Consistent 
with the present hypothesis, the frequent bidders under-performed compared to the 
infrequent bidders by 0.070/0 when market valuation was high. most likely is because 
frequent bidders are in general more easily afflicted with hubris. which results in 
overpayment for the targets. In contrast, when the market sentiment is bearish during 
low valuation periods, these small targets are even more favorable to the investor, 
simply because they are very easy to integrate into the acquirer's business and do little 
harm even where they fail. This can also be seen in Table 3.6, where the acquirers of 
public targets during low valuation periods yielded a -0.770/0 negative return, whereas 
significant positive announcement returns can be observed for both private and 
subsidiary target acquisitions. 
3.4.4 The Long-run Abnormal Returns According to Target Type and 
Market Valuation Status 
Table 3.9 shows three-year long-run results according to the targefs public status 
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classification uSIng the calendar-time portfolio approach. Panel A, presents the 
regression results from the Fama-French three factor modeL and Panel B presents the 
results from the standard capital asset pricing model. Notably, except for the priyute 
target acquisitions. statistically significant returns can be seen for the three years 
following the acquisition announcement, whilst no significant abnormal returns \yere 
found among any of the other portfolios across the entire sample. This is consistent 
with most of the previous research that used the calendar-time portfolio approach. In 
order to shed light on the long-term impact market valuation has on different types of 
acquisition it is necessary to find out the difference between deals made in high 
valuation periods and those made in low valuation periods, and the different outcomes 
of the bidders' long-run performances. 
As can be seen, after controlling for size and the BIM effect, the results still show that 
deals made during high valuation periods significantly under-performed compared to 
those made during low valuation periods (0.120/0 for high, 0.41 % for low). 
Furthermore, the difference between these two return series is statistically significant 
(t = -2.48). Notably, stock offers made during high market valuation periods yielded 
the worst long-run performance (-0.24%). and this result is statistically significant (t = 
-2.32). This is consistent with the stated hypothesis, that is, stock mergers convey the 
signal of bidder overvaluation. and overvaluation will be replaced by reality in the 
long-run. 
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Across the sample, cash, stock, and mixed offer portfolios, there was a clear trend of 
deals initiated during low market valuation periods having better performance 
compared to high valuation deals. All returns for the deals made during the low 
valuation periods were positive across all the portfolios, and again, this pattern 
confirms the relationship between bidder performance and market valuation when the 
deal is initiated. 
From Panel B it can be seen that all the abnormal returns are negative, most likely is 
because only the market return was considered as the benchmark. The intercept term 
in the regression captures more dynamic changes in the returns. The reason for doing 
this is it makes it possible to see a clearer trend of the changes in bidders' abnormal 
returns when the market valuation varies. Consistent with that found using the Fama 
French three-factor model, here the stock mergers made during high valuation periods 
were found to yield the worst return, which was -1.08% with a t value -2.31. Again, 
it can be seen that cash offers yielded better performances than stock offers in all the 
portfolios, this fmding is similar to that which Bouwman et aI. (2004) found using US 
data. 
Except for the mixed offers, the results for all the other portfolios suggest that the 
difference between high valuation returns and low valuation returns is very significant. 
The last column of both panels shows that the difference between cash offers and 
stock offers was also significant, which suggests that cash offers are more rational 
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investments and hence show superior performance in the long-run. 
3.4.5 The Long-run Abnormal Returns According to Method of 
Payment and Market Valuation Status 
Table 3.10 presents the three-year long-run results according to the method of 
payment and market valuation status using the calendar-time portfolio approach. 
From this table, it can be seen that the cash offers significantly out-performed the 
stock offers in all valuation periods. Consistent with the findings in Table 3.9. where 
the deals were initiated during low valuation periods, a positive abnormal return is 
found in the three years following the acquisition announcement for all portfolios. 
Stock offers made during high valuation periods yielded the worst returns at -0.24%, 
which is statistically significant. It is not hard to understand why this is the case. The 
market receives a signal of the bidder's valuation status according to the bidder's 
choice of method of payment. If stock is used, the perception of the market will be 
that the bidder is overvalued in some sense, thus the market will discount this 
overvaluation in the long-run unless the bidder has substantial earnings to support its 
overvaluation. 
The bottom of Table 3.10 shows the difference between the long-run results of high 
valuation mergers and those of low \"aluation mergers. except for the mixed offer 
portfolio, all the portfolios showed significant results. Across all the acquisition 
portfolios of the sample. the t \"alue was -2.48. This result suggests that deals made in 
low valuation periods statistically out-perfonned those made In high valuation 
periods. 
Consistent with the findings of Franks, Harris. and Titman (1991). this research found 
that cash offers out-performed stock offers in the long-run. Across all the acquisition 
portfolios of the sample the cash offers yielded a 0.17% return, while the stock offers 
yielded a -0.08% return. Even though all these returns are insignificant, the mean 
difference between them is statistically significant, with t = 3.4. 
Panel B presents the results from the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
All the abnormal returns when using the CAPM were negative, but the trends were 
similar to those observed in panel A. Firstly, the returns increased when the valuation 
moved from high to low. Even though the results from the low valuation periods were 
insignificant, the mean differences between the high and low yaluation portfolios 
were very significant. By using the CAPM, it is proved that the results are robust to 
different models. 
3.4.6 The Long-run Abnormal Returns According to Bidding 
Frequency and Market Valuation Status 
Table 3.11 presents the three-year long-run results according to the acquirer's bidding 
frequency. In generaL it was found that the frequent bidders under-perfonned 
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compared to the infrequent bidders in the long-run following acquisition 
announcement. Panel A presents the results from using the Fama French three-factor 
model, and it can be seen that across all the acquisition portfolios of the sample the 
frequent bidders yielded a 0.21 % return. The infrequent bidders yielded a 0.25% 
return, and even though the results for the infrequent bidder portfolio is insignificant 
the mean difference between the two portfolios is significant. This fmding suggests 
that bidding frequency is an important factor in explaining the long-run returns of 
bidders. 
However, when the results were classified according to market valuation status, 
something very interesting was found. For the high valuation periods, it is seen that 
the frequent bidders yielded a -0.28% return, while the infrequent bidders realized a 
positive return of 0.31 %. Moreover, the mean difference result also shows that the 
difference is significant. However, for the deals made during low valuation periods, 
the frequent bidders yielded a positive return of 0.68%, while the infrequent bidders 
only yielded a 0.37% return. Again, in panel B, similar patterns were found, in that the 
frequent bidders in the low valuation portfolios out-performed the infrequent bidders, 
and the difference is significant. 
These findings suggest that frequent bidders do not always under-perform compared 
to infrequent bidders in the long-run; when the market valuation was taken into 
consideration, the whole scenario changed dramatically. Again, this finding is in line 
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with the hypothesis that frequent bidders are more easily infected by market sentiment. 
When the market is hot, they are encouraged to make more acquisitions, at the same 
time they are more likely to be overconfident. Thus, deals initiated during hot market 
valuation periods significantly under-perform. However, when the market sentiment is 
bearish during low market valuation periods, frequent bidders will be even more 
conservative. They are more careful in choosing their target and in accessing the 
combining synergy simply because everybody knows that low valuation periods are 
not a good time to realize short-run gains, and the deal must have some long-run 
compensation to cover the short-run losses. Frequent bidders use their experience 
accumulated from the past. Thus, it is clear that market timing is one of the key issues 
in determining whether a merger deal will be successful or not. Timing in merger 
refers specifically to the financing decisions intended to capitalize on temporary 
mis-pricing, generally via the issuance of overvalued securities and the repurchase of 
undervalued ones. When the market valuation is low, managers in bidding firms face 
critical decisions regarding the selection of targets and timing. Unless they are quite 
certain about the merger outcome they will not initiate the deal, because there will be 
a great loss in reputation if others have not made the same mistake. In this case, 
frequent bidder managers are more experienced in choosing their target and are more 
prone to exercising their merger programme during low valuation periods simply 
because the target share will be cheaper during these periods. 
In summary, this research shows that the more experienced and more conservative the 
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sentiment during low valuation periods, the more frequent bidders out-perform 
infrequent bidders in the long-run. If a bidder initiates a deal. as part of a large mager 
programme, during a low valuation period there should be less cost in capital and it 
should result in a better performance in the long-run. 
3.5 ROBUSTNESS 
In this section there is a discussion of the robustness of the results of this research to 
the different classifications of high, neutral, and low valuation markets, and to the 
different event windows used to calculate the short-run and long-run returns. 
3.5.1 Robustness for Merger Activity Classifications and Different 
Event Windows in both the Short-run and Long-run 
The results that are presented above used the PIE ratio classification of the UK total 
market index to classify the months into high, neutral. and low valuation periods. An 
alternative method used here is the merger activity classification. From the work of 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) it is known that 
the volume of acquisitions is positively correlated with periods of high market 
valuation. Given this, acquisitions undertaken when there are many acquisitions are 
more likely to be influenced by market sentiments, hence the bidding firms' managers 
are more likely to be overconfident compared to when deals are initiated during low 
merger activity periods. 
Using this classification the merger activity ratio was calculated as the ratio of total 
meraer transaction volume to total market capitalization for each month from 1985 to 
e 
2003 using the SOC data. As with the PIE classification, five years of historical 
merger data was used to classit~· each month into an above (below) average group if 
the merger activity ratio of that month was uho\'t? (below) the an:ragc ratio of the past 
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five years. Then the months with merger activity ratios in the top (bottom) half of the 
above (below) average group were classified as high (low) valuation periods. All 
remaining months were classified as neutral valuation months. Because the SDC data 
for the UK only became available in 1985, and it was necessary for the classification 
to have data for the five previous years, the total sample for estimation runs from 
1990 to 2003. Using this classification, the sample is smaller than that used for the 
PIE classification, and contains 3,881 complete takeover deals. Among these deals, 
1,289 were initiated during high market valuation periods, 1,871 during neutral 
valuation periods, and 721 during low market valuation periods. 
Panel B of Table 3.12 presents the short-run results based on three different 
classifications, using the same event window. It can be seen that when using the 
merger activity classification, the abnormal returns for the overall sample are less than 
when using the PIE method. This is probably due to the smaller sample size, and also 
because the period from 1987 to 1989, which was a very high period of takeover 
activity, was excluded. However, the results using this classification are still 
consistent with the main measurement, which shows that in the short-run, the deals 
initiated during periods of high merger activity out-perform those done in low merger 
activity periods, and the mean difference between these two return series is significant 
with t =1.81. Classification by market index alone revealed the same pattern as 
observed from the main PIE classification. 
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Panel A reports the results based on an eleven-day event window, and Panel C reports 
the results based on a three-day event window. The reason for doing calculations for 
different event windows is to check whether the results are affected according to the 
event window selection. In Panel A it can be seen that for the eleven-day window 
there was a much bigger CAR in general. For the PIE and Index classifications there 
were 2.47% and 2.41 % abnormal returns respectively; apart from the larger abnormal 
return, the pattern is the same as for the five-day event window. For Panel C, the 
abnormal returns of each of the three classifications are all less than the for the 
five-day event window result. However, they showed a similar trend when the market 
valuation or volume of merger activity changed. For the merger activity classification, 
the three-day announcement return was 0.62%, and is highly significant. Again, 
consistent with the five-day event window result, the abnormal return decreased from 
1.05% to 0.19% when the merger activity moved from high to low, and the mean 
difference between them was statistically significant. 
In Table 3/13, Panel A, the second column presents the three-year long-run results 
according to the merger activity classification. They are consistent with the results 
from the PIE classification. It can be seen that for deals made in high merger activity 
periods, the bidders realized a negative return of -0.07%, and this result is significant. 
This suggests that if an overconfident manager follows the market sentiment and 
makes a merger during a high merger activity period, it is more likely they will suffer 
from significant losses in the long-run. Moreover, it can be seen that the difference 
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between high and low is also significant, which shows that the deals made in low 
merger activity periods significantly out-performed those that were not. 
The second column of Panel B shows the results based on the two-year event 
windows. It can be seen that the result is slightly better than the three-year returns. 
This is simply because from month 24 to 36 following a merger announcement, there 
were more negative returns. Notably, the acquirers that made their deals during high 
merger activity periods yielded a positive return of 0.15%, and the difference between 
this month 24 group and the month 36 group is statistically significant with the 
coefficient at 0.22% and t = 2.84 (these results are not shown in the table). This 
finding suggest that the losses from month 24 to 36 offset all the gains to the bidder 
from the acquisition announcement. 
Overall, similar evidence has been found from the merger activity classification that 
managers make poorer acquisitions when they expect more acquisitions to be 
undertaken. When merger activity is high, each manager may be more inclined to 
acquire another company and be less careful in assessing synergies. Roll's (1986) 
bidding competition hypothesis, also serves as a creditable explanation for these 
findings. When competition among bidders during high merger activity periods is 
high, they will automatically wipe out potential gains to bidders and result in losses in 
the long-run. 
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3.5.2 Robustness for UK Total Market Index Classification and 
Different Event Windows in both the Short-run and Long-run. 
The second classification used to check the robustness of the short-run and long-run 
results was based on the UK total market index itself and the PIE ratio of the index. 
For the market index classification, the de-trended UK total market index (UKTMJ) 
was used as the proxy for market valuations67. The index level for each month was 
classified as above or below the previous five-year average UKTMI level. The 
months in the top half of the UKTMI levels in the above average group were 
classified as high valuation months, while those in the bottom half of the UKTMI 
levels in the below-average group were classified as low valuation months. All other 
months were classified as neutral valuation months. The data for this classification ran 
from 1985 to 2003. The short-run results for this classification are presented in Table 
3.12. 
From Table 3.12 it can be seen that, based on the market index classification, 1,529 
deals were initiated during high market valuation periods, 2,017 during neutral 
valuation periods, and 1,045 during low market valuation periods. It is known from 
the numbers that during high market valuation periods the market welcomes merger 
deals. Panel B shows the results for the five-day event window, where bidders in high 
valuation periods yielded a return of 1.57%, and those that made their deals during 
67 The best straight line fitting the linear trend was removed from the UKTMI level before classifying 
each month as above or below the previous five-year average. The de-trending procedure used was the 
same as described for the PIE ratio. Since the UKTMI level had trended upwards, failure to remove the 
trend would result in a systematic classification of more recent acquisitions as high valuations and 
older acquisitions as low valuations. 
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low valuation periods yielded a return of 1.10%. From the differences in the means 
test, it was found that in the short-run, bidders in high valuation periods 
out-performed those in low valuation periods by 0.47%, and this result is significant 
with t = 2.72. Panel B presents the three-day event window results, which are 
consistent with the five-day window results, that is, 0.82% for high valuation mergers, 
and 0.27% for low valuation mergers, the difference in the means is still very 
significant with t = 3.51. 
Table 3.13, Panel A and Panel B present the three-year and two-year long-run ~esults 
following the merger announcement respectively. These results continue to provide 
strong support for the notion that low-valuation acquirers make better purchases than 
high-valuation acquirers. For the three-year event windows, low valuation acquirers 
on average significantly out-performed high valuation acquirers by 0.22%. For the 
two-year event windows, low valuation acquirers on average out-performed high 
valuation acquirers by 0.36%, with t = 1.99. 
In summary, using both the market index and merger activity classifications and 
choosing different event windows served to prove that results were not caused by 
chance when using a particular market valuation classification method. The 
robustness test reinforces the findings that high valuation acquirers out-perform low 
valuation acquirers in the short-run, but perform less well in the long-run as the 
market eventually learns about the quality of the acquisition decisions. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study is to explore the possible linkage between overall stock 
market valuation and merger outcome, and the unique characteristics of frequent 
bidders and non-public targets, by applying different market valuations. In this way, 
the performance test was conducted on different bidder portfolios. Taking a large UK 
domestic takeover sample ranging from 1985 to 2003, the main findings are that the 
short-run and long-run performance of bidders are both highly correlated with the 
market valuation level at the time the deal is initiated. More specifically, the results 
show that the announcement period returns are much higher for the deals undertaken 
in high valuation markets compared to those made in low valuation markets. In 
addition, long-run reversal has been found for both portfolios and acquirers initiating 
their deals in high valuation markets significantly under-performed in the long-run 
compared to those deals initiated in low valuation markets. 
Similar to other studies undertaken in this field, a further question is asked: "What is 
the market reaction towards frequent bidder acquisition and non-pUblic target 
acquisition, given the condition of different market valuation levels"? In most cases, 
the findings are consistent with the conventional results, which suggest that frequent 
bidders perform less well than infrequent bidders in general. However, something 
different was found in the long-run study, that is, frequent bidders out-perfonned 
infrequent bidders where the deals were initiated during low market valuation periods 
in the long-run. As discussed in Chapter 1, growth through many small acquisitions 
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over a long period of time will yield better performance than growth through a small 
number of large acquisitions. Most likely is because frequent bidders are not only 
aIDicted by hubris, but will also gain from the experience of making many small 
acquisitions. When the market is hot, such bidders will be encouraged to make more 
acquisitions and are likely to be more overconfident in general, thus deals initiated 
during hot market valuation periods will significantly under-perform. However, when 
the market sentiment is bearish during low market valuation periods, frequent bidders 
will be even more conservative simply because they need to be more careful in 
choosing their target and assessing the combining synergy. Most likely is because it is 
well known that low valuation periods are not a good time to realize short-run gains, 
thus the deal must have some long-run compensation to cover any short-run losses. 
Consistent with previous findings, the results show that non-public target acquisitions 
yield better performance in both the short-run and long,.run. Moreover, the private 
target acquisitions made during high market valuation periods yielded the best 
short-run returns of all the portfolios, these being 2.09% for the five-day event 
window. 
In summary, in the UK market, strong evidence has been found of the linkage 
between market valuation and merger outcome, and the results also suggest that 
frequent bidders exhibit different characteristics during different market valuation 
periods. Most importantly, it has been found that there are long-run performance 
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reversals among deals initiated during both high and low market valuation periods. 
Some recent studies have suggested that these reversals are probably due to a 
combination of market irrationality and managerial hubris. Shleifer and Vishney 
(2004) suggested that inefficient capital markets and differences in managers' time 
horizons drive merger activity. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) have suggested 
that merger activity is high during stock market booms because more targets accept 
acquirer bids. The conclusion of these various research streams is that stock prices 
matter; both firm and market valuations clearly affect the intensity of merger activity 
and the subsequent performance of mergers. 
This chapter has also raised some interesting questions for further research. As the 
results suggest that market valuations do affect merger outcomes. it may be suspected 
that there will be some sort of correlation between individual merger deals when the 
overall market valuation level changes. Thus, the outcome of the merger deals should 
correlate with previous deals and exhibit a certain momentum pattern. The notion of 
this momentum pattern will be investigated in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Figure 3.1. Total Market P/E Ratio and De-trended P/E ratio Diagram 
The original UK Total Market Index PIE ratio is obtained from DataStream range from 
1980 to 2005. In order to classify each month into a valuation group we first de-trend the 
market PIE by removing the best straight-line fit from the PIE of the month in question 
and the five preceding years. It is necessary to remove the trend from the market PIE ratio 
because PIE ratio have trended upwards as shown in the graph below (the top line), so 
that not removing the trend would result in a systematic classification of more recent 
acquisitions as high -valuation acquisitions and other acquisitions as low acquisitions. 
1-Market PE Ratio - De-trended PE Ratio 1 25 . 
20 
15 ~ 
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Table 3.1 Data Description 
This table presents the data from Securities data corporation (SDC) Merger and Acquisition 
database and consists of. 4,591 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 2003 by 1,231 
publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. "Public targets" is defined by SDC. 
"Related Acquisition" is defines as an acquisition in which the acquirer and target have the 
same two-digit primary SIC code. "Cash only" "Stock only" is defmes as the method of 
payment is 100% by cash or stock respectively. Deal value is from SDC. 
Year Number Number Number of Number Number Average 
of of Public related of Cash of Stock Deal Value 
Targets Targets Acq uisitions Only Only (Million 
Pound) 
1985 16 4 2 12 3 25.6 
1986 45 4 19 35 8 45.4 
1987 143 19 57 97 25 30.4 
1988 247 30 99 ]64 12 24.1 
1989 259 36 82 ] 17 23 23.9 
1990 173 16 63 ] 12 7 16.3 
1991 148 21 58 89 15 33.2 
1992 151 9 61 85 13 18.5 
1993 179 20 75 1] 5 15 16.9 
1994 232 22 116 121 17 19.0 
1995 230 22 111 131 21 17.6 
1996 300 18 130 154 14 22.4 
1997 381 40 237 194 22 42.0 
1998 436 38 240 272 15 26.4 
1999 409 45 203 240 14 37.0 
2000 395 31 239 167 25 34.2 
2001 301 27 212 ]02 23 22.2 
2002 336 16 155 135 11 31.0 
2003 201 20 128 112 11 39.7 
85 to 03 4591 438 2288 2464 294 27.9 
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Table 3.2: Acquirer Number and Transaction Value by Form of Payment and Acquisition Type 
This' Table shows' the' 'mean aiid'median market vahle of equity of the acquirer and the mean and median transaction value of the 
acquisition. The summary statistics are based on the sample of 4,591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. 
Acquiririg firms are included in this sample if they are UK firms listed on London Stock Exchange. Using monthly data from 1985 to 
2003, each month from '1985 to 2003 is classified as a high, neutral, low valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month 
belongs to the top (bottom) half of all de-trended PIEs above (below) t,he past five year average. "Cash only", "Stock only" is defines 
as the method of payment is 100% by cash or stock respectively. Deal value is from SDC. (Unit: Million Pounds) 
No. of Mean Deal Median Deal Total Deal Percentage of Percentage of Total 
Acquisition . Value ' Value, Nalue Total Deal No. of Acquisitions 
Value 
All Acquisitions ,,, 4591 28.47 4.50 , 130717.84 100.0% 100.0% 
High Valuation Acquisitions 1376 31.27 5.00 43002.40 32.9% 29.9% 
Neutral Valuation Acquisitions ' 2133 25.67 4.10 54772.18 - 41.9% 46.5% 
Low Valuation Acquisition 1082 30.45 4.63 32943.26 25.2% 23.6% 
Cash Acquisitions 2464 24.24 4.00 59739.41 45.7% 53.7% 
Stock Acquisitions 
1, 
294 84.33 7.36 24792.06 19.0% 6.4% 
Mixed Payment Acquisitions 1833 25.20 '-, 4.85 46186.37 35.3% 39.9% 
High Valuation Cash Acquisitions 719 26.20 4.25 18836.87 14.4% 15.7% 
, High Valuation Stock Acquisitions 93 85.91 10.55 7903.75 6.0% 2.0% 
High Valuation Mix Acquisitions 564 28.83 5.36 16261.78 12.4% 12.3% 
Neutral Valuation Cash Acquisitions 1123 21.05 3.70 23661.72 18.1% '24.5% 
Neutral Valuation Stock Acquisitions 139 100.23 6.56 13931.72 10.7% 3.0% 
Neutral Valuation Mix Acquisitions 871 19.72 4.50 ' '17178.74 13.1% -'19.0% 
Low Valuation Cash Acquisitions 621 27.76 4.20 17240.82 13.2% ' ,13.5% 
Low Valuation Stock Acquisitions , ,,' 63 46.93 ,,6.79, .. 2956.59 2.3% - 1.4% 
Low Valuation Mix Acquisitions 398 32.02 5.25 12745.85 9.8% 8.7% 
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Table 3.3: Acquirer Number and Transaction Value by target public status 
This Table shows the mean and median market value of equity of the acquirer and the mean and median transaction value of the 
acquisition. The summary statistics are based on the sample of 4,591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. 
Acquiring firms are included in this sample if they are UK firms listed on London Stock Exchange. Using monthly data from 1985 to 
2003, each month from 1985 to 2003 is classified as a high, neutral, low valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month 
belongs to the top (bottom) half of all de-trended PIEs above (below) the past five year average. The definition of "Public Target", 
"Private Target" and "Subsidiaries" and data of Deal Value is from SDC. (Unit: Million Pounds) 
No. of Mean Deal Median Total Deal Percentage of Percentage of 
Acquisition Value Deal Value Value Total Deal Total No. of 
Value Acquisitions 
All Acquisitions 4591 28.47 4.50 130717.84 100.0% 100.0% 
Public Target Acquisitions 438 30.51 4.85 13363.13 10.2% 9.5% 
Private Target Acquisitions 2624 29.22 4.50 76680.39 58.7% 57.2% 
Subsidiaries Target Acquisition 1529 26.60 4.25 40674.32 31.1% 33.3% 
High Valuation Pub. Acquisitions 109 28.46 5.00 3101.70 2.4% 1.4% 
High Valuation Priv. Acquisitions 863 27.72 4.80 23921.13 18.3% 18.8% 
High Valuation Sub. Acquisitions 403 39.65 5.00 15979.57 12.2% 8.8% 
Neutral Valuation Pub. Acquisitions 193 20.06 4.26 3870.83 3.0% 4.2% 
Neutral Valuation Priv. Acquisitions 1202 29.90 4.25 35942.71 27.5% 26.2% 
Neutral Valuation Sub. Acquisitions 739 20.24 4.00 14958.64 11.4% 16.1% 
Low Valuation Pub. Acquisitions 136 46.99 5.95 6390.60 4.9% 3.0% 
Low Valuation Priv. Acquisitions 559 30.08 4.50 16816.55 12.9% 12.2% 
Low Valuation Sub. Acquisitions 387 25.16 4.50 9736.11 7.4% 8.4% 
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Table 3.4 Acquirer Number and Transaction Value by Bidding Frequency 
This Table shows the mean and median market value of equity of the acquirer and the mean and median transaction value of the 
acquisition. The summary statistics are based on the sample of 4,591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. 
Acquiring firms are included in this sample if they are UK firms listed on London Stock Exchange. Using monthly data from 1985 to 
2003, each month from 1985 to 2003 is classified as a high, neutral, low valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month 
belongs to the top (bottom) half of all de-trended PIEs above (below) the past five year average. We define frequent bidder as those 
bidder taken four or more bids within three years, infrequent bidder as those bidder taken 3 or less bids with three years. Deal value is 
from soc. (Unit: Million Pounds) .. . j 
All Acquisitions .. 
All Frequent Bidder Acquisition 
. All Infrequent Bidder Acquisition 
High Valuation Frequent bidder Acquisition~ 
", '" 
High Valuation Infrequent bidder Acquisitions 
Neutral Valuation Frequent bidder Acquisitions 
Neutral Valuation Infrequent Acquisitions 
Low Valuation Frequent bidder Acquisitions· 
Low Valuation Infrequent Acquisitions 
No. of 
Acquisition 
4591 
1453 
3138 
411 
964 
729 
1405 
313 . 
769 
Mean Deal 
Value 
28.47 
25.47 
29.86 
27.15 
,. 
33.03 
21.14 
28.01 
33.37 
29.26 
Median Deal 
Value 
4.5 
4.4 
4.5 
5.6 
4.73 
4.08 
4.1 
3.9 
4.9 
Percentage of 
Total Deal Value Total Deal Value 
130717.84 
31013.98 
93103.86 
11156. 14 
31845.66 
15411. 29 
39360.89 
10445.95 
22491.31 
100.00% 
28.32% 
71.68% 
'8.53% 
24.36% 
11.79% 
30.11% 
7.99% 
17.21% 
Percentage of 
Total No. of 
Acquisitions 
100.00% 
31.65% 
68.35% 
8.95% 
21.00% 
15.88% 
30.60% 
6.82% 
16.75% 
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Table 3.5 Acquisitionfrequency of UK public acquirers; 1985 to 2003 
This table presents the data from Securities data corporation (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database and consists of. 4,591 U.K acquisitions undertaken from 1985 to 
2003 by 1,231 publicly listed acquirers for which deal values are available. The 
number of acquisition indicated the quantity of acquisition any firm had made during 
1985 to 2003 period. Percent of bidder is defined as the percentage of bidders in each 
category among total sample. 
Number of Number of Percent of Cumulative 
Acquisitions Bidders Bidders Percentage 
1 339 27 -40 • ::>' .0 27.54% 
2 202 16.41% 43. gS~() 
3 148 12.02% 55. 97% 
4 214 17.38% 73.35% 
5 76 6.17% 79. 53% 
6 66 5. 36% 84.89% 
7 42 3.41% 88.30% 
8 31 2. 52% 90.82% 
9 29 2. 36% 93. 18% 
10 18 1.46% 94.64% 
11 14 1. 14% 95. 78% 
12 11 O. 89% 96. 67% 
13 7 o -70 . .;) /0 97.24% 
14 4 O. 32% 97.56% 
15 3 0.24% 97.81% 
16 3 O. :24% 98.05% 
17 2 O. 16% 98.21% 
18 4 O. 32% 98.54% 
19 3 O. 24% 98. 78% 
20 4 O. 32% 99. 11 % 
21-60 11 0.89% 100.00% 
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Table 3.6 Short run cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by target public status and market valuation status 
This table contains short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all acquisitions undertaken during high, neutral and low 
valuation months, based on the sample of 4,591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. Using monthly data 
from 1985 to 2003, each month is c.Iassified as a high(low) valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month belongs to the 
top(bottom)half of all de-trended PIE above (below) the past five year average. All remaining months are classified as neutral 
valuation month. CARs for each firm are calculated as the following formula: 
+2 
CAR = L (RII - Rm) , which we use 5 day event windows, day 0 is the announcement day of an acquisition. The definition of 
-2 
"Public Target", "Private Target" and "Subsidiaries" are from SDC. t -statistics are provided in the parenthesis. 
'" 
All Public Private Subsidiaries 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR 
All acquisitions 4591 1. 53% 438 -0. 72% 2625 1. 69% 1528 1.48% 
(14. 22) ** (-2. 09) ** (11. 3h* (8. 74) ** 
High valuation acquisitions 1375 1. 95% 136 -0. 51% 779 2.09% 460 1. 74% 
(9. 72) ** (-2.74) ** (7. 5) ** (5. 56) ** 
Neutral valuation 2135 1. 37% 186 -0.60% 1247 1. 52% 702 1.30% 
acquisitions (8. 72) ** (-1.01) (7. I) ** (5.4h* 
Low valuation acquisitions 1081 1. 33% 116 -0. 77% 599 0.93% 366 1.47% 
(6. 07) ** (-0.72) (1. 94) * (4. II) ** 
High Val- Low Val 0.62% 0.26% 1.16% o. 27% 
(3.08) ** (1. 33) (2.65) ** (3.1:3)** 
( •• , • indicate the significance level at 5%, and 10% respectively, "Val" refer to "Valuation") 
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I able 3. 7 Short run cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by method of payment and market valuation status 
This table contains short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all acquisitions undertaken during high, neutral and low 
valuation months, based on the sample of 4,591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. Using monthly data 
from 1985 to 2003, each month is classified as a high(low) valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month belongs to the 
top(bottom)half of all de-trended PIE above (below) the past five year average. All remaining months are classified as neutral 
+2 
valuation month. CARs for each firm are calculated as the following formula: CAR = L (Rit - Rm) , which we use 5 day event 
-2 
windows, day 0 is the announcement day of an acquisition. "Cash" refers to 100% cash offer, "Stock" refers to 100% stock offer, 
"Mixed" refers to the mixture of both cash and stock offer in one deal. t -statistics are provided in the parenthesis. 
All Cash Stock Mixed 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR 
All acquisitions 
4591 1. 53% 2486 1. 50% 289 2. 11% 1816 1. 49% 
(14. 22) ** (11. 03) ** (3. 66) ** (8. 44h* 
High valuation 
acquisitions 1375 1. 95% 730 1. 95% 89 3.22% 556 1. 73% 
(9. 72) ** (7.84) ** (3.07) ** (5. 25h* 
Neutral valuation 
acquisitions 2135 1. 37% 1134 1. 37% 137 1. 94% 864 1. 38% 
(8. 72) ** (6. 87) ** (2.08h* (5. 29) ** 
Low valuation 
acquisitions 1081 1.33% 622 1. 33% 63 0.90% 396 l. 31% 
(6. 07) ** (4. 43) ** (1. 09) (l. 04) 
High Val. - Low Val 0.62% 0.62% 2.32% 0.42% 
(3. 08) ** (3. 73) ** (1. 89) * (7. 39h* 
( •• , • indicate the significance level at 5%, and 10% respectively, "Val" refer to "Valuation") 
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Table 3.8 Short run cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) by bidding frequency and market valuation status 
This table contains short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all acquisitions undertaken during high. neutral and low 
valuation months, based on the sample of 4,591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. Using monthly data 
from 1985 to 2003, each month is classified as a high(low) valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month belongs to the 
top(bottom)half of all de-trended PIE above (below) the past five year average. All remaining months are classified as neutral 
+2 
valuation month. CARs for each firm are calculated as the following formula: CAR = I (R;, - Rnr) , which we use 5 Jay event 
-2 
windows, day 0 is the announcement day of an acquisition. We define frequent bidder as those bidder taken 4 or more bids within 
three years, infrequent bidder as those bidder taken 3 or less bids within three years. t -statistics are provided in the parenthesis. 
All Frequent Bidders Infrequent Bidders Freq. - Infreq. 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR Coefficient t value 
All acquisitions 4591 1.53% 1453 1.49% 3138 1. ;:)6% -0.07% (-3. N9) ** 
(14. 22) ** (3. 18) ** (3. 64h* 
Iligh valuation acquisitions 1375 1.95% 444 I. 71% 931 2. 07% -0. :Hl% (-7.51 h* 
(9. 72) ** (2. 86h* (:t 12) ** 
Neutral valuation 21 :~;:) 1. 37% 711 1 '36°1 •• 10 1421 1.42% -0. Of)% ( J. (7) ** 
acquisitions (8. 72) ** (1. 71)* (2. ~) ** 
Low valuation acquisitions 1081 I. 33% 295 1. 41% 7Hb 1.28% O. 1:)% (I. 7hh 
(G. 07) ** (2. 87) ** (2. ;:)2) ** 
Iligh Val - Low Val 0.62% 0.30% O. 7~% 
(3.08) ** (8.59)** (4. 17) ** 
( ••. • inJicatc the significance level at 5%, and 10% respectively "Val" refers to "Valuation" "Frc(!" refcrs to "Frcqucnt") 
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Table 3.9 Three years long run abnormal return based on target public status alld 
market valuation status classification by using calendar time portfolio approach 
This table provides the results of acquirer's 3 years post announcement long run 
return calculation by using calendar time portfolio approach for all acquisitions 
undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation months. Using monthly data from 
1985 till 2003, each month is classified as a high(low) valuation month if the 
detrended market PIE of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended 
PIEs above (below) the past five year average. All remaining months are classified as 
neutral valuation months. The definition of "Public Target". "Private Target" and 
"Subsidiaries" is from SDC. "Non-public" portfolio is the returns combining pri\'ate 
and subsidiary portfolio together. To form Calendar time portfolio, we use the 
following method: The portfolio return for group j is the average over all months with 
~ R. 
at least 10 observations ofCTPj (t).1 = ~ 1.1, Where jet) consists of acquisitions in 
i=j(t) Nj(!) 
group j for the months L through month 36 and where N jill is the number of 
acquisitions in j(t) .. Panel A present the regression result by using Fama French Three 
Factor Model, Panel B present the result by using CAPM 
FF 3 Factor Model: CTPj(l) - Rf = a 1 + fJl (Rm - Rf ) + fJ'2 (SMB) + fJ3 (HJ/L) + G 
Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model: CTPj(l) - Rr = a 1 + fJl (Rm - Rr) + G 
The values in the brackets are t statistics. 
Panel A: Regression result by using Fama-French Three Factor Model: 
All Public Private Subsidiary Pub.- NonPub. 
(t-value) 
All 0.22% 0.12% 0.28% 0.25% -0.15% 
(-2.82)* * 
(0.75) (0.92) (1.91)* (0.49) 
High Valuation 0.l20/0 -0.35% 0.21% 0.19% -0.55% 
Acquisitions (-3.49)** 
(1.14) ( -1.65)* (0.97) (1.53) 
Neutl Valuation 0.28% -0.18% 0.19% 0.14% -0.350/0 
Acquisitions (-3.64)* * 
(1.32) (-1.72)* (1.11) (0.69) 
Low Valuation 0.41% 0.28% 0.47% 0.37% -0.14°,0 
Acquisitions (-2.83)** 
( 1.29) ( 1.55) C' "''')** _._,j (0.71 ) 
High - Low -0.29°/'0 -0.63% -0.26% -0.18% 
(t \'al~l(,) { -',48)** (-4.61)** (-3.19)** ( -3.03)** 
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Panel B: Regression result by using Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model: 
All Public Private Subsidiary Pub.- NonPub. 
(t-value) 
All -0.370/0 -0.85.% 0.320/0 0.26% -l.14 
(-2.82)** 
(-l.29) (-1.49) (2.44)** (l.51) 
High Valuation -0.540/0 -l.87% -0.58% -0.480/0 -1.34% 
Acquisitions (-3.49)** 
(-l.89)* (1.37) (-1.81)* ( -0.93) 
Neutr. Valuation -0.42% -0.84% 0.210/0 0.13% -1.01% 
Acquisitions (-3.64 )** 
(-2.23)** (-1.53) (2.39)* * (1. 77)* 
Low Valuation -0.16% -0.29% 0.51% 0.4 70/0 -0.78% 
Acquisitions (-2.83)** 
(-0.51 ) (-2.77)** (1.80)* (2.10)** 
High-Low -0.380/0 -l.58% -1.090/0 0.95% 
(t value) (-2.48)" (-4.61 )** (-3.19)** (-3.03)** 
(*, * * represent significance level at 10% and 50/0 respectively) 
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Table 3.10 Three years long run abnormal return based on method of payment and 
market valuation status classification by using calendar time portfolio approach 
This table provides the results of acquirer's 3 years post announcement long run 
return calculation by using calendar time portfolio approach for all acquisitions 
undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation months. Using monthly data from 
1985 till 2003, each month is classified as a high(low) valuation month if the 
detrended market PIE of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended 
PIEs above (below) the past five year average. All remaining months are classified as 
neutral valuation months. "Cash"(stock) means that acquirers using 100% of 
cash(stock) as the method of payment, "Mixed" means that acquirers use both cash 
and stock as method of payment. To form Calendar time portfolio. we use the 
following method: The portfolio return for group j is the average over all months with 
'" R at least 10 observations ofCTPj(t),f = ~ 1.1, Where jet) consists of acquisitions in 
i=j(l) Nj(l) 
group j for the months 1, through month 36 and where N .1(1) is the number of 
acquisitions in j(t) .. Panel A present the regression result by using Fama French Three 
Factor Model, Panel B present the result by using CAPM 
FF 3 Factor Model: CTPj(l) - Rf = a l + /31 (Rm - Rf ) + /32 (SMB) + /33 (HML) + & 
Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model: CTPj(l) - R f = a l + /31 (Rm - R f) + & 
The values in the brackets are t statistics. 
Panel A: Regression result by using Fama-French Three Factors Model: 
All Cash Stock Mixed Cash - Stock 
(t-value) 
All 0.22% 0.17% -0.08% 0.210/0 0.250/0 
(3.40)** 
(0.75) (0.64) (-0.21 ) (0.63) 
High Valuation 0.12% 0.16% -0.24% 0.27% 0.40% 
Acquisitions (3.03)** 
(1.14) (1.80)* (-2.32)** (2.19)** 
Neutl Valuation 0.280/0 0.24% -0.14% 0.22% 0.38% 
Acquisitions (3.08)** 
(1.32) (0.88) (-0.61 ) (0.64) 
Low Valuation 0.41% 0.470/0 0.350/0 0.20% 0.120/0 
Acquisitions (1. 72)* 
(0.94) ( 1.00) (0.99) ( 1.29) 
Hioh - Low -0.29% -0.31 % -0.59% 0.07% e- ( -2.48)** (-2.17)** (-2.79)** (1.22) 
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Panel B: Regression result by using Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model: 
All Cash Stock Mixed Cash - Stock 
(t-,'alue) 
All -0.370/0 -0.18% -1.07% -0.56% 0.89% 
(3.40)** 
( -1.29) ( -0.69) (-2.67)** ( -1.65)* 
High Valuation -0.540/0 -0.32% -1.18% -0.230/0 O.86°(, 
Acquisitions (3.03)** 
(-1.89)* (-0.08) (-2.31)** (-0.75) 
Neutr. Valuation -0.42% -0.14% -1.07% -0.630/0 0.93% 
Acquisitions (3.08)** 
(-2.23)** ( -0.54) (-2.72)** (-l.81)* 
Low Valuation -0.160/0 -0.11% -0.63% -0.31 % o -"lo/c .)_ 0 
Acquisitions (1.72)* 
(-0.51 ) ( -1.17) (-1.50) (-1.20) 
High-Low -0.38% -0.21% -0.55% 0.080/0 
(t value) ( -2.48)** ( -2.17)** (-2.79)** ( 1.22) 
(*, * * represent significance level at 10% and 50/0 respectively) 
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Table 3.11 Three years long run abnormal returns based 011 acquirer's bidding 
frequency and market valuation status classification by using calendar time 
portfolio approach 
This table provides the results of acquirer's 3 years post announcement long run 
return calculation by using calendar time portfolio approach for all acquisitions 
undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation months. Using monthly data from 
1985 till 2003, each month is classified as a high(low) valuation month if the 
detrended market PIE of that month belongs to the top (bottom) half of all detrended 
PIEs above (below) the past five year average. All remaining months are classified as 
neutral valuation months. We define frequent bidder as the those bidder taken four or 
more bids within three years, infrequent bidder as those bidder taken 3 or less bids 
with three years. t -statistics are provided in the parenthesis. To form Calendar time 
portfolio, we use the following method: The portfolio return for group j is the average 
" R over all months with at least 10 observations ofCTP)(/),1 = ~ 1,1. Where jet) 
1=)(/) N)(!) 
consists of acquisitions in group j for the months 1. through month 36 and where N .I(t) 
is the number of acquisitions in j(t) .. Panel A present the regression result by using 
Fama French Three Factor Model, Panel B present the result by using CAPM 
FF 3 Factor Model: CTP,(/) - R j = a l + [31 (Rm - Rr) + [32 (SMB) -+- [33 (HML) + £ 
Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model: CTPj(,) - R j = a l + [31 (Rm - Rr) + £ 
The values in the brackets are t statistics. 
Panel A: Regression result by using Fama-French Three Factor Model: 
All Frequent In-frequent Freq. - In-freq. 
All 0.22% 0.21% 0.250/0 -0.04% 
(-2.21)** 
(0.75) (1.70)* (0.97) 
High Valuation 0.120/0 -0.28% 0.31% -0.59% 
Acquisitions (-2.90)** 
(1.14) (-1.38) (1.86)* 
Neutral Valuation 0.28% 0.22% 0.29% -0.07°u 
Acquisitions (-3.07)** 
( 1.32) ( 1.49) (1.30) 
Low Valuation 0.41% 0.68% 0.37°;0 0.31% 
Acquisitions (2.75)** 
(1.29) (0.95) (1.51) 
High - Low -0.290/0 -0.96% -0.060/0 
(t value) (-2.48)* * ( -2.40)** ( -4.09)** 
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Panel B: Regression result by using Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model: 
All Frequent In-frequent Freq. - In-freq. 
All -0.37% -0.35% -0.29% 
-0.06° ° 
(-2.21)** 
( -1.29) ( -1.08) (-1.79)* 
High Valuation -0.54% -0.58% -0.35% o ")"'10 - . __ 1 0 
Acquisitions (-2.90)** 
( -1.89)* (-2.37)** (-1.69)* 
Neutr. Valuation -0.42% -0.34% -0.32% -0.02% 
Acquisitions (-3.07)** 
(-2.23)** (-1.44) (-1.26) 
Low Valuation -0.16% -0.12% -0.21 % 0.09% 
Acquisitions (2.75)** 
(-0.51 ) (-1.77)* (-1.95)* 
High - Low -0.38% -0.460/0 -0.140/0 
(t value) (-2.48)** ( -2.40)** ( -4.09)** 
(*. ** represent significance level at 100/0 and 5% respectively) 
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Table 3.12 Short Run Robustness Check for Different Market Valuation 
Classifications and Different Event Windows 
This table contains short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all acquisitions 
undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation months, based on the sample of 
4.591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. Each month is 
classified as a high (low) valuation month by different method. "PIE" refers to Market 
PIE classification: "Activity" refers to merger activity classification. "Index" refers to 
market index classification. For "PIE" classification, each month is classified as a 
high (low) valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month belongs to the 
top (bottom) half of all de-trended PIE above (below) the past five year average. All 
remaining months are classified as neutral valuation month. The data for PIE 
classification runs from 1985 to 2003. For "Activity" classification, we first 
calculate the merger activity ratio. the ratio of total merger transaction volume to total 
market capitalization, as in PIE classification, we use five years of historical merger 
data to classify each month into an above (below) average group if the merger activity 
ratio of that month is above (below) the average ratio of past five years. Then. the 
months with merger activity ratios in the top (bottom) half of the ahc)\'e (below) 
average group are classified as high (low) valuation period. All remaining months are 
classified as neutral valuation months. The data for "Activity" classification runs from 
1990 to 2003. For "Index" classification, we use detrended UK Total Index(UKTI) as 
the proxy for market valuations. The index level in each month is classified as above 
or below that past five year average UKTI level. The top half of UKTI levels in the 
above-average group are classified as high valuation months, the bottom half of UKTI 
levels in the below average group are classified as low valuation months. All other 
months are classified as neutral valuation months. The data for "Index" classification 
runs from 1985 to 2003. CARs for each firm are calculated as the following formula: 
+2 
CAR = ~ (R - R) which Panel A use 11 days event window (-5.+5). day 0 is the ~ II m • 
-2 
announcement day of an acquisition. And Panel B use 5 days event window (-2. +2), 
and Panel C use 3 days event window (-1,+1) t -statistics are provided in the 
parenthesis. 
)Q7 
Table 12 
Panel A Event window (-5, 5) 
PIE Activity Index 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR 
All 
acquisitions 4591 2.47% 3881 2. 23% 4591 2.41% 
(11. 09) ** (8. 39) ** (6. 19) ** 
High 
valuation 1361 2.81% 1289 2. 70% 1529 2. 77% 
acquisitions (10. 31) ** (9.94) ** (7.81) ** 
Neutral 
valuation 2153 2.01% 1871 2. 13% 2017 2.26% 
acquisitions (10.66) ** (8. 65) ** (6. 05) ** 
Low 
valuation 1077 1.64% 721 (1. 41) % 1045 1.89% 
acquisitions (8.42) ** (2. 59) ** (3. 55) ** 
High - Low 1.17% 1.29% 0.88% 
(4.59)** (4.97)** (3. 51) ** 
Panel B Event window (-2, 2) 
PIE Activity Index 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR 
All 
acquisitions 4591 1. 53% 3881 1.36% 4591 1. 53% 
(14. 22) ** (7. 37) ** (14. 22) ** 
High 
valuation 1361 1.95% 1289 1. 61% 1529 1. 57% 
acquisitions (9. 72) ** (7. 11) ** (1.48) ** 
Neutral 
valuation 2153 1.31% 1811 1.54% 2011 1. 44% 
acquisitions (8. 12) ** (2.90) ** (6.91) ** 
Low 
valuation 1011 1.33% 121 (0.15)% 1045 1. 10% 
acquisitions (6. 01) ** (1. 86) * (5.89) ** 
High - Low 0.62% 0.S6% 0.41% 
(3.0S) -* (LSI)· (2. 12) •• 
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Panel C Event Window (-1, 1) 
PIE Activity Index 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR 
All 
acquisitions 4591 O. 77% 3881 0.62% 4591 O. 77% 
(4. 18) ** (6. 93) ** (4.18) .. 
High 
valuation 1361 1. 16% 1289 1.05% 1529 0.82% 
acquisitions (2.92) ** (7. 01) ** (3. 57) ** 
Neutral 
valuation 2153 0.67% 1871 O. 72% 2017 0.60% 
acquisitions (3. 55) ** (1. 51) ** (4. 33) ** 
Low 
valuation 1077 0.23% 721 O. 19% 1045 0.27% 
acquisitions (1. 87) * (3. 71) ** (3. 51) ** 
High - Low 0.93% 0.86% 0.55% 
(t value) (2.48) ** (1.69)* (1.88)* 
(*, ** represent significance level at 10% and 5% respectively) 
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Table 3.13 Long-run Robustness Check for Different Market Valuation 
Classifications and Event Windows by Using Calendar Time Portfolio Approach 
This table contains short-run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all acquisitions 
undertaken during high, neutral and low valuation months, based on the sample of 
4,591 acquisition deals undertaken by 1,231 public listed acquirers. Each month is 
classified as a high (low) valuation month by different method. "PIE" refers to Market 
PIE classification: "Activity" refers to merger activity classification. "Index" refers to 
market index classification. For "PIE" classification, each month is classified as a 
high (low) valuation month if the de-trended market PIE of that month belongs to the 
top (bottom) half of all de-trended PIE above (below) the past five year average. All 
remaining months are classified as neutral valuation month. The data for PIE 
classification runs from 1985 to 2003. For "Activity" classification, we first 
calculate the merger activity ratio, the ratio of total merger transaction volume to total 
market capitalization, as in PIE classification, we use five years of historical merger 
data to classify each month into an above (below) average group if the merger activity 
ratio of that month is above (below) the average ratio of past five years. Then, the 
months with merger activity ratios in the top (bottom) half of the above (below) 
average group are classified as high (low) valuation period. All remaining months are 
classified as neutral valuation months. The data for "Activity" classification runs from 
1990 to 2003. For "Index" classification, we use detrended UK total Index as the 
proxy for market valuations. The index level in each month is classified as above or 
below that past five year average UKTI level. The top half of UKTI levels in the 
above-average group are classified as high valuation months, the bottom half of UKTI 
levels in the below average group are classified as low valuation months. All other 
months are classified as neutral valuation months. The data for "Index" classification 
runs from 1985 to 2003. To form Calendar time portfolio, we use the following 
method: The portfolio return for group j is the average over all months with at least 10 
~ R. 
observations ofCTPj(t),1 = £..- "I, Where in Panel A j(t) consists of acquisitions 
;= jet) N j(l) 
in group j for the months 1,· through month 36 and where N jet) is the number of 
acquisitions in j(t). In panel B, j(t) consists of acquisitions in group j for the months 
1, through month 24. In order to obtain intercept return, we regress CTP by using 
Fama French Three Factor Model: 
CTPj(t) -R/ =al +/1}(Rm -R/)+/12(SMB)+/13(HML)+& 
The values in the brackets are t statistics. 
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Table 13 
Panel A: (1, 36) 
PIE Activity Index 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR 
All 
acquisitions 4591 0.22% 3881 0.28% 4591 0.22% 
(0.75) (1. 35) (1. 70)· 
High 
valuation 1361 0.12% 1289 -0.07% 1529 O. 15% 
acquisitions (1.14) (-1. 79)· (1. 26) 
Neutral 
valuation 2153 0.28% 1871 O. 19% 2017 0.24% 
acquisitions (1.32) (0. 88) (0. 62) 
Low 
valuation 1077 0.41% 721 0.46% 1045 O. 37% 
acquisitions (1.29) (1.40) (1. 17) 
High - Low -0.29% -0.53% -0.22% 
(t value) (-2.48)·· (-3.13)" (-2.97) •• 
Panel B (1,24) 
PIE Activity Index 
Number CAR Number CAR Number CAR 
All 
acquisitions 4591 0.34% 3881 0.30% 4591 0.34% 
(1.28) (1. 54) (1. 28) 
High 
valuation 1361 0.09% 1289 O. 15% 1529 O. 12% 
acquisitions (1.50) (1. 02) (0. 81) 
Neutral 
valuation 2153 0.31% 1871 0.28% 2017 0.30% 
acquisitions (1.44) (0. 81) (1.41) 
Low 
valuation 1077 0.46% 721 0.39% 1045 0.48% 
acquisitions (0.91) (1. 79). (1. 16) 
High-Low -0.37% -0.24% -0.36% 
(t value) (-2.01)· (3.66)·· (-1. 99). 
(., •• represent significance level at 10% and 5% respectively) 
Chapter 4 Merger Momentum and Market Valuation 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, there will be an empirical examination of the relationship between 
merger momentum and high market valuations. As discussed in the previous chapters,. 
mergers are the result of the good performance of bidders and are also affected by 
market valuation and other factors. The hypothesis follows that they should be 
correlated with each other, and with recent market conditions, and thus exhibit certain 
momentum patterns. Merger momentum is defmed here as a correlation between the 
market reaction to a merger announcement and the recent market conditions. Previous 
studies have found that the merger market reacts positively to the market conditions. 
However, for the large UK domestic sample used in this research, it was found that 
this correlation is more pronounced during high market valuation periods than at other 
times. Overall, these results are consistent with the stated hypothesis, and show that 
merger momentum does exist and may explain a large proportion of bidders' returns. 
Recent studies on takeovers have documented that merger momentum plays an 
important role in explaining the stock returns of bidding firms. For example, Rosen 
(2005) found that when a merger is announced during a "hot" period, the long-run 
returns of bidders tended to be lower than those deals announced at other times. 
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However, less attention has been paid to examining the relationship between market-
wide high valuation and the quality of mergers. In this research, the returns to bidding 
fmns over different market valuation periods was used as an indicator of merger 
quality, which can shed light on the different theories of when and why acquisitions 
occur in conditions of market-wide high valuation. Thus, this study especially 
examined whether market-wide high valuations influenced the reaction to a merger 
announcement. It was found that the market reaction to a merger was positively 
correlated with the response to other mergers in the recent past, especially during a 
high market valuation period. In addition, similar to the finding in previous chapter, 
significantly long-run reversals were seen for merger deals announced in hot merger 
markets. These findings are consistent with'Jensen's (2004) agency cost hypothesis of 
merger activity. Furthermore, it was found that the tendency of merger momentum 
varies over different valuation periods. This indicates that merger momentum not only 
results from investor sentiment, but also from the hubris of managers that have 
sufficient external resources during high valuation periods. This could be due to the 
direct impact of market valuation on the market's reaction towards a merger 
announcement (Rhodes-Kropf, et al., 2003). 
If market valuations do influence manger's decision on acquisition activities, two 
obvious questions arise: Do these impacts on acquisition decisions have consequences 
for the performance of the acquirer? and, Does market valuation also have an impact 
on merger momentum? The goal of this chapter is to shed light on these two 
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questions. 
Based on the UK sample, this research shows that there exists a form of merger 
momentum during high valuation periods, that is, the short-run market reaction to a 
merger announcement is positively related to the response to recent market conditions 
and other merger deals in the recent past. Good market conditions are defmed here as 
when the market reaction to a merger deal has been favourable. This study also 
examines whether or not market factors influence the reaction to a merger 
announcement and the long-run performance of the acquirer. 
Many previous studies have evaluated the quality of a merger based on the short-term 
market reaction to the merger announcement as well as on the long-run returns to the 
merger (e.g. Asquith, et aI., 1983 and Loughran and Vijh, 1997). In order to have a 
clear picture of the sources and consequences of merger momentum, both short-run 
and long-run methodologies were used here to compare the announcement reaction to 
long-run returns. A cross-sectional analysis of 1,957 acquisitions completed by UK 
public firms announced between 1985 and 2002 was used to determine the factors that 
affect both short-run and long-run market reactions to merger announcements in high 
valuation periods and in nonna! valuation periods. 
This chapter examines three theories that are all in line with the notion of merger 
momentum, although each gives different predictions regarding bidders' long-run 
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returns. The hubris hypothesis of merger assumes that irrational managers misevaluate 
the target's intrinsic value, which results in overpayment. According to this theory, 
merger momentum may result from a group of managers being afflicted with hubris or 
overconfidence when they have sufficient external resources to fmance a merger. The 
merger will temporarily push up the bidder's share price, but will result in a loss in the 
long-run due to the initial over payment. These types of mergers can usually be seen 
during high valuation periods, simply because the high valuation provides more 
external resources and more takeover opportunities, which increases the hubris of the 
bidding firm's manager. 
The second theory is the neoclassical theory of mergers, which assumes that managers 
act to maximize shareholder value. The idea here is that the merger is an 
efficiency-improving response to various industry shocks, such as antitrust policy or 
deregulation (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). 
According to this theory, merger momentum may result from shocks that increase the 
synergies for a group of mergers. Mergers announced following these shocks should 
be better on average than other mergers in both the short-run and long-run, and 
merger momentum might result from the correlated announcement returns leading 
from these industry shocks. 
Another theory is that merger momentum occurs in particular periods when 
over-optimism is predominant the market (e.g. high valuation periods). Helwege and 
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Liang (1996) found that shareholder reaction to a corporate announcement can be 
affected by investor sentiment, that is, the reaction of investors to factors other than 
the value created by the merger. When the merger market is over heating, especially 
during over valuation periods, a strong merger momentum will be observed because 
the investor as a group (possibly managers) are more easily infected by over optimism 
about merger announcements. According to this theory, the long-run stock return 
reversal should be seen as the optimism eventually being replaced by reality. 
Previous studies have shown that merger deals are more frequent when the overall 
stock market valuation is high. (Dong, et aI., 2003; Jensen, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf, et aI., 
2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 2004). If mergers are driven by a belief to do with 
something other than synergy or fundamentals, it is very easy to understand why 
managers make such large numbers of acquisitions during high valuation periods. 
Firstly, bidders like to take advantage of their overvalued shares when their stock 
price becomes substantially high, the biggest capital expenditure at those times will be 
taking over a relatively less overvalued frrm by issuing stock at an overvalued price. 
This raises the question as to why target managers accept such deals if they know that 
the bidder is overvalued. A credible explanation given by Rhodes-Kropf, et al. (2003) 
is that target managers are also willing to sell off their stock holdings at the 
overvalued price. Secondly, when a firm's stock price becomes overvalued, any 
attempt to eliminate it will be faced with disappointing the capital markets, and 
managers may risk their careers in the attempt; the only choice left is for them to 
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embark on takeovers and further push up the price for the purposes of earnings 
management (Jensen 2004). The consequential overall stock market overvaluation 
could result in merger momentum; the findings of this research are in line with this 
argument. 
Furthermore, this research found that long-run returns to bidder's portfolios during 
high valuation periods significantly under-performed whether the deals were 
categorized by cash or stock, or by pre-announcement financial status (glamour or 
value bidder). These findings suggest that the mergers made during high valuation 
periods are dominated by over-optimism, any announcement period return vanishing 
and leading to further share price reduction as the bubbles are eventually replaced by 
real results. Gorton, et al. (2002) showed that managers are willing to make 
non-profitable acquisitions to deter other firms from acquiring their own firm (eat or 
be eaten), and these defensive merger waves can result from economic shocks, which 
it could be argued are the same type of economic shocks that create high valuation. If 
mergers during these waves are more likely to be defensive in nature, then these 
mergers should be less likely to create value. Thus, market-wide high valuation is 
highly likely to produce bad acquisitions, and these bad acquisitions should correlate 
with each other as well as correlating with common market factors. 
From the large sample of UK acquisitions, clear evidence was found of merger 
momentum during high valuation periods. The short-run market reaction towards a 
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merger announcement was positively related to the reaction to other merger deals in 
the recent past, and evidence was also found that it is positively related to overall 
market conditions. Nevertheless, the effects of merger momentum disappear in the 
long-run, as the over optimistic belief in the merger is replaced by reality as time 
passes. Firms that announce merger deals during hot merger markets perform 
significantly worse than mergers announced during other periods. These results also 
suggest that managerial motivation may influence merger decisions in hot merger 
markets. The empirical findings further indicate that merger momentum might exist in 
other forms, such as at the firm level and could be affected by the overall momentum 
of the stock market. 
This chapter is organized in the following sections. Section 1 reviews the relevant 
literature in this field. Section 2 presents a hypothesis based on the gap identified in 
the previous literature. Section 3 reveals the data and methodologies incorporated in 
this study. Short-run results and discussions are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
examines the long-run market response to merger announcements, and the final 
section offers some conclusions. 
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4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A sizeable stream of theoretical and empirical research on the motivation and 
profitability of M&A has contributed a great deal of knowledge and information and 
the recently increased focus on merger momentum provides some new insights into 
various merger theories. It is known that takeover activity comes in waves68 and that 
announcement-day returns are significantly positive for target shareholders while 
bidder shareholders' returns vary depending on the mode of acquisition, method of 
payment, and type of target. Moreover, recent studies have shown that the market's 
reaction to a merger is positively correlated with the response to other mergers in the 
recent past. Nevertheless, previous literature has also shown that post-acquisition 
returns to acquiring shareholders are higher for cash offers and tenders than for stock 
offers and mergers. However, the empirical evidence regarding bidders' long-run 
returns is somewhat mixed, especially where merger deals are made during high 
market valuation periods.69 
Recently, researchers have begun to explore the possible link between M&A activity 
and stock price. Jovanovic and Roussean (2001) have shown that periods of high 
merger activity are correlated with high market valuations. Rhodes-Kropf and 
68 See Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), and Richard J. Rosen 
(200S). 
69 See Bruner (2002), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Franks, Harris, 
and Titman (1991), Rau and Vennaelen (1998), Asquith (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jensen 
(2004), DeMis and McConnel (1986), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Bradley and Sundaram (200S), 
Rosen (200S), Jarrel and Poulsen (1989), and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). 
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Viswananthan (2004) developed a theoretical model in which both finn-specific and 
market-wide mis-valuation were shown to cause merger waves. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2004) theoretically modelled the impact of market valuation on the decision to 
acquire, the method of payment used, the perfonnance of acquirers, and the 
occurrence of merger waves. Rosen (2005) defined a new area of merger momentum, 
and found a positive correlation between the market reaction to a merger 
announcement and recent market conditions.70 
This section is organized as follows: because the UK and European countries correlate 
closely, there is first a history of takeovers in European countries as a whole. Secondly, 
the area that has recently been most debated, that is, the literature on bidder's long-run 
perfonnance is presented, followed by a review of the causes and consequences of 
market-wide overvaluation, which is a very important component of this research. By 
these means, this section will review two important hypotheses (the hubris hypothesis 
and stock market driven acquisitions), both of which are in line with this thesis. 
4.2.1. Corporate Takeover History Since 1900 
It is now well known that M&As occur in cyclical waves. The second industrial 
revolution culminated in the first European merger wave (1880-1904), which aimed at 
70 Rosen's (2005) results suggested that a bidding firm's stock prices are more likely to increase when 
a merger is announced if recent mergers by other firms have been received well or if the overall stock 
market is doing better, this is evidence of merger momentum. However, there is long-run reversal. 
Long-run bidders' stock returns are lower for mergers announced when either the merger or stock 
markets were hot at the time of the merger than for those announced at other times. 
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creating monopolies. Anti-trust regulation curbed monopoly power, but also initiated 
a second merger wave (1919-1929) that led to increased vertical integration. The third 
European merger wave started in the 1950s, and did not reach its peak until the 
mid-1960s. The focus of this wave was diversification and the creation of large 
conglomerates to face the global markets. The technological progress in biochemistry 
and electronics, as well as the development of new financial instruments and markets 
(e.g. the junk bond market), was behind the fourth merger wave (1983-1989). These 
financial innovations facilitated the fmancing of acquisitions and also caused an 
unprecedented high level of hostile bids. During the past decade, a fifth wave (1993-
2000) emerged coinciding with a sustained economic boom, the development of new 
European stock exchanges, such as the European New Markets and the European 
Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System (EASDAQ), and the 
growth in the Internet and telecommunications industries. In 2001, the collapse of 
consumer confidence in these industries as well as the overcapacity in the traditional 
sectors caused an abrupt reduction in merger activity. 
The start of the fifth M&A wave was clearly in 1993 as the total dollar value paid for 
target firms in the US and Europe doubled after four consecutive years of decline in 
M&A activity. An even steeper rise happened in 1996: the total value of US and 
European acquisitions rose to USD 1,117 million (with Europe accounting for 37% of 
the worldwide value of M&A deals). In the following years, the M&A wave gained 
even more strength with a value of USD 1,574 million in 1997 (35% of which was 
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realised in Europe), USD 2,634 million in 1998 (33% in Europe), USD 3.319 million 
in 1999 (47% in Europe), and USD 3,451 million in 2000 (43% in Europe). 1999 was 
a remarkable year for the European M&A market, as it was now almost as large as the 
US market. Also, 12% of the total value of the European market was now generated 
by deals in excess of USD 100 billion. The number of hostile acquisitions was also 
exceptionally large in Europe in 1999 with 369 hostile bids compared to only fourteen 
in 1996, seven in 1997, five in 1998, and thirty-five in 2000. 
4.2.2 Relevant Literature on Bidder's Long-run Performance 
In the 1990s, most of the research into the financial performance of M&As has 
focused on stock returns surrounding announcement dates. Researchers have paid 
little attention to the results of long-run returns, perhaps because the strong belief in 
market efficiency indicated what the result should be. Recently, a steady stream of 
research has focused on the long-run post-acquisition returns, and most has found that 
there is a negative long-run return to bidders associated with initial positive 
announcement returns. In fact, early studies by Jensen and Ruback (1983) noticed this 
phenomenon, and they stated, "'These post-outcome negative abnormal returns are 
unsettling because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that 
changes in stock prices overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers." 
The aim of this section is to answer two questions. Firstly, does the accumulated 
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evidence suggest that post-acquisition performance is, indeed, negative? The answer 
to this question would seem quite important As, in addition to the obvious implication 
for market efficiency, an answer would clearly inform the debate on gains from 
mergers. Studies focusing on announcement period performance have concluded that 
mergers produce wealth gains to the stockholders of the target and acquiring firms 
combined. If negative performances after merger are found in the majority of the 
empirical research, will it overturn this conclusion? Secondly, what are the possible 
explanations for the previous research findings on long-run performance? Of course, 
if the long-run performance is insignificant, different from zero, no explanation is 
needed. However, based on previous findings, a convincing explanation is necessary 
for the documented under-performance. 
Because of the differing characteristics of mergers, tender offers, and failed bids, the 
empirical findings will be presented. To begin with, a summary of the individual 
studies that have examined this issue in its various contexts will be provided. 
4.2.2.1 Empirical Findings on Performance Following Mergers 
There are several different empirical works in this area, and while they all reported 
abnormal returns following acquisition armouncements, they came from different 
directions. Mandelker (1974) provided the least support for negative post-acquisition 
performance. The CAARs, though negative, were not economically significant. In 
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addition, while no t-statistics were provided for his entire forty-month 
post-acquisition period, the t-statistics for both the ten-month and twenty-month 
period were insignificant. At the other extreme, Asquith (1983) reported CAARs of 
-0.072 in the 240 days following merger outcome. This return is both economically 
and statistically significant, providing perhaps the strongest evidence against the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns. 
All of the other work is to some extent ambiguous. Using the same data but different 
methodologies, Magenheim and Mueller (1988), and Bradley and Jarrell (1988) 
reached opposite conclusions. Magenheim and Mueller found what are most likely 
significant CAARs over three years, while Bradley and Jarrell found insignificant 
results over the same time period. More specifically, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) 
examined seventy-eight New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange 
(NYSEI AMEX) acquiring firms that completed takeovers worth at least $15 million 
during the period 1976 to1981. The authors classified fifty-one of the acquisitions as 
mergers and twenty-six as tender offers. They calculated abnormal returns from the 
market model, estimating the parameters a. and ~ over one of three periods: months 
(-60, -4), (-36, -4) or (+13, +36) relative to the initial announcement month. For the 
first two estimation periods, the authors' Table 11.5 presents CAARs for each of the 
first three years subsequent to the announcement. The calculations show that the 
CAARs over the entire three-year post-announcement period are -0.1436 and -0.3896 
using the first and second estimation periods, respectively. Only the CAAR over the 
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first year (-0.0321) is presented using the third estimation period, which runs over the 
second and third post-announcement years. While the two three-year estimates differ 
substantially, they both appear to be economically significant. The authors reported no 
statistical significance over the three-year period. However, they presented z-values 
(standard nonnal) of -1.2464 and -4.9307 for perfonnance over months (-3, +36) 
relative to the month of initial announcement, using the first and second estimation 
periods, respectively. 
The authors presented post-announcement returns for mergers and tender offers 
separately in Table 11.3, using only the (-60, -4) estimation period. The calculations 
show CAARs over the first three years after the announcement to be -0.2437 and + 
0.0632, respectively, for the two sub-samples. Once again, z-values are reported for 
the period (-3, + 36). They are -2.60 for mergers and 0.56 for tender offers. 
Magenheim and Mueller appear to be the first to calculate post-acquisition returns for 
the two types of acquisitions separately. Similarly, subsequent researchers have 
generally found that returns are higher after tender offers than after mergers. 
Bradley and Jarrell (1988) criticized Magenheim and Mueller's methodology stating 
(p. 255), "It is well known that market model parameter estimates based on monthly 
data are inefficient and nonstationary." Indeed, financial economists have long 
pointed out that if the true abnormal performance is non-zero during the estimation 
period, measurement of abnormal performance in the forecast period will be biased. 
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Bradley and J arrel estimated abnormal returns using a method similar, if not, identical 
to that of Asquith (1983). Here, the daily abnormal return was the difference between 
the return on the acquirer's stock and the return on a portfolio of securities of similar 
beta. The authors found a statistically insignificant CAAR of -0.16 over the first three 
post-acquisition years. 
Langetieg (1978) reported CAARs of between -0.223 and -0.2615 over seventy 
months using four different statistical methods. While these abnormal returns are both 
economically and statistically significant, his control firm approach yielded 
insignificant returns. 
Malatesta (1983) found statistically significant abnormal returns for the year after the 
first public announcement of a merger but insignificant results for the year after 
board/management approval. Limmack (1991) assessed post-acquisition performance 
over two years, finding significantly negative CAARs for two of his three 
methodologies. However, Limmack does not separate mergers from tender offers, 
leaving interpretation somewhat ambiguous. 
Thus, taken together, the literature at this point only suggests the possibility of an 
anomaly. The lack of corroboration across the work, as well as the use of empirical 
methodologies now considered inadequate for measuring long-run abnormal stock 
performance, prevents a strong conclusion being drawn at this point. 
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In the 1990s, a number of studies provided stronger evidence of negative post-merger 
performance, starting with that of Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), which found 
a statistically significant five-year CAAR of -0.1 026 under a size and beta adjustment. 
They completed their work following on the heels of Franks, Harris, and Titman. 
While Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker employed similar methodology to that of 
Franks, Harris, and Titman, and even used a sample supplied by Robert Harris, they 
reached different conclusions. Their sample of 937 mergers and 227 tender offers (p. 
1607) "represents nearly the entire population of acquisitions of NYSE and AMEX 
firms by NYSE firms over the period 1955 to 1987." 
Anderson and Mandelker (1993) reported five-year CAARs of -0.0956 and -0.0931, 
under a size and a size and BIM adjustment, respectively. Their CAARs are 
statistically significant. However, these two studies should not be viewed as 
independent. The two datasets greatly overlap, since Anderson and Mandelker used 
the 1966 to 1987 portion of Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker's (1992) data. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) found a statistically significant five-year buy-and-hold 
return 
relative to a size and BIM control of -0.159. However, when overlapping cases are 
eliminated, the buy-and-hold return relative to a control becomes -0.142, which is 
only marginally significant (t=-1.69). Rau and Vermaelen (1998) found a statistically 
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significant three-year CAAR of -0.0404. However, this CAAR can be viewed as 
economically insignificant. Finally, Gregory (1997) found two-year CAARs of 
between -0.1182 to -0.1801 using six different models, all of which are statistically 
significant. Gregory used UK data, providing an out-of-sample test of the anomaly. 
While Gregory did not separate mergers from tender offers, the discussion below 
suggests that post-acquisition performance would have been even worse if tender 
offers had been removed from the sample. 
Taken together, it can be argued that in the 1990s, the empirical findings suggest 
strong evidence of an anomaly following mergers. Some evidence of statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns can be found in each of the six works discussed 
above, and strong evidence of both economically important and statistically 
significant negative performance in some of them. As a group, the studies covered a 
lengthy time period and two countries (the US and the UK). A wide variety of 
statistical techniques were used, all of which go beyond the old-style CAPMlmarket 
model approaches. There has been a fair amount of criticism of long-run return 
studies in general, from for example, Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon 
(1997), and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). However, the differing results on tender 
offers (see below), as well as the differing methodologies used in the six studies, 
suggest that something more than a statistical bias is at work here. 
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4.2.2.2Empirical Findings on Performance Following Tender Offers 
Acquisitions can be made either via a merger or a tender offer. Mergers are generally 
friendly agreements between the management of the bidding and target firms, while 
tender offers involve the purchase of shares without the need for approval from the 
target's management. This distinction is made mainly because studies have generally 
found that the market response to tender offers is more positive (or less negative) than 
the reaction to mergers over both short-term and long-term horizons. In part, this 
may be due to the prevalence of cash payments in tender offers (Martin, 1996). A 
better idea of performance following an acquisition will be obtained if the two forms 
are separated. 
To begin with, Doss and Ruback (1977) examined stock return performances both 
before and after tender offers. They compiled a sample of 124 NYSE firms making 
successful tender offers, and forty-eight NYSE firms making unsuccessful tender 
offers over the period of 1958 to 1976. The abnormal returns were calculated using 
the market model. The study measured the post-acquisition performance of acquirers 
over two periods, months (+1, +12) and (+13, +60), relative to the frrst public 
announcement of the bid. From their Table 4.3, it is calculated that the CAAR for the 
successful acquirers over this entire sixty-month period was 0.0591. While this 
performance may be economically important, the t-statistics reported for the two 
periods were both insignificant. In addition, the abnormal returns are calculated as 
-0.0262 for unsuccessful acquirers for the same sixty-month period. Again, the 
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t-statistics were insignificant for each of the two periods. This work also calculated 
post-acquisition performances following nineteen clean-up mergers, that is, offers 
where the acquirer owned over one-half of the target frrm's shares prior to the merger. 
Doss and Ruback's Table 4.4 indicates that the CAAR for acquirers over months (+1, 
+ 13) was 0.0844, with a marginally significant t-value of 1.60. No results were 
reported for months (+ 13, +60). 
By contrast, Magenheim and Mueller(l988) found a CAAR of 0.0632 for the three 
years following tender offers. The statistical significance cannot be assessed for either 
of these calculations. However, since the CAARs are of opposite signs and of similar 
magnitudes (though for different post-event time periods), it can be concluded that the 
null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns following acquisition should not be rejected 
based on these two empirical findings. 
4.2.3 Stock Market Overvaluation 
A recent study by Jensen (2004) showed that market-wide overvaluation can seriously 
damage the health of a corporation. Despite this, few CEO's agree that their company 
share is overvalued. However, the overvaluation of company stock is at least as 
common and as harmful as undervaluation. In this section, some recent research on 
the causes and consequences of overvaluation and how it relates to merger decisions 
is presented. 
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According to the previous research, most agree that t~e mis-valuation of companies 
leads to the misallocation of resources between companies. The overvalued 
companies have better access to both equity and debt capital, whereas undervalued 
companies have difficulties in raising capital. The end result is that the overvalued 
companies may undertake investments that are not as profitable as the stock market 
expects. In addition, they may use these overvalued shares as currency for 
acquisitions. The overvaluation may also lead to misallocation of resources within the 
company, when company management attempts to fulfil overoptimistic expectations 
of the stock market on company growth and future profitability. At worst, 
management finds out from the stock market or financial analysts where to invest and 
where to divest. Management may achieve growth through acquisitions (by using 
overvalued stocks), but profitability may be more difficult to attain. The recent trend 
in financial statements is to show good profitability either by extending accounting 
principles or using pro forma statements, but profitability cannot be artificially 
inflated indefinitely. The corrective price changes may be large, causing private 
investors to lose their trust in the stock market. Overvaluation could be more common 
than undervaluation, since stakeholders have clear incentives to increase stock prices 
whereas no-one really has an interest in lowering a stock price even when it is 
overvalued. Company management benefits from the stock price increase through 
stock option plans and direct ownership of shares. In addition, the ability to undertake 
acquisitions with overvalued stock allows them to lead larger companies. In larger 
companies they are better paid, they gain more respect, and have more power. 
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Financial analysts have an interest in giving "buy" recommendations in order to 
maintain good relations with company management, to promote the brokerage 
function of their employer, and to facilitate the employer's investment banking 
activities. Furthermore, financial analysts and investment bankers work very closely 
together. Whenever a company is trying to raise capital, the investment bankers 
make sure their research firms give favourable ratings to the stock markets. This 
leads to companies having favourable ratings even where companies are in serious 
financial trouble. At the same time, managers are working under the impression 
given by optimistic financial analysts once their firm becomes overvalued. This can 
be a problem because analysts tend to report "good" news on a firm's financial status, 
they want high, predictable, consistent, and ideally, constant year-on-year growth. 
Hence managers have to play the "earning game" to meet analysts' expectations. This 
will further push up the valuation of the company and might finally result in 
bankruptcy.71 
Due to the problems caused by overvaluation, the development of measures to avoid 
and detect overvaluation should be an imperative. However, so far such action is rare. 
Some proposals in this area are presented in the chapter on fmancial disclosure, 
compensation, and corporate governance. In the future, further research into norms 
and appropriate practices is needed to improve the accuracy of stock market 
valuation. 
71 See Jensen (2004), who presented a theoretical framework of overvaluation based on an agency cost 
explanation, and pointed out that the current financial system has some shortcomings that could lead to 
a significant overvaluation effect. 
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4.2.4 Several Theoretical Hypotheses 
4.2.4.1 The Hubris Hypothesis and Merger Momentum 
Roll (1986) analyzed the factors that effect takeover activity, postulating that strong 
market efficiency in all markets, and the prevailing market price of the target already 
reflects the full value of the firm 72. The higher valuation of the bidders (over the 
target's true economic value), he states, results from managerial hubris and excessive 
self-confidence. Hubris is one of the factors that cause the winner's curse 
phenomenon to occur, with bidders making mistakes when evaluating target firms and 
engaging in takeovers even when synergy is absent. Hubris is the main driving force 
inducing takeover overpayment, and often results In bidders' long-run 
under-performance. 73 
The winner's curse concept has a long history in the literature on auctions. When 
there are many bidders or competitors for an object of highly uncertain value, a wide 
range of bids is likely to result. The highest bidder will bid and typically pay in excess 
of the expected value of the goods. The winning bidder is, therefore, "cursed" in the 
sense that its bid exceeds the value of the item, so the firm loses money. Capen, 
72 We mentioned hubris hypothesis in previous chapter, however, her~ we focus on the interaction 
between hubris hypothesis and merger momentum issue. 
73 Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) presented evidence that some types of bidder systematically 
overpay, supporting the agency hypothesis. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) found that bidders that reduce 
their market value are subsequently more likely to be acquired than bidders that do not make bad 
acquisitions. Trahan and Shawky (1992) investigated acquiring firms based on industry characteristics 
and found that bidder returns vary across industries. Trahan (1993) suggested that firm size and 
cash-flow payouts are the major factors in explaining the likelihood of acquisition. Furthermore, 
Burkart (1995) argued that the ownership ofan initial stake induces bidders to overpay. 
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Clapp, and Campbell (1971), based on their analysis of sealed-bid competitive lease 
sales, presented a diagram that depicted the ratio of high estimate to true value as a 
function of the degree of uncertainty 
Arguably however, during high market valuation periods, the managers of bidding 
firms tend to be more afflicted with hubris than at other times, not only because they 
have more external resources to finance their merger deals, but they are also infected 
by optimistic beliefs just as most ordinary investors are during a bull market. When 
market sentiment is bullish, managers may feel encouraged to make acquisitions 
because they believe the market expects firms to undertake growth-enhancing 
initiatives like acquisitions. By the same token, when the market sentiment is bearish, 
the market does not have the same expectations, and managers respond by avoiding 
acquisitions unless they are reasonably certain that the synergies are large enough to 
justify going against market sentiment and expectations. This is somewhat similar to 
Baker and Wurgler's (2003) "catering" argument regarding dividends. 
The expectation is that there will be a strong tendency toward market momentum 
when managers are afflicted with hubris during high market valuation periods. This is 
simply because where merger deals are initiated not by potential synergies but 
optimistic belief, then most of these deals should exhibit the same pattern of 
short-term price run-ups. Once managers see there are short-term benefits associated 
with merger deals, then they will be infected by the same optimism, and hence start to 
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initiate their own merger deals. When market-wide sentiment is bullish, the market 
tends to react favourably to all merger deals made during a certain period of time, and 
so induce a strong merger momentum, that is, the market reaction to a merger is 
positively correlated with the response to other mergers in the recent past. 74 
4.2.4.2 The Stock Market Driven Acquisition Hypothesis and Merger Momentum 
Shleifer and Vishny' (2003) presented a theoretical explanation of merger waves that 
rests on the assumption that share prices become overvalued during stock market 
booms. The managers of firms with overvalued shares know that they are overvalued 
and wish to protect their shareholders from the loss in wealth that will come when the 
market lowers its estimate of the firm's value to its warranted level. 75 They 
accomplish this by exchanging their overvalued shares for the real assets of another 
company, which presumably are correctly priced in the market. 76 The target's 
managers are assumed to have short time horizons, so they too gain by cashing in 
their stakes in their firms at favourable terms. 
74 Bouwman, et al. (2004) argued that acquisitions during booming stock markets are easier than 
during bearish markets because target resistance is lower when stock prices are high due to the fact that 
targets are receiving premiums that are over and above their already high valuation. Another possibility 
that could introduce merger momentum in high valuation markets is herding behaviour by managers. If 
managers expect more acquisitions to be undertaken during high-valuation periods, each manager may 
be more inclined 0 acquire another firm and be less careful in assessing synergies, since the reputation 
damage from a bad acquisition made as a part ofa herd may be smaller than if the manager had made a 
more isolated decision. 
7.5 However, Jensen (2004) argued that bidding firms' managers also intend to further push up the 
overvaluation by meeting the earning target set by financial analysts. 
76 Rhodes-Kropfand Viswanathan (2004) argued that overvalued bidders' wish to use stock is 
incorrect because targets should not be eager to accept stock. They also showed that private 
information on both sides can rationally lead to a correlation between stock merger activity and market 
valuation. 
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Although mergers are not assumed to generate any wealth-creating synergies, when 
they occur as a result of fIrms having overvalued shares they, according to Shleifer 
and Vishny's (2004) theory, appear to be win-win events. In the Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan's (2004) version of the overvaluation theory, the motivation of the 
acquiring fIrm's managers is the same as in Shleifer and Vishny's version, although 
the target's managers are assumed to accept the overvalued shares of bidders because 
they overestimate the gains from the merger. 
However, it can be argued that Shleifer and Vishny's (2004) hypothesis suffers from a 
logical difficulty. According to their theory, the managers of a company with 
overvalued shares are assumed to maximize the welfare of their current shareholders 
at the expense of new ones. Given this objective, it is not obvious why the managers 
choose to acquire other fIrms as a way of unloading their overvalued shares. Their 
shareholders will gain if they trade their overvalued shares for any fairly valued real 
assets. Since all firm's share prices tend to rise during a stock market boom, any fIrm 
that they buy is likely to be overvalued. Thus, Jensen's (2004) argument regarding the 
agency cost of overvaluation seems to be a creditable explanation to this logical 
problem. He asserted that the agency costs between managers and shareholders, and 
managers and financial analysts cause overvaluation. This conflict is impossible to 
reconcile without there being fundamental reforms of the existing auditing and 
financial reporting systems. 
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Jensen's argument and Shleifer and Vishny's hypothesis are both in line with the high 
market valuation merger momentum hypothesis. Merger momentum occurs when 
market reaction to a merger is systematically correlated with the response to other 
mergers in the recent past. In other words, the quality of a merger is not only decided 
by its own method of payment and estimated synergies, but also by recent mergers 
that have taken place in related industries, and by market-wide investor sentiment. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2004) argued that managers acting in overvaluation periods tend 
to use merger as a tool for unloading their overvalued shares, but this could also be 
due to the dilemma of meeting the analysts' targets (Jensen, 2004). In both cases, we 
should expect to see managers react optimistically towards a merger deal and pass this 
signal to other individual investors, hence producing market-wide bullish investor 
sentiment. Thus, these strong investor sentiments are more likely to produce merger 
momentum during high market valuation periods. 
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4.3 HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.3.1 The Hypotheses Construction 
If market valuations do impact on acquisition decisions, and mergers do come in 
waves, two obvious questions arise: does this impact on acquisitions have 
consequences for the market's reaction to merger deals? And do these reactions rely 
on merger deals in the recent past during hot merger waves? The goal of this research 
is to shed light on these questions. 
Merger momentum is defined here by gauging the correlation between the market 
reaction to a merger announcement and recent market conditions, as well as how it 
correlates with bidder-specific merger activity, bidder-specific stock momentum, and 
deal specific control variables. A hot merger market is defmed as one where the 
reaction to recent market conditions has been favourable. Thus, hot merger markets 
are related to, but not necessarily the same as, merger waves. Waves are traditionally 
measured by the number of mergers rather than by the market's reaction to merger 
announcements. According to previous studies, market reaction not only depends on 
the new information contained in a merger announcement, but also on how the market 
reacts to this new information. 77 The market's reaction to the same kind of 
information can also vary over different time periods. Studies have found that firms 
tend to issue equity when their market values are high relative to book values and tend 
77 For example, new information could be whether or not a merger is likely to create synergies. 
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to repurchase equity when market values are low.78 This market timing appears to 
have a significant impact on market reaction to announcements as well as an impact 
on long-tenn stock perfonnance. In this section, possible origins of momentum are 
described and the hypotheses tested. 
Synergy theory states that the combined firms' value is greater than the sum of two 
individual stand alone companies, thus, M&A activities are an efficient means to 
achieve these synergies. Arguably, merger momentum can reflect the most common 
factors that influence the synergies available from different mergers. Previous studies 
have suggested that mergers cluster around economic and industry shocks, and most 
mergers around these shocks are associated with a positive stock market reaction.79 
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the shocks create common synergies. 
However, the perception of common synergies varies among different managers in 
different industries. It is possible that some managers imbued with hubris or 
overconfidence in some sectors could initiate merger deals simply because they 
misperceive the potential synergies from merger. If this is the case, it could lead to 
increases in merger activity. At the same time, if making an acquisition reduces the 
probability that a firm is subsequently acquired, then managers can use mergers to 
78 Secondary equity offerings are related to market valuations according to Taggart (1977), Marsh 
(1992), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991), lung, Kim, and Stultz 
(1996), and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (200 I). Initial public offerings coincide with market 
valuations according to Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1995), and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 
(1998). 
79 See Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), and Andrade, et aI. (2001). 
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preserve private benefits. Merger waves can arise when managers make acquisitions 
to deter other firms from acquiring their firm. 80 A manager is willing to acquire 
defensively even when it is not profitable. Gorton, et al. (2002) showed that defensive 
merger waves can result from economic shocks. If mergers made during waves are 
more likely to be defensive in nature, then these mergers should be less likely to 
create value. Arguably, this could be the case during high market valuation periods, 
when over optimism and irrational synergy perceptions dominate the market. So, 
bad acquisitions can cluster in time due to manager hubris and defensive mergers 
resulting from high market valuation. However, there is no reason to believe that 
mergers made during waves should be better off in the long-run. 
Furthermore, merger waves and merger momentums should be highly correlated, if 
the neoclassical theory holds and if merger waves are responses to common shocks. 
Neoclassical theory sees mergers as an efficiency-improving response to various 
industry shocks, such as antitrust policy or deregulation. 81 If mergers are 
concentrated around common shocks that positively affect the potential synergies 
from all mergers, then mergers during waves should, on average, have higher 
synergies than mergers at other times, and hence should have better performance. 
In summary, given the assumption that investors all respond to synergies at so~e level, 
80 See Morch, et al. (1990), and Gorton, et al. (2002). 
81 See Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002). 
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both the neoclassical theory and hubris hypothesis generate merger momentum, but 
from different directions. Under the hubris hypothesis, a negative correlation should 
be seen between merger waves and the market reaction to merger announcements, 
while if neoclassical theory dominates the correlation should be positive. However, 
both theories assume that the market reaction contains all the information about the 
soon to be merged firm, thus it should not be expected that any long-run price reverse 
will be seen after a merger. 
In hot markets, merger momentum could result from optimistic investor sentiment. A 
large amount of the literature has found that investors tend to be over optimistic in hot 
markets. Lihngqvist, et al. (2001) found that in hot markets, regular institutional 
investors are allocated IPO stock at a discount, for the gradual resale to exuberant 
investors in the after market. Similar studies by Loughran and Ritter (2002) also 
suggested that substantial mis-pricing occurs in hot IPO markets. 82 The same 
phenomenon could exist in hot merger markets. If over-optimism influences the 
market reaction to merger announcements, then an autocorrelation between the returns 
to bidding firms and merger announcements should be seen. During hot merger 
markets, when optimism reigns, the market reaction to all announcements should be 
more positive than at other times. However, price increases should reverse in the 
82 Other studies include those of Loughran and Ritter (1995) who attributed high returns on seasoned 
equity offerings to optimistic beliefs on the part of investors, and Helwege and Liang (1996) who found 
evidence of over-optimism in hot IPO markets. Loughran, et al. (1994) suggested that IPO issuers time 
their issues to take advantage of the optimism of investors in hot markets, implying that issuances in 
hot markets may be worse than average. 
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long-run as optimism is replaced by results. 
Investor sentiment can also be affected by financial analysts' unrealistic forecasts. 
Jensen (2004) argued that the critical role that financial analysts play can seriously 
damage companies' health, because the analysts want high, predictable, consistent, 
and ideally, constant year-on-year growth. It can be seen from the data that they 
penalise companies that do not show consistent, predictable growth. However, when 
managers change, not just the accruals, but their firm's real operating decisions to 
achieve that predictable, consistent growth, they are by definition destroying value. 
Essentially, the analysts are rewarding the managers for doing just that, in the 
pretence that somehow certainty can be created in an uncertain world. 
Furthermore, investor sentiments in hot markets are not only affected by the 
unrealistic forecasts of analysts, but also by managers as a whole being imbued with 
the same optimism as the investors. Hence, they are likely to overestimate the 
synergies from a merger, leading them to make more bad acquisitions during hot 
markets. If managers are rewarded for temporally increasing share prices, then there is 
a strong incentive to make non-profit oriented acquisitions, since such bad 
acquisitions can also temporarily push up the acquirer's share price. This being the 
case, a pattern should emerge whereby mergers made in hot markets are worse than 
those made in cold markets. 
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Recent theoretical work has addressed the observed positive correlation between 
overall stock valuation and merger activity, which was noted by Golbe and White 
(1988), among others. Shleifer and Vishny (2004) suggested that clustering in merger 
activity is seen because a substantial portion of such activity is driven by stock market 
valuations. They posit that bull markets lead groups of bidders with overvalued stock 
to use it to buy real assets of undervalued targets through mergers. Coupled with 
sufficiently highly misperceived merger synergies in the market place, their model 
allows for less overvalued targets as well, relying mainly on dispersion in valuations. 
Target managers with short time horizons are willing to accept the bidder's 
temporarily overvalued equity. Overvaluation in the aggregate, or in certain industries, 
will therefore lead to wave-like clustering in time83 . Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) 
also found a positive relationship between market valuation and the number of merger 
activities. Both studies suggested that many of the merger waves are caused by 
changes in the business environment that both increase overall stock prices and lead 
to more profitable merger opportunities. If this is the case, and the neoclassical theory 
of merger holds, bidders should experience higher returns during high valuation 
periods, and because these returns reflect the real synergies, there should not be any 
long-run reversals. However, if firms' acquisition decisions are not responses to 
fundamental factors hut to firm-level overvaluations, a rational stock market should 
react to an announcement negatively as evidence that a firm may think its stock is 
overvalued. 
83 Nelson (1959) found that merger waves starting in the late 1800s were associated with stock market 
booms. 
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However, the empirical results are mixed for bidders' long-run performances. Hence. 
it can be argued that investor optimism during high market valuation periods also 
plays an important role in explaining the correlation between mergers and stock price. 
If investor sentiment dominates the market during high market valuation periods, 
more positive reactions to merger announcements should be seen in the short-run, 
with a significant long-run reversal as optimism is replaced by reality in time. 
In summary, the hubris hypothesis, the neoclassical theory of merger, and the investor 
sentiment hypothesis, taken together can explain why firms make acquisitions under 
different market conditions, although they offer different explanations regarding 
merger momentum and how hot markets and mergers might be associated. The market 
should have a positive reaction to a merger announcement in a hot market when either 
the synergies or over-optimism reigns. However, the theories differ in their long-run 
I 
predictions. If mergers are made in order to exploit synergies, then they should add to 
the firm's value in the long-run, while if optimistic belief dominates, then the bidding 
firm's long-run performance should be negative, as reality will replace unrealistic 
expectations in the long-run. Furthermore, it should be noted that if mergers are 
initiated to meet analysts' forecasts during stock market booms, then this should 
contribute to a further weakening in performance for mergers in this period. 
4.3.2 Model Development 
This section sets up the empirical model to be tested, and explains the rationale 
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behind each variable chosen to proxy merger momentum. 
This empirical model has been developed to test how recent merger activity and 
changes in stock prices affect the market reaction to a merger announcement in both 
the short-run and the long-run. Furthermore, there is a specific focus on deals made in 
high valuation periods, and by sub-dividing the sample using a market valuation 
approach light will be shed on different predictions regarding merger momentum 
based on different market conditions. The sample has been divided into hot and 
normal market periods according to the level of transaction intensity in the acquisition 
market. Thus, the total transaction values have been used together with merger 
numbers as the proxy for hot and cold markets. In this study, the focus is on bidding 
firms only. Hence, deals involving private an~ subsidiary targets have been included. 
In order to test market reaction as accurately as possible, the pre-takeover fmancial 
status (value versus glamour) 84 of the bidder and the specific conditions of the 
acquisition have been controlled for. The model is as follow: 
Market Reaction = F (Merger Momentum, Market Momentum, Bidder-Specific 
Merger Momentum, Bidder-Specific Stock Momentum, Deal-SpecifIC Control 
Variables) 
84 Rau and Vermalen (1998) found that the long-run under-performance of acquiring firms in mergers 
is predominantly caused by the poor post-acquisition performance of the low 81M 'glamour' firms. 
They interpreted this finding as evidence that both the market and management over extrapolate the 
bidder's past performance when they assess the desirability ofan acquisition. Specifically, they 
argued that managers of glamour firms are afflicted with hubris. 
23S 
The remainder of this section is devoted to giving an in depth explanation of each 
variable in equation 1. The dependent variable on the left hand side is market reaction, 
which is measured by the CAR and BHAR over short and long horizons. The 
short-run market reaction to a merger announcement was examined using the bidding 
finn's CAR for the five days surrounding the first public announcement. This gives 
the immediate reaction to the merger. The price reaction incorporates any new 
infonnation, including synergies created by the merger and the split of synergies 
between bidder and target, but it also includes the effect of investor sentiments such as 
over-optimism. 85 The BHAR was used together with the calendar-time portfolio 
approach to evaluate the bidding finns' long-run reactions to a merger announcement. 
Based on the research set-up, if the short- run response contains all the infonnation 
about a merger, the post-announcement abnonnal return should be zero on average. 
Any systematic patterns in the post-announcement abnonnal returns may be due to 
investor sentiment in a hot market valuation period. 
The reaction to a merger announcement may depend on recent mergers. For this 
reason two measures of recent overall merger activity were included: the merger 
numbers for the last twelve months, and the average five-day CAR on merger 
announcements made in the twelve months prior to the announcement. The first one 
8S The results are similar when using a three-day window. The five-day window was chosen because 
Fuller, et al. (2002) found that a five-day window around the merger announcement data given by the 
SOC was wide enough to capture the first mention of a merger every time for a sample of 500 
announcements. Also, note that if merger discussions are broken offbut later resumed, the 
announcement that discussions were being resumed as the announcement date. 
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of these is intended to capture waves, while the second is to capture merger 
momentum. Previous studies have found that there is autocorrelation within meroer 
e 
activity. with the number of mergers in a year helping predict the number of mergers 
in the next year. Since the factors that lead to an autocorrelation in the number of 
mergers might also affect the market's reaction to the merger announcements, the 
number of mergers in the year prior to a particular announcement was included as one 
measure of merger conditions. 
The second measure of recent merger conditions is the main measure of hot merger 
markets. Merger momentum was measured using the average five-day CAR on 
merger announcements made in the twelve months prior to an announcement. A hot 
market is one where recent mergers have generated strong announcement returns. 
Bidder-specific merger momentum was controlled for using three variables. 
1) The quality of a firm's acquisitions was measured using the five-day 
announcement return for the last merger undertaken by the bidding firm. as 
long as the announcement occurred in the previous three years. 
2) To measure how active a firm was the number of acquisitions announced by 
the bidder in the previous three years was used. Some firms in the sample 
made a series of acquisitions while others made only one. 
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3) A dummy was included for whether this was the first merger announcement 
by the acquirer in the previous three years. 86 
Mergers may also be affected by conditions in the broader stock market. As noted 
above, merger waves generally occur in periods of rising stock prices. The FTSE All 
Share index was used as a proxy for the general level of stock prices in the market. To 
examine whether stock prices were rising, the changes in the index during the period 
starting one year prior to a merger announcement and ending three days before the 
announcement were used. 
Bidder-specific returns in the period leading up to a merger announcement were 
measured using the BHARs for the period starting one year prior to a merger 
announcement and ending three days before the announcement. The BHARs were 
measured relative to the benchmark of the FTSE All Share index. 
The targets were divided into three groups: public firms, private fmns, and 
subsidiaries, and separated into 'two forms of acquisition fmancing: stock financing 
and fmancing that included at least some other type of financing. This was for the 
purpose of controlling for differences between stock and other financing and between 
public and other targets. 87 The deal-specific control variables include dummy 
variables for whether the target is a private firm or a subsidiary (with public targets as 
86 Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Fuller, et al. (2002) found that frequent acquirers are different 
from occasional acquirers. Thus, it was thought necessary here to include a first merger dummy . 
• 7 See Travlos (1987), Asquith, et aI. (1987), Servaes (1991), and Fuller, et al. (2002). 
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the omitted group). In the sample, 2.2% of targets were publicly traded, 57.2% 
privately owned, and 40.6% subsidiaries. Dummies were included so that interaction 
between the type of target and a dummy could be examined to see whether a deal was 
financed using stock, since there is evidence that stock-financed acquisitions may 
differ by target type. 6.7% of the acquisitions in the sample were financed using 
solely stock. 
Morek, et al. (1990), and Maquieira, et al. (1997) found that returns to bidding firms 
are lower when the merger is diversifying. To control for this, the firms were divided 
into seventeen industries using the classification given by Kenneth French on his web 
site88• A dummy was then defined as taking the value 1 if a merger was diversifying, 
that is, if it involved firms from two different industries. 
The financial strength of the bidding firm was controlled for using the BIM ratio and 
the return on assets (ROA). There is evidence that a high BIM ratio is associated with 
a higher short-run CAR. The ratio of BIM values also affects long-run returns 89. The 
BIM ratio was calculated using data available for the year prior to the merger 
announcement. The ROA was included to control for the fmancial performance of a 
firm. Morek, et aI. (1990) suggested that firms with better prior performance make 
better acquisitions. Here, the income of the year prior to the acquisition announcement 
was divided by the assets at the end of that year to arrive at the ROA. 
II The web address is mba.tuck.dartmouth.edulpageslfacultylken.frenchldataJibrary.hbnl. 
19 See Lang, et aI. (1989), Servaes (1991), and Rau and Vennaelen (1998). 
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4.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Data Selection 
The focus of this research is on domestic M&As undertaken by UK firms announced 
between January 1985 to December 2002, as given in the SDC database. For the 
purposes of this work, a merger is defmed as an acquisition of equity where one firm 
purchases at least 50% of another and after the purchase the bidder owns at least 90% 
of the target. Acquisitions were included in the sample if the following conditions 
were met: 
1. The acquirer was a UK firm listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
2. If daily acquirer return data was available for two days before the 
announcement date until two days after the announcement date, and if the 
following acquirer data was available for the three years following the 
acquisition: market equity (from June each year), the BIM ratio (from 
December each year) and monthly return data. 
3. The target was a publicly traded or private UK firm, or a subsidiary thereof. 
4. The transaction value was 1 million pounds or more. 
5. As in Loughran and Vijh's (1997) work, a prerequisite was that the closing 
share price of the acquirer for the month before the announcement was not less 
than three. This eliminated firms that were very small or in distress. 
6. The acquirer was a non-financial, non-utility firm. 
As in Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoler's (2002), and Heron and Lie's (2002) work, a 
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cash acquisition is defined as any acquisition where the total transaction value was 
paid in cash, non-convertible debt, or non-convertible preferred stock. A stock 
acquisition is defined as any acquisition where the total transaction value was paid in 
common stock and options, warrants, rights, or convertible debt. Acquisitions 
involving a combination of cash and stock are defmed as mixed payment acquisitions. 
The announcement dates reported in the SDC data were used. Stock market data was 
collected from the Data Stream data set. Any mergers where there was no Data Stream 
data for the bidder was dropped. 
In order to focus as closely as possible on the effect of general market conditions, a 
number of cuts were made to the sample. First, tender offers were not included in the 
basic sample. Acquisitions can be made either via a merger or a tender offer. Mergers 
are generally friendly agreements between the management of the bidding and target 
firms, while tender offers involve the purchase of shares without the need for approval 
from the target's management. Tender offers were excluded for two reasons. First, 
studies have generally found that the market response to tender offers is more positive 
(or less negative) than the reaction to mergers over both short-term and long-term 
horizons. This may be due in part to the prevalence of cash payments in tender offers 
(Martin, 1996). If the proportion of tender offers is related to market conditions, some 
of the results could be attributed to market conditions rather than to the mix of tender 
offers and mergers. The second reason is that there were no tender offers for private 
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fIrms or for subsidiaries. Thus, to the extent that there are differences in the market 
response to acquisitions of public targets, private targets, and subsidiaries (Fuller, et 
ai., 2002), the inclusion of tender offers could bias the results. For these reasons, and 
since only a small proportion of acquisitions were tender offers, this work focuses on 
mergers only. All the results are robust to the inclusion of tender offers. 
Many of the mergers in the SDC database involved a target that was much smaller 
than the bidding fIrm. It is unlikely that such an acquisition would have a material 
effect on the future earnings of the bidder, and thus, it should have little effect on the 
bidder's stock price. To concentrate on the mergers most likely to have a significant 
effect on the bidding fIrm's stock price, there was a prerequisite that the target be at 
least 10% of the bidder's size. It is important that there is a relative size cut off, but 
the exact minimum target size is less crucial. The main results hold for any cut off 
between 5% and 25%. 
To measure the relative size of the target and the bidder, the ratio of the market value 
of the target to the market value of the bidder was calculated. Where the market value 
for the target could not be established (most targets are not publicly traded), the price 
paid in the acquisition was used as a proxy. Where the price paid in the acquisition 
could not be established, the book values of the equity for both the target and the 
bidder were used to estimate relative size. Mergers where the target was much larger 
than the bidder were also eliminated. These mergers are not common and may reflect 
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special circumstances, and therefore any merger where the target was more than 120% 
of the size of the bidder was dropped. 
Finally, outliers were eliminated. Any firm with a negative book value of equity or 
with a ratio of the BIM value of equity of over 10 was dropped. Firms with returns on 
assets of below - 100% or above 200% were also excluded. Once this was done, the 
mergers in the top 1 % and the bottom 1 % of the abnormal announcement returns were 
also dropped. This left a sample of 1,957 mergers. Table 4.1 provides some 
descriptive statistics on this sample. 
There are some distinctive trends in the sample. First of all, it can be seen from Table 
4.1 that cash was used to fmance 55.9% of the deals, while only 6.9% of deals used 
stock as the method of payment. This could be due to the large proportion of private 
and subsidiary targets in the sample. Secondly, a clear increasing trend in merger 
numbers can be observed as time passes. The peak is reached in 2000, when there 
were 178 deals, while the numbers at the end of the 1980s were similar to those in the 
1990s, indicating that a strong merger wave took place at the end of each decade. 
However, the transaction values indicate that the merger wave of the late 1990s was 
on a much larger scale than that of the late 1980s. 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample of 1957 merger deals. All 
the right hand side variables from our empirical model are described here. Trailing 12 
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month average cumulative announcement return (CAAR) is the average CAAR for all 
sample mergers ending 3 days before an announcement together with 
Trailing 12-month number of mergers are the two variables we used to proxy for 
merger momentum variables and its mean value is 1.2%, which suggest bidder gain 
positive announcement return through out the sample. Market momentum variables is 
proxy by using trailing 12 month return on FTSE all share index that is the return on 
the FTSE all share index in the year ending three days before a merger announcement 
and it has a mean value of 13.9%. For bidder specific merger momentum and bidder 
specific stock momentum variables we using one dummy and the number of mergers 
by the bidder in the 3 years prior to the announcement to proxy for it, and the mean 
value is 59.4% and 0.71 respectively. We also controlled for the method of payment 
and other financial variables that had been found in past literature could significantly 
influence bidder's performance. We will discuss rest of the table when we introduce 
our results. 
4.4.2 Methodologies 
This section presents the methodologies used to calculate the right-hand size variable 
shown in equation 1, which is used for the calculation of the market's 
merger announcements in both the short-run and long-run. 
4.4.2.1 The Short-run Returns using the CAR Measure 
reaction to 
Following the methodology of Fuller, et al. (2002), a modified market model was 
used to estimate abnormal returns. The market model was not used because the 
presence of frequent acquirers in the sample suggests a high probability of other 
acquisition announcements in the estimation period, and any abnormal returns caused 
by these announcements would bias the parameter estimates. The daily abnormal 
returns for a firm were calculated by deducting the equally-weighted index return 
from the firm's return. The abnormal returns for a five-day event window around the 
announcement date (from two days prior to an announcement date until two days after 
the announcement date) were also calculated. The CARs were calculated by adding 
the abnormal return between the returns of the bidder and the returns of the 
benchmark index:9o 
2 
CAR = L (Rt - RINDEx,t) 
t=-2 
Where Rt is the return on the stock of the firm on date t relative to the announcement 
date, and R index,t is the return on the FTSE All Share index for that date. The results 
are robust to the use of the market model. 
To estimate the CAR, it is necessary to use an index that is highly correlated with 
what the returns of the bidding firm would be if it had not announced a merger. There 
are several options. Fuller, et ai. (2002) used the market index as the benchmark for 
measwing the CAR. However, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) showed that most 
merger waves are the result of shocks to a specific industry. This suggests that it 
might be better to use an industry-based index as the benchmark. Alternatively, 
90 The benchmark index used here was the FTSE All Share value-weighted index, the results hold 
when using the indexes of different industries. 
24S 
studies of long-run returns, where the market model is problematic, often create 
indices by breaking finns into quintiles based on both market equity and the BIM r~tio, 
yielding twenty-five portfolios (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The three indices are 
highly correlated with bidder returns in the year prior to the merger announcement. 
They also tend to produce the same results as in the empirical tests carried out here. 
For the sample of 1,957 mergers, the average CAR using the benchmark was 1.2%, 
which is significantly different from zero. 
4.4.2.2 The Long-run Returns using the BHAR Measure 
There are some methodological concerns associated with the long-run BHAR 
methodology that need to be addressed. Barber and Lyon (1997) advocated the use of 
BHARs where the sample finns are matched to control finns of similar size and BIM 
ratios. They found that this approach yielded well-specified test statistics because it 
alleviated the rebalancing, skewness, and new listing biases that other techniques 
suffer from. Although CARs overcome event-clustering problems, they are subject to 
the measurement, new listing, and skewness biases described by Barber and Lyon. 
Another problem with CARs is that they are poor in detecting any long-run abnormal 
performance. Corporate events such as M&As have been documented as occurring in 
waves, and the calendar-time portfolio approach will understate the extent of 
abnormal returns since it smoothes such returns over the hot and cold periods. 
Moreover, as compared to CARs, BHARs are better able to measure the returns to an 
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investor who holds a security for a long post-event period. With this concern in mind, 
the BHARs methodology was chosen as the primary measure of long-run returns. The 
BHAR is here defined as the value of holding a long position in the stock of the 
bidding firm and a short position in a benchmark index over the time horizon: 91 
T T 
BHAR = I1 (l + 1\ ) - I1 (l + Rindex,1 ) 
1=1 1=1 
As discussed above, the focus is on one benchmark, the FTSE All Share index. but the 
results are generally similar when using an industry-based index. Two time horizons 
were examined, one that included the announcement period and one that focused on 
the post-announcement period only. The first, which is referred to as the total window. 
runs from two days prior to a merger announcement to three years after the 
announcement, while the second starts three days after the announcement day and 
ends three years after it. The total window captures the total stock market impact of 
the merger, including the effect of the announcement, which the post-announcement 
period excludes. Only mergers for which there was post-announcement data for at 
least one year was included. As is standard, it was assumed that when a firm was 
de-listed from the London Stock Exchange. it earned the benchmark return for the 
period after it was dropped. 
The average BHAR in the post-announcement period was -4.28%. which is not 
significantly different from zero. This estimate of long-run under-performance is in 
QJ Including periods before and after the merger is completed. 
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the range of estimates found in earlier studies. 92 
4.4.2.3 The Long-run Returns using the Calendar-Time Portfolio Measure 
In this research, the calendar-time portfolio approach was used for reasons of 
robustness. 93 Using this approach, the calendar-time abnormal returns were 
calculated for the sample firms. Inference is based on a (-statistic derived from the 
time-series of the monthly calendar-time portfolio's abnormal return. It should be 
noted, that corporate events such as M&As have been documented to occur in waves, 
and the calendar-time portfolio approach will understate the extent of abnormal 
returns since it smoothes them over the hot and cold periods. Moreover, this approach 
is better for measuring the returns to an investor who holds a security for a long 
post-event period. Since the objective here is a cross-sectional analysis, the sample 
was divided into five sub-groups, and then the returns for each group were calculated. 
The returns were compared with the FTSE All Share index as a benchmark, and also 
calculated using the Fama French three-factor model. 
A returns index was created for the sample as a whole, and also for the sub-samples 
based on quartiles of the key independent variables. These were: the trailing 
twelve-month average CAR (merger momentum), the trailing twelve-month number 
of mergers (merger waves), the trailing twelve-month return on the FTSE All Share 
92 For example, Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000). 
93 Jaffe (1974), and Mandelker (1974) were the first to use the calender-time portfolio approach; it was also 
advocated by Fama (1997) and implemented in recent work by Loughhran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompcrs 
(1997), and Brav, Geczy, and Gompcrs (1995). 
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index (market momentum), the CAR on the bidder's last acquisition (bidder-specific 
merger momentum), the twelve-month trailing BHAR on the bidder's stock 
(bidder-specific stock momentum), and the CAR on the acquisition. The quartiles 
were created using monthly averages of the independent variables. 
To construct the calendar-time portfolio of bidders' returns, the average returns were 
taken of all the firms that had made an acquisition in the three years prior to each 
month, excluding the current month. Each bidding firm remained in the portfolio for 
thirty-six months, and the portfolio was rebalanced on a monthly basis. The equation 
is as follows: 
~ R' t CTP }(t),t = L.J I, 
i=}(t) N }(t) 
Where jet) consists of acquisitions in group j for the months 1, through month 36 and 
where N j(t) is the number of acquisitions in jet). Mitchell and Stafford's (2000) 
standard methodology was followed when constructing the calendar-time portfolio, 
and any month with fewer than ten firms in the portfolio was dropped. 94 
Once the calendar-time return series for each group had been obtained, they were 
regressed on the Fama-French three factors to find the calendar-time abnormal returns 
for each group. The equation is as follows: 
Where Rept is the simple monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (either equally 
94 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) suggested that there should be at least ten firms in each month's 
portfolio, in order to avoid sample selection bias problems. 
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or value weighted), R f t the monthly return on three-month Treasury bills, Rmt the 
return on a market index, and 5MBt the return of portfolios of small stocks and big 
stocks. HMLt is the difference in the returns of the portfolios of high BIM stocks and 
low BIM stocks. 
For the sample as a whole, the portfolio return was -0.06% per month, or -1.99% for 
the three-year post-announcement period. This result is very similar to that obtained 
using the BHAR measure . 
.4.4.2.4 The High Market Valuation Classification Method 
The main classification used to form the high market valuation control portfolio was 
similar to that described in the previous chapter. Each month was classified as a high, 
neutral, or low valuation period. Monthly FTSE All Share index data from 1985 to 
2002 was used to capture the price levels that existed in each month from January 
1985 to December 2002. In order to classify each month by valuation the market 
index was first de-trended by removing the best straight-line fit from the FTSE All 
Share index of the month in question and the five preceding years. It was necessary to 
remove the trend from the market index because the FTSE All Share index had 
trended upwards; not removing the trend would result in a systematic classification of 
more recent acquisitions as high-valuation acquisitions and older acquisitions as 
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low-valuation acquisitions. 95 
After de-trending the FTSE All Share index, each month was placed in an above or 
below average group, according to whether the de-trended index of that month was 
above or below the previous five-year average. The months were then ranked in order 
of the de-trended FTSE All Share index. The top half of the above average months 
were classified as high valuation months and the bottom half of the below average 
months were classified as low valuation months. All other months were classified as 
neutral valuation months.96 
Once each month had been placed in different valuation groups, the high market 
valuation acquisition portfolio was formed. All acquisitions that had taken place in 
high valuation months were put into this portfolio so that the cross-sectional 
regression of the CARs and BHARs could be run on the different factors that induce 
merger momentum. 
95 These results are robust to reasonable changes in the length of historical data used in the 
de-trending. 
96 In the final tables, the results are presented for the case where the top and bottom half are classified 
as high and low valuation respectively, and are robust to different cut off points such as, the top and 
bottom 2131'11 , 1I41h etc. 
2S1 
4.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.5.1 Results 
4.5.1.1 The Short-run CAR Regression Results 
Tables 4.3 to 4.7 present the results for the short-run CAR regressions. These 
.' 
regressions include. controls for the form of financing, the type of targets, 
firm-specific financing characteristics, a dummy for whether a merger was 
diversifying, and industry dummies. 
Table 4.3 shows the results of the CAR regressIon carried out on the merger 
momentum variables, which were proxied by the trailing twelve-month average CARs 
and twelve-month number of mergers. The full sample regression indicates that there 
is evidence of merger momentum at the overall market-level but not at the firm-level. 
The market -wide merger momentum variable, which is the coefficient for the trailing 
twelve-month average CAR, is positive and statistically significant. A 1 % increase in 
the trailing CAR can cause the bidder's CAR to move up by 0.2 percentage points. 
However, the coefficient of the trailing twelve-month number of mergers (which 
captures merger waves) is insignificant. This is probably due to the fact that there 
were two merger waves over the whole sample period, and the latter (1997 to 2000) 
was much greater in both quantities and values, thus, the second wave dominated the 
effect of first wave. Rosen (2005) also suggested that this may be due to the merger 
wave in the sample. 
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The regression based on the high market valuation period portfolio shows that there is 
a significant positive relationship between merger momentum variables and short-run 
market reactions. A 1 % increase in the trailing CAR can boost the bidders' CARs by 
0.41 %. This result is in line with the hypothesis that merger momentum is more 
significant during high market valuation periods simply because investor sentiment 
plays an important role at these times. 
Table 4.4 shows the results of the CAR regresslOn carried out on the market 
momentum variables that were proxied by the trailing twelve-month returns on the 
FTSE All Share index. Mergers may also be affected by conditions in the broader 
stock market. As noted earlier, merger waves generally occur in periods of rising 
stock prices. To examine whether stock prices were rising, the changes in the index 
during the period starting one year prior to a merger announcement and ending three 
days before the announcement were used. The re~ults show that the market index 
positively effected the bidders' CARs from a merger announcement during high 
valuation periods. For every percentage point increase in the FTSE All Share index in 
the twelve months prior to an announcement made during a high valuation period 
boosted the CAR by 3.5%, and this result is statistically significant. For the rest of 
the portfolios, the results show that although there are positive relationships they are 
• insignificant. 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the regression carried out on the bidder-specific merger 
momentum variables. The bidder-specific merger momentum was proxied using three 
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variables. The quality of a firm's acquisition was measured usmg the five-day 
announcement return on the last merger undertaken by the bidding firm, as long as the 
announcement occurred in the previous three years. The number of acquisitions 
announced by the bidder in the previous three years was used to measure how active 
the firm was. Previous studies have found that the characteristics of frequent and 
infrequent bidders differ. Thus, a dummy was introduced where the merger 
announcement was the first made by the acquirer in the previous three years. There 
was found to be a statistically significant positive relationship between the bidder's 
return on the previous announcement and the short-term return on the present one. A 
1 % increase in the bidder's previous announcement return caused a 4.5% increase in 
the present announcement return for the high valuation control portfolio. The positive 
significant relationship between the first merger dummy and the bidder's CAR for the 
high market valuation control portfolio suggests that bidders gain from previous 
experience during high valuation periods. However, during other periods this 
relationship is insignificant and sometimes negative. Results for the regression carried 
out on the number of mergers that bidders had made in the previous three years shows 
that the short-run returns of present deals depended on factors other than how active a 
firm was. Thus, it would seem that the effect of previous mergers on the short-run 
reactions to a current merger appears to depend on the market's reaction to the earlier 
mergers, rather than how many there have been. 
Table 4.6 shows the regression results for the CAR on bidder-specific stock 
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momentum. This stock momentum was measured by the bidder-specific returns in the 
period leading up to the merger announcement using the BHAR for the period starting 
one year prior to the merger announcement and ending three days before the 
announcement. The bidder's trailing twelve-month returns were negatively related to 
its CAR on the current merger announcement; where the previous one-year BHAR 
increased by 1 %, the CAR from the announcement decreased by 0.5%. During the 
high valuation periods, the magnitude was lower and the results show a more 
significant negative relationship. This fact could be explained by Roll's (1986) hubris 
hypothesis, and will be discussed further in the following section. 
Table 4.7 presents the results for the regression carried out on the other control 
variables. The targets were divided into three groups: public firms, private firms, and 
subsidiaries, and separated by the form of acquisition financing: stock financing, and 
financing that included at least some other type of financing. The results show that the 
acquisitions financed with stocks generally had negative announcement returns, 
although this result is insignificant. On the other hand, deals fmanced with cash or 
other forms of payment generated significant positive announcement returns. This 
result is in line with most previous findings. 97 As Fuller, et al. (2002) suggested, 
public and private targets have significantly different characteristics. Thus, those in 
this sample were separated into public and other targets, and it was found that for 
most of the control portfolios, private target acquisitions yielded significant positive 
97 See Travlos (1987), Asquith, et al. (1987), Servaes (1991), and Loughran and Vijh (1997). 
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announcement returns. 
Previous studies have found that returns to bidding firms are lower when the merger is 
diversifying. To control for this, the firms were divided into seventeen industries 
using the classification given by Kenneth French on his website. A dummy was then 
constructed that took the value 1 if a merger was diversifying, that is, if it involved 
firms from two different industries. In the sample under study, 40.3 % of all mergers 
were diversifying. Compared to other countries, this ratio is relatively high. It was 
found that for most of the control portfolios, diversifying mergers generated a positive 
correlation with the announcement returns, although for the high market valuation 
control portfolio this relationship was insignificant and relatively weak; this is 
probably due to mergers tending to be concentrated in specific industries during high 
market valuation periods. 
The bidding firms had an average of 101.7 million pounds in assets and a median of 
40.2 million in assets. Because of the wide range of bidder size the log of the total 
assets was included as a control variable. The size was found to negatively relate to 
the bidder's short-run return across the sample period and during the early period; this 
result is consistent with that found by Loderer and Martin (1997). However, the 
bidder's size was found to be significantly positively related to the bidder's short-run 
return for the high market valuation control portfolio. This may be because larger 
firms have more access to external finance and have more bargaining power, 
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especially during high market valuation periods when all fIrms tend to be overvalued 
by the market. 98 
The ratio of target to bidder size in the sample had a mean of 24.9% and a median of 
14.60/0. This ratio was included as a control variable because other researchers have 
found it to be correlated with the bidder's short-run return. A positive correlation was 
found for all the control portfolios and was especially signifIcant for the high market 
valuation portfolios; the reason for this is the same as discussed above. 
The fInancial strength of the bidding fIrms was controlled for using the BIM ratio. 
Previous studies have suggested that a high BIM ratio is associated with a higher 
short-run CAR. The BIM ratio also affects long-run returns.99 It is calculated using 
data available for the year prior to the merger announcement. The average ratio in the 
sample was 0.47, and this is significantly positively related to the CAR. 
In summary, it was found that most of the control variables have a significant 
coefficient in the regression for the high valuation periods. These signs are consistent 
with earlier literature. This suggests that the factors that affect the momentum 
variables exist in addition to the factors identified in the previous chapters. 
98 Rhodes-Kropf, et al. (2004) suggested that small firms tend to cash in their overvalued equity as 
quickly as possible, even at a discount price. 
" See Rau and Vermaelen (1998). 
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4.5.1.2 The Long-run BHAR Regression Results 
The BHAR regression results are presented in Tables 4.8 to 4.12. The same control 
variables were used as when examining the short-run CAR with an additional 
independent variable, the CAR, for the post-announcement period. 
Table 4.8 presents the regression results for the BHAR on the CAR and market 
momentum variables. As with the short-run regressions, trailing twelve-month 
returns on the FTSE All Share index were used as the proxy for market momentum. 
The CAR was included as a control variable in the regression on the 
post-announcement period. These variables allowed for tests to be made for reversals. 
The coefficient of the CAR variable was statistically indifferent to -1, which means 
the announcement abnormal returns were given back in their entirety during the 
post-announcement period. For acquisitions that took place during high market 
valuation periods an even more significant result was found. However, this does not 
imply that the merger created no synergies, since any benefits accruing to the owners 
of the target were excluded. 
The results for the market momentum variables also showed the reversal of the CAR. 
The coefficient of the increase in the stock index over the twelve months prior to an 
announcement was negative and significant for the high market valuation period 
portfolios. For the total sample portfolio, the post announcement and total window 
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results also showed that there was a long-run reversal, but the magnitude and 
significance were less than in the case of the high valuation period portfolio. In 
general, both results show that an acquisition announced during a high valuation 
period does worse in the long-run, than one announced in other periods. This is true 
even when the positive short- run reaction to the announcement of these mergers (i.e. 
total window returns) is included. 
As with the short-run studies, the market-wide merger momentum was proxied using 
twelve-month trailing average CARs in the market, and to capture merger waves 
trailing twelve-month merger numbers were used. The results in Table 4.9 show that 
the measure of market-wide merger momentum is negative and significant, both in the 
post-announcement period and in the total windows. Notably, for the high market 
valuation control portfolios there was an even more significant result with an even 
lager negative coefficient. Most likely is because the deals announced during high 
valuation periods are most easily infected by hubris and investor optimism. As time 
passes, the over optimism is replaced by reality, thus a more significant long-run 
reversal is observed. 
These results suggest not only that firms announcing in a hot merger market have a 
downward drift in their stock price in the post-announcement period, but that the deals 
announced in cold merger periods also end up with a lower stock price. This can be 
clearly seen as the coefficient for the total windows regression is negative and 
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significant. However, when combined with Table 4.10, the results for the merger wave 
regression do not seem to be very significant, which suggests that the bidder~s 
long-run return depends on the last deal rather than on the quantity of merger deals 
the bidder has made in the previous year. However, the result for the high market 
valuation control portfolio is significantly negative. This evidence partially suggests 
that mergers announced during waves are worse in the long-run than mergers 
announced at other times. 
Table 4.10 presents the regression results for the BHAR on bidder-specific merger 
momentum. It is difficult to draw the conclusion that firm-level momentum is 
reversed in the long-run as there is no strong evidence of reversal for the firm specific 
momentum variables. However, it can be seen that compared to the short-run studies, 
there is a much more significant coefficient for the long-run results. This suggests that 
firm-level momentum is more obvious in the long-run, which is probably due to the 
characteristics of the firm-level momentum variable simply needing time to reveal its 
function. In summary, no long-run reversal was found for bidder-specific merger 
momentum. 
As in the short-run studies, the bidder-specific stock momentum pattern was proxied 
using the trailing twelve-month BHARs on the bidder's stock, which is the BHAR on 
the bidder's stock in the twelve months ending three days before an announcement. 
Strong evidence was found for the effect of a bidder-specific stock momentum on the 
bidder's long-run performance, as the coefficient of this control variable was 
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significant in all portfolios with a negative sign. This evidence strongly supports the 
hypothesis that bidders' managers tend to be afilicted with hubris or over confidence 
when their firm is doing well, and have more external resources to finance a merger. 
Furthermore, the most significant sign was found for the high valuation post-
announcement period control portfolio. This evidence suggests that managers of 
bidding firms make worse acquisition decisions when their firm is doing better in a 
high valuation period, this is probably because of the overvaluation effect advocated 
by Jensen (2004).100 
Table 4.12 presents the results for the long-run regresslOn on the other control 
variables. Similar to the findings of the short-run regression, these results are mostly 
consistent with previous research. 
F or the private target acquisitions negative coefficients were found for all the holding 
portfolios, although the magnitude is less than for the short-run studies. This suggests 
that the performance of bidders involved in private target acquisitions gradually get 
worse over a period of time. This may be due to the mis-perceived synergies of initial 
acquisitions and overpayment for private targets. For acquisitions involving 
subsidiaries, significant positive coefficients were found and this suggests that over a 
100 Jensen (2004) suggested that agency costs increase surprisingly during overvaluation periods, and 
one of the major causes is to meet analysts' forecasts. Managers who fail to meet the target set by the 
analyst will face the problem of disappointing the market. Hence, they will initiate acquisitions even 
where they are not profitable in the long-run, but can boost their stock temporally. 
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period of time, the bidder's performance gradually gets better. These results, 
however, strengthen the point of the bidder's performance long-run reversal. 
For the stock financing and other financing control variables, a result similar to that of 
the short-run studies was found. The bidders that chose stock as the method of 
payment consistently did worse in the long-run, with a negative coefficient. For those 
that financed the transaction solely with cash or made a mixed offer there was a 
different scenario, these were significantly positive. This suggests that bidders are 
much more careful regarding synergy screening when they are using cash as the 
method of payment. 
Notably, a very significant size effect was found in the long-run study. As noted 
earlier, the bidder to target size ratio could be an important indicator of the bidder's 
long-run performance. It was found that with an increased divergence of target to 
bidder size, the bidders tended to show a positive long-run performance in all the 
holding portfolios, and this result is also in line with the hypothesis. 
In summary, when investigating merger momentum in the long-run, the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that momentum is caused by over-optimism, as 
short-run returns vanish as time passes and there is a strong tendency for long-run 
reversal over time. 
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Table 4.13 reports the portfolio's average returns and standard deviations. The pattern 
of returns is generally consistent with the pattern for the BHAR. The key variables in 
the regression are the trailing twelve-month average CAR (merger momentum), the 
trailing twelve-month number of mergers (merger waves), the trailing twelve- month 
return on the FTSE All Share index (market momentum), the CAR on the bidder's last 
acquisition (bidder-specific merger momentum), the twelve-month trailing BHAR on 
the bidder's stock (bidder-specific stock momentum), and the CAR of the acquisition. 
The quartiles were created using the monthly averages of the independent variables. 
As mentioned before, it is no surprise to see that the statistical significance is weaker 
for the calendar-time portfolio approach. 101 
As can be seen from the table, the I-value of the top and bottom quartile deviations is 
highly significant for most of the key merger momentum variables. For the 
twelve-month trailing average CAR (the measure of merger momentum) portfolio, the 
results suggest that acquisitions made in hot merger markets, as measured by the top 
quartile of the twelve-month trailing average CAR, have significant lower long-run 
returns than those made in cold markets, as measured by the lowest quartile. 
The result for the trailing twelve-month returns on the FTSE All Share index also 
shows that market-wide momentum factors are significant in explaining the bidders' 
long-run returns. The results for other variables are generally statistically insignificant, 
101 Previous studies have suggested that using the BHAR gives the hypothesis tests a lot of power, but 
may reject too many nulls (type one errors). On the other hand, the calendar time portfolio approach, 
by aggregating individual events into calendar time portfolios, throws away valuable information, 
thereby reducing the power of any hypothesis test. 
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although the pattern of returns is consistent with the pattern for the BHAR. 
4.5.2 Discussion 
4.5.2.1 Discussion of the Short-run Studies 
The results of the short-run regression strongly support the hypothesis that merger 
momentum plays an important role in explaining bidders' returns during high market 
valuation periods. This high market valuation period evidence shows that recent 
history in the merger market affects the CAR from a merger announcement; a bidding 
firm's stock price increases more when recent mergers have had positive responses 
from the market; and the market rewards firms whose previous mergers it has 
preferred. Furthermore, the market-wide momentum factor suggests that a high 
market valuation leads to better announcement returns. 
These results are consistent with the hubris hypothesis, neoclassical theory, and the 
investor sentiment hypothesis. The hubris hypothesis suggests that bidding firms' 
managers are easily infected by hubris or overconfidence when they have plenty of 
external resources to finance the merger, this could arise when the bidder's stock has 
sufficient run-up before the takeover. When hubris is the case, then there can be a 
positive autocorrelation in the announcement return. However, there was also a 
negative coefficient for the trailing twelve-month BHAR on the bidders' stock, which 
is the measure of bidder-specific stock momentum. This negative coefficient implies 
that if a bidder is infected by hubris because of good performance in the previous year, 
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it could lead to a negative market reaction to the merger announcement. If the 
rationale of the hubris hypothesis is recalled, then it is not hard to understand why this 
is the case. The hubris hypothesis suggests that the managers of bidding firms that 
have had recent success may believe that they can create value in situations that the 
market judges to be negative net present value. The managers thus want to make 
acquisitions even when they anticipate the announcement will generate a decline in 
stock prices. They expect they will be proved correct in the long-run. 
Neoclassical theory also predicts the correlation between merger momentum factors 
and bidders' short-run announcement returns. Previous studies show that if mergers 
are concentrated in periods following economic shocks, then this could also lead to 
autocorrelation in announcement returns. Since the shocks can boost overall stock 
prices, the CAR can be positively correlated with recent returns in the stock market. 
The results here show that a 1 % increase in the trailing twelve-month average return 
on the FTSE All Share index can boost the bidder's CAR by 3.5%, and this result is 
highly significant. 
Investor sentiment theory also predicts the correlation between CARs and recent 
market conditions, but for different reasons. When market valuation is high, most 
investors will be imbued with over optimism and this over optimism regarding 
mergers overall generates a positive autocorrelation in announcement returns, while 
overall optimism about frrms can lead to a positive correlation between the CAR and 
the returns in the stock market. Jensen (2004) argued that this investor optimism could 
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also result from financial analysts mis-forecasting or from their unrealistic 
expectations of the merger deal. It is well known that financial analysts play a 
critical role in the fmancial market, they are paid to make up a nice story. When this is 
the case, and if herding behaviour is taken into consideration, it is not hard to 
understand why bidders' short-run positive returns are related to recent market 
conditions during high market valuation periods. However, it is very hard to 
distinguish these three hypotheses from each other using the short-run regression 
study. They will be examined in more detail when the long-run results are discussed. 
The results of the regression on the market-wide momentum variable further supports 
our hypothesis that high market valuations lead to merger momentum in both the 
short and long-run. The negative coefficient for the bidder run-up variable shows that 
if the bidder's stock has increased alot before a takeover then it is more likely to 
generate a negative announcement return. Shleifer and Vishny's (2004) overvaluation 
driven acquisition hypothesis is in line with these findings. Firms are more likely to 
use stock financing when they feel their stock is overvalued. However, they send a 
signal to the market when they accomplish the merger deal with stock, and the market 
will respond immediately to these signals, thus the result is a negative coefficient for 
the market momentum variable. 
In summary, the short-run study results are in line with the hypothesis that the market 
reacts to merger announcements associated with recent market conditions and 
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bidder-specific merger momentum variables. 
4.5.3 The Long-run Regression Results 
Overall, the long-run regression is in line with the hypothesis that merger momentum 
is caused by investor sentiment, these results are more obvious for the high market 
valuation holding portfolio, but hold for the other control portfolios as well. 
As discussed above, investor sentiment results in part from the investor becoming 
over optimistic, such investors are influenced by irrational sentiments and this could 
lead to a divergence in agreement about the probability distributions of future payoffs 
on assets. As Fama and French (2005) suggested, price effects are large when: (i) 
misinformed investors, or those with asset tastes, account for a substantial amount of 
the invested wealth, and (ii) they are misinformed about, or have tastes for, a wide 
range of assets with returns less than perfectly correlated with the returns on other 
assets. 
• 
Different investors have different tastes regarding the future payoffs of asset, and this 
divergence of tastes leads to equilibrium in asset pricing. However, when an over 
optimistic investor sentiment predominates in the market during a high market 
valuation periods, a systematic bias in the investors' tastes will be seen as most 
investors have biased homogeneous beliefs regarding mergers' future payoffs. 
As time passes, the real information of the bidder will be revealed to the market, and 
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the optimism will eventually be replaced by reality, a downward trend in the bidder's 
long-run return will then be observed. The results here show that hot stock markets, as 
measured by the trailing twelve-month returns, are also associated with larger 
short-run announcement effects that reverse themselves in the long-run. If market 
participants are optimistic about the prospects for a merger they will bid up the stock 
of the merging firms. However, as the performance of the merged firm is revealed 
over time, market participants may revise their views of the quality of the merger 
downward, losing their optimism. 
The long-run reversal of the positive short-run momentum in mergers also suggests 
that the market rationally reallocates the resources as a result of optimism being 
replaced by reality. 
However, while mergers may create synergies, the neoclassical hypothesis does not 
predict the long-run downward drift in prices following mergers in high valuation 
markets, according to the findings of this research. The results are more consistent 
with the hubris hypothesis of merger and with investor sentiment in general. The 
calendar-time portfolio approach shows similar results, however the magnitude and 
significance are less compared to the BHAR regression. 
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4.6 ROBUSTNESS 
Previous studies have shown that the different types of target and mergers may 
influence the market reaction to a merger announcement. Furthermore, different time 
periods can also affect the market reaction, as discussed in the previous section. This 
section examines how robust the results are to splitting the sample according to type 
of merger, type of target, and the presence or not of a merger programme. 
To check for robustness, the effect of different types of merger was examined. Tender 
offers were excluded from the original sample because previous studies have 
generally found that the market response to tender offers is more positive (or less 
negative) than the reaction to mergers over both short-term and long-term horizons. In 
part, this may be due to the prevalence of cash payments in tender offers. Augmenting 
the sample with tender offers meeting the other sample criteria gave similar results. 
When looking at Table 4.15, it can be seen that market-wide merger momentum 
(which was proxied by the trailing twelve-month return on the FTSE All Share index) 
exists and that a negative bidder~specific merger momentum exists in the short-run 
studies for the high market valuation control portfolio. Long-run reversals for the 
main merger momentum variables can also be seen; this is consistent with the original 
sample results. Previous studies have also documented that the market reaction to 
stock mergers differs from its reaction to other types of financing, thus the sample was 
sub-divided into stock mergers and all others. The results (not shown) for the two 
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sub-samples are qualitatively similar. 
Much of the preVIOUS literature has focused on the relationship between merger 
outcome and different types of targets. The objective of this research is to find out the 
relationship between market reaction and recent market conditions, thus the focus is 
on the bidders and includes as much as possible the merger deals. Public targets. 
private targets, and subsidiaries were included in the study. However. to ensure that 
the results are robust to the types of targets, the original sample was sub-divided into 
public targets and other targets, giving sub-samples of 1.776 private and subsidiary 
targets and 181 public targets for the period 1985 to 2002. The regression of CAR and 
BHAR were then run on the key merger momentum variables based on the 
sub-samples. 
The results are consistent with the earlier findings. although the trailing twelve-month 
BHAR on the bidders' stock, which is the main measure of bidder-specific stock 
momentum. is statistically significant for the publicly-traded target sample although 
not for the other sample. Arguably, this is due to the small size of the sample of 
publicly-traded targets. 
A robustness check was also conducted on the long-run calendar- time portfolios by 
usino different benchmarks. For robustness. a regression of the bidders' monthly 
:::-
abnormal returns on the Fama-French three factors was conducted. By using the 
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Fama-Fre~ch three factors, more consistent and more significant results were found 
for most of the key variables. However, these results are consistent \vith our 
regression results when using the BHAR measures. 
Overall, the results appear robust to the different classifications of the sample and the 
different periods of time horizons employed in the research. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the merger momentum effect that is, the 
interaction between broad market conditions and the market's response to a merger 
announcement. To explain the source of merger momentum, the interaction between 
the market short-run reaction and the bidder's long-run performance was discussed. 
This research particularly focuses on high market valuation periods and has found that 
merger momentum is rather strong when the market tends to be overvalued compared 
to other periods. 
Using a large sample of 1,957 UK domestic acquisitions undertaken in the period 
1985 to 2002, evidence of momentum in merger markets was found. When the market 
had been reacting favourably to merger announcements, it tended to continue to do so. 
Similarly, mergers announced during hot stock markets tended to get a better reaction 
from the market than those announced during cold markets. Notably, this 
phenomenon is particularly evident when the overall market valuation is high. This 
suggests that managers are easily infected by good. news and exhibit similar 
behavioural biases when the market valuation is high. 
Three hypotheses have been put forward to explain the source of merger momentum 
(the hubris hypothesis, the synergy hypothesis, and the investor sentiment hypothesis). 
The short-run regression results revealed the fact that all three hypotheses provide 
reasonable explanations. However, the long-run results give greater support to 
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investor sentiment being the important factor in the market's reaction to merger 
announcements. If investors' reactions to merger announcements are based on the 
rational expectation of combined synergy then they will react positively to merger 
announcements with no long-run drift. If neoclassical theory, which states that 
industry or economic shocks create synergy holds then more positive market reaction 
should be seen during high valuation periods as it contains many common shocks. 
Thus, our results are also consistent with the neoclassical explanation of merger 
momentum. However, when the majority of investors are infected by optimistic 
beliefs, the short-run price run-ups caused by a merger announcement are reversed in 
the long-run as this optimism is eventually replaced by reality. When considering 
the driving force of investor optimism it can be seen that high valuation periods are 
most likely to produce this sentiment. 
The concerns of financial analysts may operate in addition to investor sentiment. 
Financial analysts are always optimistic during high market valuation periods (Jensen 
2004), hence they will set up unrealistic earning targets for the firm. Managers who 
fail to meet those targets face punishment by disappointed investors, so they have to 
boost the share price to manipulate earnings. At the same time, managers are easily 
infected by optimism resulting from past success in the same way as ordinary 
investors, and they initiate merger deals involving overpayments in order to meet the 
analysts' expectations. At the same time managers will make bad choices and 
misperceive the combined synergy when they are systematically afilicted with hubris 
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during high market valuation periods, thus it is no surprise to see bidders' long-run 
reversals. In general, the investor sentiment hypothesis together \\'ith the 
overvaluation hypothesis can serve as two creditable explanations for the findings of 
this research. 
This chapter has covered two aspects of the research. Firstly. the market's reaction to 
merger announcements has been decomposed into several factors. It \\'as found that 
merger outcomes not only depend on the bidders. but are also correlated with broader 
market conditions and stock market price levels, and most importantly. they depend 
on how other recent deals have been received by the market. Secondly, it was 
discovered that high market valuation does affect the quality of merger deals, and 
stimulates the short-run returns, but leads to significant long-run reyersal. It seems 
that mergers are subject to more behavioural biases when market valuation is high and 
these formulate the merger wave: deals within merger waves tend to be correlated 
with each other and co-move in the same direction. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics/or M&A sample 
This table describe the characteristics of our UK merger sample from 1985 - 2002. 1\ 
is the number of deals per year. Transaction values reported in millions of pounds. 
Cash deals are those that involved 100% cash payment and stock deals are those that 
involved 100% stock payment. The sample consists of all completed deals listed on 
the Security Dada corporation (SDC) U.K M&A data base. All the acquirers in our 
sample are public firms. We define a merger as an acquisition of equity where one 
firm purchases at least 50% of another and after the purchase: the bidder owns at least 
900/0 of the target. We also require that the target be at least 10% of the bidder's size. 
Year N Transact Transact Transaction Cash offer Stock Mixed 
Ion IOn Value offer offer 
Value Value (sum) 
(Mean) (median 
) 
1985 11 36.59 28.23 402.51 58.33% 33.33% 8.34% 
1986 26 18.57 1l.15 482.75 76.92% 11.54% 11.54% 
1987 69 20.05 7.50 1383.56 72.46% 8.70% 18.84% 
1988 172 20.72 4.57 3564.14 58.140/0 3.49% 38.37% 
1989 143 22.28 6.00 3186.60 5l.75% 6.29% 41.96% 
1990 99 8.84 4.50 874.68 62.63% 3.03% 34.34% 
1991 66 25.72 5.10 1697.20 62.12% 4.550/0 33.33% 
1992 71 14.78 4.05 1049.59 49.30% 8.45% 42.25% 
1993 78 19.76 8.50 154l.00 92.270/0 6.00% 1.73% 
1994 116 14.28 6.80 1656.01 49.140/0 2.59% 48.27% 
1995 108 14.91 6.19 1609.79 44.440/0 9.26% 46.30% 
1996 115 26.62 7.10 3061.32 43.48% 0.00% 56.52% 
1997 173 16.48 7.00 2851.23 47.40% 5.20% 47.40% 
1998 163 15.91 7.50 2593.07 65.64% 3.68% 30.68% 
1999 149 34.11 11.00 5082.85 50.34% 4.030/0 45.63% 
2000 178 32.90 10.80 5855.34 44.94% 3.37% 51.69°'0 
2001 124 18.68 6.80 2334.43 25.81% 4.84% 69 "'-0 ._~ =' ,0 
2002 96 4l.13 6.00 3907.08 5l.04% 6.25% 42.71 % 
Overall 1957 402.31 148.79 43133.15 55.900/0 69...,0· . _ /0 37.18% 
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for the sample of 1957 mergers announced during 1985-2002. 
Trailing 12-month number of mergers is the number of sample mergers in the 12 
months prior to an announcement. Trailing 12-month average cumulatiYe 
announcement return (CAAR) is the average CAAR for all sample mergers in the 12 
months ending 3 days before an announcement. CAAR for the last announcement by 
the firm is for the most recent merger where the target is at lease 5°'0 the size of the 
bidder as long as the merger was announced in the three years prior to the current 
announcement. Stock financing is the percent of mergers that are entirely financed by 
stock. Other financing is the percent of merger that have some non-stock financing. 
Target is public, private, and subsidiary refer to the percent of mergers with that type 
of targets. Diversifying merger is the percent of mergers where the target and bidding 
firm are in different industries. For the industry classification, we use the SDC 
industry classification definition. 
Variables Mean Median Std. dev 
Trailing 12-Month average CAAR 
Trailing 12-Month number of mergers 
Trailing 12-Month return on FTSE all 
share index 
Dummy that is one if this is the first 
announcement by the bidder in the prior 
3 years 
Number of mergers by the bidder in the 3 
years prior to the announcement 
Stock Financing 
Other Financing 
Target is public firm 
Target is private firm 
Target is subsidiary 
Market value of bidding firm ( millions 
pounds) 
Book to Market Ratio 
Log (bidder market value) 
Ratio of target to bidder size 
Diversifying merger 
1.2% 
128 
13.9% 
59.4% 
0.71 
5.2% 
94.8% 
2.2% 
57.2% 
40.6% 
101.7 
0.47 
1.63 
2-1. 9% 
40.30/0 
1.230/0 0.9% 
127 41 
11.3% 22.3% 
1 49.1% 
o 1.11 
0 28.5% 
1 38.9% 
0 14.7% 
1 49.5% 
0 49.1% 
40.2 186.2 
0.42 0.47 
1.6 0.55 
15.60/0 24.1% 
0 49 ')0 ._,0 
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Table 4.3 Regression results for the CAR on merger momentum variable 
The sample consists of 1957 U.K mergers announced between1985 to 2002. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnonnal return (CAR). The CAR is defined as 
2 L (R I - R mdex ,t) where Rt is the return on the bidding firm's stock and R Lindex is 
1= - 2 
the return on the FTSE All Share index. The CAR is measured over the five-da\" 
window surrounding the merger announcement for the bidding firm's stock. Trailing 
12 month average cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR) is the average 
CAR for all sample mergers in the 12 months ending 3days before an announcement. 
The significance level is report as t-statistic. 
Dependent variable: CAR 
Independent variables: Merger Momentum Variables 
Trailing 12-month Trailing 12-month 
average CAR number of No. of observations 
Full Sample 
(1985 to 2002) 
Early time period 
(1985 to 1989) 
Later time period 
(1990 to 2002) 
High market 
valuation period 
(1998-2001) 
0.20 
(2.73)** 
-0.34 
(-1.23) 
0.27 
(2.25)** 
0.41 
(2.82)** 
mergersll 000 
-0.008 
( -1.62) 
-0.097 
(-1.98)* 
-0.003 
( -1.56) 
-0.001 
(-2.35)** 
1957 
421 
1536 
810 
*, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 4.4 Regression results/or the CAR on market momentum variable 
The sample consists of 1957 U.K mergers announced between1985 to 1002. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The CAR is defined as 
~ 
I (R 1 - R mdex ,I) where Rt is the return on the bidding firm's stock and R Lindex is 
1= -2 
the return on the FTSE All Share index. The CAR is measured over the five-day 
window surrounding the merger announcement for the bidding firm' s stock. The 
market momentum is proxy by Trailing 12-month FTSE All Share index return which 
is the return on the value-weighted FTSE All Share index in the year ending three 
days before a merger announcement. The significance level is report as t-statistic. 
Dependent variable: CAR 
Independent variables: Market Momentum Variable 
Full Sample 
(1985 to 2002) 
Early time period 
(1985 to 1989) 
Later time period 
(1990 to 2002) 
High market 
valuation period 
portfolio 
Trailing 12 month return on 
FTSE all share index 
0.023 
(0.67) 
0.011 
(1.05) 
0.027 
(1.96)* 
0.035 
(3.71)** 
No. of observations 
1957 
421 
1536 
810 
*, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively 
""!7~ 
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Table 4.5 Regression results for the CAR on bidder specific merger momentum 
variables 
The sample consists of 1957 U.K mergers announced between1985 to 2002. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The CAR is defined as 
2 I (R 1 - R mdex ,I) where Rt is the return on the bidding firm's stock and R I.index is 
1 = - 2 
the return on the FTSE All Share index. The CAR is measured over the five-day 
window surrounding the merger announcement for the bidding firm's stock. The 
bidder specific merger momentum is proxy by the CAR on bidder's last 
announcement, the first merger dummy and the number of mergers by firm in last 3 
years. CAR for the last announcement by the firm is for the most recent merger where 
the target is at least 10% the size of the bidder as long as the merger was announced in 
the three years prior to the current announcement. The first merger dummy is one if 
the firm has made an acquisition in the three years prior to the announcement and zero 
otherwise. The significance level is report as t-statistic. 
DeEendent variable: CAR 
Independent variables: bidder specific merger momentum variables 
CARon First merger Number of No. of 
bidder's last dummy merger by firm observations 
announcement in last 3 years 
Full Sample 0.052 0.002 0.001 1957 
(1985 to 2002) (1.52) (0.41 ) (0.65) 
Early time 0.037 -0.003 0.001 421 
period (1.23) ( -0.43) (1.53) 
(1985 to 1989) 
Later time 0.067 -0.005 0.001 1536 
period (1.88)* (-0.81 ) (0.61) 
(1990 to 2002) 
High market 0.045 0.008 0.003 810 
valuation (2.73)** (3.07)** (1.24) 
period 
portfolio 
~, ... indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively 
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Table 4.6 Regression results for the CAR on bidder specific stock momentum 
The sample consists of 1957 U.K mergers announced between1985 to 2002. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnonnal return (CAR). The CAR is defined as 
2 I (R 1 - R index ,1) where Rt is the return on the bidding finn's stock and R t.index is 
1= -2 
the return on the FTSE All Share index. The CAR is measured over the fi\'e-da\' 
window surrounding the merger announcement for the bidding firm's stock. The 
bidder specific stock momentum is proxy by trailing 12- month BHAR on bidder's 
stock. The buy and hold return (BHAR) on bidder's stock is the return in the 12 
months ending three days before an announcement, which is calculate as 
T T 
I1 (l + R1 ) - Il (l + Rmdex,l) where R( is the return on the bidding firm's stock and 
1=1 1=1 
Rmdex,; is the return on FTSE all share value-weighted index. The significance level is 
report as t-statistic. 
Dependent variable: CAR 
Independent variables: bidder specific stock momentum 
Full Sample 
(1985 to 2002) 
Early time period 
(1985 to 1989) 
Later time period 
(1990 to 2002) 
Trailing 12-month BHAR on 
bidder's stock 
-0.005 
(-1.98)* 
0.009 
(1,56) 
-0.008 
(-2.12)** 
No. of observations 
1957 
421 
1536 
* ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectIvely 
280 
Table 4.7 Regression results for the CAR on control variables 
The sample consists of 1957 U.K mergers announced between1985 to 2002. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The CAR is defined as 
2 I (R 1 - R mdex ,1) where Rt is the return on the bidding firm's stock and R Lindex is 
1= - 2 
the return on the FTSE All Share index. The CAR is measured oyer the five-day 
window surrounding the merger announcement for the bidding firm's stock. Stock 
financing is the percent of mergers that are entirely financed by stock. Other financing 
is the percent of mergers that have some non-stock financing. Target is public. pri\·ate. 
and subsidiary refer to the percent of mergers with that type of target. The ratio of 
target-to-bidder size is the ratio of target equity to bidder equity. Bidder book-to 
market is the book-to-market equity ratio and return on assets. Diversifying merger is 
the percent of mergers where the target and the bidding firm are in different industries. 
The significance level is report as t-statistic. 
Dependent Variable: CAR 
Independent Variable: Control Variables 
Full Sample Early time Later time 
(1985 to 2002) period period 
(1985 to 1989) (1990 to 2002) 
Private target 0.008 0.005 0.009 
(1.95) * (1.43 ) (2.09)* * 
Subsidiary 0.011 0.003 0.012 
(l.72) (0.76) (1.41) 
Stock -0.18 -0.07 -0.09 
Financing (-l.55) (-0.56) ( -0.85) 
Other 0.15 0.08 0.10 
Financing (2.32 )** (2.79)** (1.33) 
Log of total -0.023 -0.006 0.001 
assets ( -0.86) (-1.45) (0.92) 
Ratio of target 0.006 0.013 0.005 
to bidder size (1.73) (1.47) (1.97)* 
Bidder book to 0.005 0.007 0.004 
market (0.87) (0.75) (0.56) 
Diversifying 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
merger (2.55)** (3.67)** ( -1.34) 
No. of 
Observations 1957 421 1536 
......... indicate statistical significance at the 5~o and I % levels respectively 
. 
High market 
valuation 
period 
portfolio 
0.05 
(2.08)** 
0.042 
(1.72) 
-0.06 
(-1.45) 
0.24 
(2.12)** 
O. 004 
(1.98)* 
0.02 
(4.66)** 
0.002 
(2.63)** 
0.001 
( 1.22) 
810 
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Table 4.8 Regression results for the BHAR on CAR and market momentum 
variables 
T T 
The BHAR is defined as IT (l + R ( ) - 11 (1 + R index ,I) (where Rt is the return on 
1=1 1=1 
the bidding firm~s stock and Rindex,t is the return on the FTSE All Share 
value-weighted index. We include acquisitions with at least one year of observations 
after the announcement. The post-announcement window runs from three days after 
an announcement to three years after the announcement. The total window runs from 
two days before an announcement to three years after the announcement. Bidder's 
CAR is the cumulative abnorma,l return around announcement period which is define 
2 
as: I (R 1 - R index ,I) where Rt is the return on the bidding firm's stock and R 
1 = - 2 
t,index is the return on the FTSE All Share index. The CAR is measured over the 
five-day window surrounding the merger announcement for the bidding firm's stock 
We use trailing 12-month FTSE All Share index return which is the return on the 
value weighted FTSE All Share index in the year ending three days before a merger 
announcement to proxy market wide momentum factor. The significance level is 
report as t-statistic. 
Dependent variable: BHAR 
Independent variables: CAR and market momentum variable 
Post announcement 
returns 
Total window 
returns 
High market 
valuation period 
post announcement 
returns 
High market 
valuation period 
total window 
returns 
Bidder's CAR Trailing 12-month 
-l.03 
(-2.76)** 
-l.08 
(-3.35)** 
return on FTSE all Adjusted R-sq 
share index 
-0.l2 
(-1.33) 
-0.34 
(1.67) 
-0.25 
(-2.91)** 
-0.38 
(-2.45)** 
0.038 
0.067 
0.066 
0.051 
...... indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively 
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Table 4.9 Regression results for the BHAR on merger momentum variables 
T T 
The BHAR is defined as D (1 + R,) - D (1 + Rmdex .,) (where Rt is the return on 
the bidding firm's stock and Rindex.t is the return on the FTSE All Share 
value-weighted index. We include acquisitions with at least one year of observations 
after the announcement. The post-announcement window runs from three days after 
an announcement to three years after the announcement. The total \\'indow runs from 
two days before an announcement to three years after the announcement. we proxy 
merger momentum using trailing 12-month average CAR and to capture the merger 
wave we using trailing 12-month number of mergers. Trailing 12-month average 
cumulative abnormal announcement return is the average CAR for all sample mergers 
in the 12 months ending 3 days before an announcement. Trailing 12-month number 
of mergers is the number of sample mergers in the 12 months prior to an 
announcement. The significance level is report as t-statistic. 
Dependent variable: BHAR 
Independent variables: merger momentum \'ariables 
Trailing 12-month Trailing 12-month 
average CAR number of Adjusted R-sq 
Post announcement 
returns 
Total window 
returns 
High market 
valuation period 
post announcement 
returns 
High market 
valuation period 
total window 
returns 
-9.72 
(-5.61)** 
-10.33 
(-1.95)* 
-11.23 
(-4.52)** 
-8.66 
( -2.55)** 
mergerl1 000 
-0.33 
(-0.65) 
0.12 
(0.78) 
-0.27 
(-2.32)** 
-0.11 
(-1.86) 
0.078 
0.041 
0.046 
0.026 
••• indicate statistical significance at the 5°'0 and 100 levels respectively 
, 
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Table 4.10 Regression results/or the BHAR on bidder specific merger momentum 
T T 
The BHAR is defined as D. (1 + R 1 ) - D (1 + R index ,I ) (where Rt is the return on 
the bidding firm's stock and Rindex,t is the return on the FTSE All Share 
value-weighted index. We include acquisitions with at least one year of observations 
after the announcement. The post-announcement window runs from three days after 
an announcement to three years after the announcement. The total v,:indow runs from 
two days before an announcement to three years after the announcement. \\"e proxy 
bidder specific merger momentum by using the CAR on bidder's last announcement. 
first merger dummy and the number of mergers by bidder in last 3 years. CAR for the 
last announcement by the firm is for the most recent merger where the target is at least 
10% the size of the bidder as long as the merger was announced in the three years 
prior to the current announcement. The first merger dummy is one if the firm has 
made an acquisition in the three years prior to the announcement and zero otherwise. 
The significance level is report as t-statistic. 
Dependent variable: BHAR 
Independent variables: bidder specific merger momentum variables 
Post 
announcement 
returns 
Total window 
returns 
High market 
valuation 
period post 
announcement 
returns 
High market 
valuation 
period total 
window 
returns 
CAR on First merger No. of mergers Adjusted R-sq 
bidder's last dummy by bidder in 
announcement last 3 year 
0.15 
(0.44) 
0.21 
(0.87) 
0.35 
(1.75) 
0.28 
(2.12)** 
0.09 
(1.88)* 
0.11 
(1.67) 
0.07 
(2.54)** 
0.12 
(3.89)** 
-0.028 
(-1.76) 
0.012 
(1.98)* 
0.016 
(3.42)** 
0.022 
(2.12)** 
0.033 
0.12 
0.047 
0.071 
*. u, indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively" 
Table 4.11 Regression results for the BHAR on bidder specific stock momelltum 
variable 
T T 
The BHAR is defined as TI (1 + R() - TI (1 + R;ndex,l) (where Rt is the return on 
1=1 1=1 
the bidding firm's stock and Rindex,t is the return on the FTSE All Share 
value-weighted index. We include acquisitions with at least one year of observations 
after the announcement. The post-announcement window runs from three days after 
an announcement to three years after the announcement. The total window runs from 
two days before an announcement to three years after the announcement. To proxy 
bidder specific stock momentum pattern, we using trailing 12 month BHAR on 
bidder's stock which is the buy and hold return on bidder's stock in the 12 months 
ending three days before an announcement. The significance level is report as 
t -statisti c. 
Post 
announcement 
returns 
Total window 
returns 
High market 
valuation 
period post 
announcement 
returns 
High market 
valuation 
period total 
window 
returns 
Dependent variable: BHAR 
Independent variables: bidder specific stock momentum 
Trailing 12-month BHAR on 
bidder's stock 
-0.075 
(-3.26)** 
-0.062 
(-2.67)** 
-0.11 
(-4.87)** 
-0.092 
(-2.55)** 
Adjusted R-sq 
0.033 
0.12 
0.047 
0.071 
*.. indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively. , 
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Table 4.12 Regression results/or the BHAR on control variables 
T T 
The BHAR is defined as q (1 + R,) - D (1 + R;ndex,,) (where Rt is the return on 
the bidding frrm's stock and Rindex,t is the return on the FTSE All Share 
value-weighted index. We include acquisitions with at least one year of observations 
after the announcement. The post-announcement window runs from three days after 
an announcement to three years after the announcement. The total window runs from 
two days before an announcement to three years after the announcement. To proxy 
bidder specific stock momentum pattern, we using trailing 12 month BHAR on 
bidder's stock which is the buy and hold return on bidder's stock in the 12 months 
ending three days before an announcement. The significance level is report as 
t-statistic. 
Dependent variable: BHAR 
Independent variables: bidder specific stock momentum 
Post Total window High market High market 
announcement returns valuation valuation 
returns period post period total 
announcement window 
returns returns 
Private target 0.012 0.037 -0.006 0.021 
(0.34) (0.82) (-0.95) (1.54) 
Subsidiary 0.17 0.092 0.12 0.092 
(2.12)** (1.32) (2.01)* (2.33)** 
Stock -0.053 -0.077 -0.065 -0.042 
Financing (-0.75) (-0.38) (-1.89) (-1.28) 
Other 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.016 
Financing (1.54) (2.55)** (2.88)** (1.66) 
Log of total 0.031 0.023 0.043 0.035 
assets (3.75)** (1.42) (1.66) (2.89)** 
Ratio of target 0.27 0.18 0.11 0.017 
to bidder size (4.45)** (2.35)** (2.29)** (1.97)* 
Bidder book to 0.057 0.053 0.052 0.046 
market (1.19) (2.69)** (2.05)** (0.77) 
Diversifying 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.26 
merger (3.87)** (2.76)** (1.65) (1.53) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.036 0.082 0.058 0.071 
• •• indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively. , , 
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Table 4.13 Long-run porI/olio returns. 
The portfolio return for group j is the average over all months \\"ith at least 10 
observations of, C T PI (t),1 = I l~;l~' - Rindex,1 where jet) consists of acquisitions in 
i= j(l) 
group j for months t-36 through t-1, Nj(t) is the number of acquisitions in jet). and 
Rindex,t is the return on the FTSE all share value-weighted index. The quartiles are 
defined based on monthly averages of the grouping variables. Trailing 12-month 
average cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR) is the average CAR for all 
sample mergers in the 12 months ending 3 days before an announcement. Trailing 
12-month number of mergers is the number of sample mergers in the 12 months prior 
to an announcement. Trailing 12-month FTSE all share index return is the return on 
the value-weighted FTSE all share index in the year ending three days before a 
merger announcement. CAR for the last announcement by the finn is for the most 
recent merger where the target is at least 10% the size of the bidder as long as the 
merger was announced in the three years prior to the current announcement. The buy 
and hold return (BHAR) on bidder's stock is the return in the 12 months ending three 
days before an announcement. 
Top Second Third Bottom t-value of 
quartile quartile quartile Quartile Top minus 
Bottom 
Trailing 12 month -8.67% -6.43% -2.390/0 6.48% 2.62** 
average CAR 
Trailing 12 month 
number of -4.54% -4.290/0 -4.260/0 3.74% 1.29 
mergerl1000 
Trailing 12 month 
return on FTSE all -4.28% -3.69% 2.510/0 -4.550/0 -2.01 * 
share index 
CAR on bidder's last 
announcement -0.83% 2.73% -4.87% 4.76% 1.58 
Trailing 12-month 
BHAR on bidder's -5.34% -3.87% 2.20% 2.93% 1.63 
stock 
CAR -2.61 % -8.36% -6.39% -0.370/0 -1.28 
..... indicate statistical sionificance at the 50 0 and 1 % levels respectively. 
, , ~ 
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Table 4.14 Robustness long-run portfolio returns base on FF 3 factor model 
The regression results in this table represent the monthly abnormal return which 
obtain from the Fama-French three factor model: 
Rep -Rtt =a; +/3;(I\n -Rtt ) +s;CSMBJ +h,(Hlvf4) +E;,t 
Where R p t is the simple monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (either equally 
weighted or value weighted), Rft is the monthly return on three month Treasury bills, 
Rmt is the return on a value weighted market index, 5MBt is the return of 
value-weighted portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, HMLt is the difference in the 
returns of values weighted portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low 
book-to-market stocks. The quartiles are defined based on monthly averages of the 
grouping variables. Trailing 12-month average cumulative abnormal announcement 
return (CAR) is the average CAR for all sample mergers in the 12 months ending 3 
days before an announcement. Trailing 12-month number of mergers is the number of 
sample mergers in the 12 months prior to an announcement. Trailing 12-month FTSE 
all share index return is the return on the value-weighted FTSE all share index in the 
year ending three days before a merger announcement. CAR for the last 
announcement by the firm is for the most recent merger where the target is at least 
10% the size of the bidder as long as the merger was announced in the three years 
prior to the current announcement. The buy and hold return (BHAR) on bidder's stock 
is the return in the 12 months ending three days before an announcement. 
Top quartile Second Third Bottom t-value of 
quartile quartile Quartile Top minus 
Bottom 
Trailing 12 month -5.28% -2.41% 0.29% 3.67% 2.36·* 
average CAR 
Trailing 12 month -2.37% -3.73% -5.09% 1.37% 2.81·* 
number of 
merger/l 000 
Trailing 12 month -5.04% -0.38% 0.87% -2.37% -2.06* 
return on FTSE all 
share index 
CAR on bidder's last -1.65% 0.51% -2.47% 1.82% 1.92 
announcement 
Trailing 12-month 
-3.26% 1.27% 2.61% 0.51 BHAR on bidder's -1.52% 
stock 
CAR -1.29% -4.17% -2.82% -1.07 1.02 
••• indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively. , , 
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Table 4.15 Robustness regression results/or CAR and BHAR on key variables 
when include tender offers 
The sample consists of 2236 U.K mergers announced between1985 to 2002 and 892 
UK mergers during high market valuation period .. The dependent variable is the 
') 
cumulative abnormal return . The CAR is defined as I (R 1 - R Index ,I) The 
1 = - 2 
T T 
BHAR is defined as Il (1 + R 1 ) - Il (1 + R Index ,I ) The CAR is measured over the 
1=1 1=1 
five-day window surrounding the merger announcement for the bidding firm's stock. 
The BHAR post-announcement window runs from three days after an announcement 
to three years after the announcement. The key variables are: Trailing 12 month 
average cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR) is the average CAR for all 
sample mergers in the 12 months ending 3days before an announcement. Trailing 
12-month FTSE All Share index return is the return Trailing 12-month FTSE All 
Share index return is the return on the value-weighted FTSE All Share index in the 
year ending three days before a merger announcement. CAR for the last 
announcement by the firm is for the most recent merger where the target is at least 
10% the size of the bidder as long as the merger was announced in the three years 
prior to the current announcement. The buy and hold return (BHAR) on bidder's stock 
is the return in the 12 months ending three days before an announcement The 
significance level is report as t-statistic. 
Dependent Variable: CAR Dependent Variable: 
BHAR 
Full Sample High market Full Sample High market 
(1985 to 2002) valuation (1985 to 2002) valuation 
period period 
portfolio portfolio 
Trailing 0.18 0.43 -9.55 -9.12 
12-month (2.01) * (2.24)** (-3.09)** (-4.78)** 
average CAR 
Trailing 0.017 0.033 -0.17 -0.32 
12-month return (1.72) (2.16)** (-1.41) (-2.72)** 
on FTSE All 
Share Index 
CARon 
bidder's last 0.058 0.041 0.11 0.26 
announcement ( 1.55) (1.96)* (0.85) ( 1.-+5) 
Trailing 
-0. 11 -0.1-+ I2-month 0.15 0.08 
BHARon (2.32 )** (2.79)** (-1.33) (-2.12)·· 
bidder's stock 
Observations 
'236 892 2236 892 
......... indicate statistical significance at the ~~o and I % levels respectively 
. . 
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Table 4.16 Robustness regression results/or CAR and BHAR on key variables 
when divide sample into public target mergers and private target mergers 
The sample consists of 1957 U.K mergers announced between1985 to 2002. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return. The CAR is defined as 
T T I (R, - R mdex ,,) The BHAR is defined as D (l ~ R,) - D (1 4- Rlndtx .,) 
, = - 2 
the result we present below is for high market valuation period control portfolios. The 
key variables are: Trailing 12 month average cumulative abnormal announcement 
return (CAR) is the average CAR for all sample mergers in the 12 months ending 
3days before an announcement. Trailing 12-month FTSE All Share index return is the 
return Trailing 12-month FTSE All Share index return is the return on the 
value-weighted FTSE All Share index in the year ending three days before a merger 
announcement. CAR for the last announcement by the firm is for the most recent 
merger where the target is at least 10% the size of the bidder as long as the merger 
was announced in the three years prior to the current announcement. The buy and 
hold return (BHAR) on bidder's stock is the return in the 12 months ending three days 
before an announcement The significance level is report as t-statistic. 
Dependent Variable: CAR Dependent Variable: 
BHAR 
Private and Public target Private and Public target 
Subsidiary acquisitions Subsidiary acquisitions 
target target 
acquisitions acquisitions 
Trailing 0.21 0.14 -8.56 -9.71 
12-month (1.21 ) (2.24)** (-3.09)** (-4.78)** 
average CAR 
Trailing 0.012 0.047 -0.097 -0.39 
12-month return (2.43)** (1.16) (-2.92)** ( -1.95)* 
on FTSEAll 
Share Index 
CARon 
bidder's last 0.071 0.025 0.25 0.21 
announcement (2.28)** (0.83) (2.76)** (1. 77) 
Trailing 
12-month 0.095 0.088 -0.31 -0.11 
BHARon (1.21 ) (2.42)** ( -1.59) (-2.75)** 
bidder's stock 
No. of 
Observations 1776 181 1776 181 
• • • indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively . 
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CHAPTERS: CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, several empirical and theoretical issues concerning the characteristics of 
bidding firms have been resolved, that is, the strategies and performance in M&As. In 
order to answer the big question, "do shareholders gain from corporate acquisitions?" 
Several performance determinants identified in the previous literature were 
intensively examined. In addition, some important characteristics associated with the 
UK merger market have been discussed in depth. These include such things as 
non-public targets, the large proportion of cash deals. bidders with high frequency 
bidding activities, and merger momentums. This study is very important in terms of 
understanding the intrinsic driving force of corporate takeovers and reveals the 
determinants of a successful merger deal. At the same time, some factors examined in 
this thesis are believed to playa foremost role in shaping the shareholder's gain from 
acquiring firms. Therefore, this study not only fills in the gaps in the existing 
corporate finance literature, but also creates new avenues for future investigation. 
The thesis first addressed the issue of the linkage between causes and consequences of 
UK mergers, and empirically investigated bidders' outcomes according to the method 
of payment, the target's ownership status, and the bidder's bidding frequency. Over 
900/0 of the bidders exhibited a substantial price run-up before the merger 
announcement, which suggests that mergers are the outcome of good stock 
performance rather than the cause. Secondly, this work offers empirical evidence to 
support the stock-price driven acquisition hypothesis. Using a large up to date UK 
sample a positive relationship was found between market-wide valuation levels and 
bidders' announcement period returns, with a significant negative relationship in the 
long-run. Furthermore, this is the first study of the merger momentum issue to be 
carried out in the UK, and confirms the existence of merger momentum in the UK 
market. More specifically, the focus has been on the interaction between broad market 
conditions and the market's response to merger announcements, and it was found that 
the momentum effect, that is, the market's reaction to a merger, is positively 
correlated with the response to other mergers in the recent past. This finding could 
help to resolve much of the confusion associated with bidders' gains from mergers. 
Finally, in the second and third chapters the issues of frequent bidder's acquisitions 
and non-public target acquisitions were investigated from different angles, which 
yielded many important findings. 
Chapter 2 is the first empirical chapter, and addresses the issue of the causes and 
consequences for mergers. Apart from other takeover motivations identified in the 
previous literature, the bidder's pre-announcement stock performance was examined 
in order to find out the direct cause of takeover activities. Based on the large UK 
domestic takeover sample, which comprised 6,423 successful deals and 1,367 bidders, 
it was found that over 90% of the bidders exhibited substantial price run-ups prior to 
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the takeover announcement. This price run-up was about 11.8% for the whole sample 
during the twenty-four months before the acquisition announcement, and was 
extremely high for those bidders using stock as the method of payment, where it 
reached a peak of 20.62%, whereas for bidders using cash it was around 12.36%. The 
sample was also divided by the target's ownership status, and it was found that 
bidders involved in non-public target deals exhibited higher price run-ups. However, 
when looking at long-run post-acquisition performances a significant decline was seen 
in the bidders' stock returns, in general there was a -16.47% decline within 
twenty-four months of the announcement date, which is statistically significant. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that merger is the outcome of good 
performance rather than the cause. Subsequently, the notion that it is better for a firm 
to grow though a large number of small acquisitions rather than through a small 
number of large acquisitions was tested. The results are consistent with the hypothesis 
and show that the bidders' returns are positively related to the number of acquisitions 
made and negatively related to the relative size of the assets acquired. 
Furthermore, a test was conducted on the bidders' announcement period performances 
according to the target's ownership status. Over all the sample periods the five-day 
CAR was 1.52%, which is statistically significant. For bidders engaged in public 
target acquisition, the five-day CAR was -0.67 with a t value equal to -4.81, and for 
non-public target acquisitions, the bidders' gain was 1.71 % over the five-day 
announcement period with a t value equal to 15.06. An interesting discovery was 
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made when looking at the short-run results, which led to the next stage of the 
empirical test. A very high short-run CAR was found for both the public and 
non-public target acquisitions during the years with high volume merger activities (i.e. 
1989, and 1996 to 1998). This result held when the robustness issues were controlled 
for, which suggests that there must be some unknown factors driving bidders' 
performances. One of the common factors found for these years was the high volume 
of merger activity and high market valuation levels compared to other years in the 
sample. It is therefore suspected that market valuation levels are one of the driving 
forces of merger activity and also the important determinant of the bidder's 
performance. This raises the question of whether stock price levels or market 
valuation alter the level of merger activity and hence influence bidders' performances. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the above questions and delivers an empirical analysis. A 
different sample of UK domestic acquisitions was used here, which ranged from 1985 
to 2003 and comprised 4,591 successful deals. The monthly PIE ratio of the 
TOTMKUK index was used to place each month into an above (below)-average 
group if the de-trended PIE of that month was above (below) the past five-year 
average. The months were then ranked in order of the de-trended PIE. The top half of 
the above average months were classified as high valuation months and the bottom 
half of the below average months were classified as low valuation months. All other 
months were classified as neutral valuation months. Of the 4,591 acquisitions in the 
sample, 1,374 occurred dwing high valuation months, 2,133 during neutral valuation 
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months, and 1,082 during low valuation months. 
It was found that deals initiated in high market valuation periods received 
significantly higher short-run returns than those initiated in low market valuation 
periods (1.95% to 1.33% in general). These results held even after the target's 
ownership status, the method of payment, and the bidder's bidding frequency were 
controlled for, which suggests that stock market valuation is indeed a significant 
deterministic factor of a bidder's short-run performance. In order to understand how 
market valuation levels influence bidders' returns in the long-run, a further test was 
conducted on the bidders' returns on the thirty-six months following the merger 
announcement. In general, it was found that the returns were insignificant in the 
long_runI02. However, the difference between deals made in high valuation periods 
and those made in low valuation periods was significant. It was also found that there 
was a great reversal in the results, where the deals initiated in the low market 
valuation periods significantly out-performed those initiated in high valuation periods. 
Such a result indicates that the market initially rewards the acquirer who makes deals 
in high market valuation periods when the stock prices are in general above their 
fundamental values. However, these overvaluation bubbles will eventually burst when 
there are no substantial earnings to support such high prices. In contrast, for 
low-valuation acquisitions, the market is initially cautious, but comes to believe over 
102 The long-run test was conducted using both Fama-French three factor model and the standard 
CAPM. For former an insignificant positive return of 0.22% was obtained, while the latter gave an 
insignificant negative return of 
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time that such mergers are likely to have better combining synergy and hence better 
growth potential. Furthermore, the long-run investigation resulted in a unique 
discovery, which was that frequent bidders out-perfonned infrequent bidders for deals 
initiated during low market valuation periods. This suggests that frequent bidders are 
more easily affected by market sentiment and hence are very careful to in their choice 
of target when the market valuation is low. This rmding is important in tenns of 
suggesting that the rationality of frequent bidders changes according to the level of 
the market valuation. They are more prone to merger deals and have fewer concerns 
about the future prospects of the deal when the market is very hot, but are much more 
cautious about merger deals in low market valuation periods. The relationship 
between a bidder's rationality and the market valuation level can be partially 
explained by the management overconfidence hypothesis, and the organizational 
learning hypothesis, but for a deeper understanding, this surely requires further 
investigation. 
Based on the findings discussed so far, it is known that market valuation certainly 
plays an important role as a determinant of a bidder's performance. Furthermore, the 
fact that mergers come in waves, leads to the hypothesis that merger momentum 
exists in markets where one merger deal correlates with the deals of the recent past; 
where the market has been reacting favourably to the merger announcements, it tends 
to continue to do so. Chapter 4 focuses on the merger momentum issue by justifying 
the existence of the momentum pattern and then investigates its sources. 
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To defme merger momentum, the correlation between the market reaction to a merger 
announcement and recent market conditions, and to bidder-specific merger activity, 
bidder-specific stock momentum, and deal-specific control variables were measured. 
The merger momentum variables were proxied using the last twelve-month average 
CARs of all the mergers in the sample and the numbers of merger deals in the last 
twelve months. Both variables were found to be significant during high market 
valuation periods, and this led to an investigation of the sources of merger 
momentum. 
Looking .at the interaction between bidders' short-run and long-run returns enabled the 
identification of the main driving force behind merger momentum. If the short-run 
returns reveal the true synergy gains from the merger then no associated long-run drift 
should be found. However, the results show that the bidders' short-run returns were 
reversed in the long- run. Similar to that found in previous studies, the acquisitions 
announced in the high market valuation periods led to a significant long-run decline. 
These results are consistent with the investor sentiment hypothesis and are important 
in explaining such long-run drifts. If investors expect a broad range of mergers to 
create synergies, then they should react positively to merger announcements. However, 
if investor expectations are based more on optimistic beliefs than on fundamental 
values, the short-run increase in the bidder's stock price should be reversed in the 
long-run when this optimistic belief is replaced by reality as the track record of the 
merger becomes known. 
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The concern of fmancial analysts operates in addition to investor sentiment. Financial 
analysts are always optimistic during high market valuation periods (Jensen 2004). 
Hence, they will set up unrealistic earning targets for the firm. Managers who fail to 
meet those targets face punishment by disappointed investors, so they have to boost 
the share price to play the earnings game, and the M&A is the perfect medium for this. 
At the same time, managers are as easily infected by optimism resulting from past 
success as ordinary investors. Consequently, they will initiate merger deals in order to 
meet analysts' expectations rather than out of proper concern for the synergy from the 
deal, and thus these bad deals will (in most cases) reveal their true quality and result 
in long-run losses. 
In general, studying the merger momentum effect contributes to a deeper 
understanding of how and why the market's reaction to merger announcements differs 
so greatly across time and with different market valuation levels. Merger momentum 
also reinforces the previous fmdings that market valuation plays a determinative role 
in the bidder's performance. 
In short, the major contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1. It was found that over 90% of the bidders exhibited substantial price run-ups prior 
to a merger announcement, which it· can be argued is the direct cause of corporate 
takeover activities. However, there were also significant price declines following 
merger announcements, which suggests that mergers are the outcome of good 
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performance rather than the cause. 
2. The investigation into frequent bidder acquisitions has important implications for 
bidding firm managers as it clearly shows that it is better to achieye gro\\1h through 
many small acquisitions over a period of time than through a small number of large 
acquisitions. 
3. It was found that market valuations significantly influence the bidder"s 
performance in both the short-run and long-run. The implication of these findings for 
bidding firm managers is that they need to be very careful in their choice of target 
when the overall market valuation is high, because long-run reversal is most likely to 
occur when deals are made in high market valuation periods. 
4. Frequent bidders were found to be more likely to be affected hy market sentiment. 
In the long-run they under-performed compared to infrequent bidders for deals 
initiated during high valuation periods, and out-performed the infrequent bidders for 
deals initiated during low market valuation periods. The overconfidence hypothesis 
and organizationalleaming hypothesis have been put forward to explain these results. 
5. This thesis is the fist empirical study on the merger momentum issue to be 
undertaken in the UK. The results show the existence of merger momentum in the UK 
market. An empirical analysis of the origins of merger momentum has been conducted 
and several theoretical explanations for this momentum pattern haye been offered. 
The findings of this research are important because the merger momentum hypothesis 
serves as another creditable explanation for bidders" short-run and long-run 
performance. 
6.2 PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Whist this thesis makes several contributions to the existing literature, it also opens 
the door to a number of interesting issues which may be addressed by future research. 
In Chapter 2 it was found that bidders exhibit significant price run-ups prior to merger 
deals, and that acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries yield positive short-run 
returns. However, in the long-run these acquisitions lead to negative returns. These 
findings raise a number of questions. If the price run-up is due to the good 
performance of the bidder, then why is a sudden decline in price observed one month 
after the merger? Furthermore, if overvaluation and managerial concerns drive 
mergers, a large amount of insider trading in the period prior to the merger should be 
expected. The central issue drawn from Chapter 2 that is ripe for future research is the 
examination of whether acquisitions undertaken by overvalued companies are driven 
by managerial self-interest at the expense of shareholders. This issue could be 
examined by using managers' personal trading decisions as windows into their beliefs 
concernIng their firms' valuations. If a manager's motive for undertaking an 
acquisition is their belief that the share pnce is overvalued, the same private 
information presents opportunities for trading by insider. If there are other reasons for 
trading, managers of overvalued acquirers should be expected to be the net sellers of 
their stock. Moreover, examining insider trading by acquiring firms will shed light on 
whether mergers are motivated by managerial self-interest. Based on Jensen's 
agency-driven explanation for acquisitions using overvalued equities, a strong 
relationship should be seen between insider selling and the acquisition announcement. 
300 
Thus, acqUIrIng finns need to constantly gIve out good news to the market to 
stimulate price levels, and a poor long-run post-acquisition performance should be 
seen because of a lack of synergies in the deals. 
Chapters 2 and 3 both focus on frequent bidder acquisitions. and it is found that 
frequent bidders accumulate experience from acquisitions they have made in the past. 
The empirical evidence shows that it is better for a firm to grow through many small 
acquisitions than through a small number of large acquisitions. However. the 
examination of the mechanism of this learning process is beyond the remit of this 
thesis, there is a plan to carry out such an investigation in the future. More specifically. 
the plan is to study empirically how post-acquisition decisions and learning from 
previous acquisition experience affect the long-term performance of acquiring firms. 
It is hoped that this future research will focus on the way acquisitions are managed 
after completion. Is the target finn integrated within the structures and operations of 
the acquiring finn. or has it been kept independent as a stand-alone unit? Are 
resources, such as senior managers, brand names, and physical facili ties being 
retained or replaced? Through these decisions and the actions taken to implement 
them. the acquiring firm creates or destroys value for its shareholders. These aspects 
of M&A have so far been left largely unexplored and unexplained by the literature 
and demand a further thorough investigation. 
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